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My	   PhD	   research	   adopts	   an	   institutional	   approach	   to	   understanding	   biodiversity	   conservation	  
governance	   and	   identifying	   options	   for	   reform.	   The	   focus	   of	  my	   PhD	   is	   on	   how	   institutions	   and	  
actors1	  enable	  (and	  constrain)	  collective	  action	  to	  conserve	  biodiversity	  and	  respond	  to	  drivers	  and	  
disturbances.	  This	  literature	  review	  summarises	  the	  key	  concepts,	  theories,	  and	  paradigms	  that	  will	  
underpin	  my	  research	  and	  have	  influenced	  its	  design	  and	  methods.	  Specific	  information	  about	  the	  
study	  areas,	  policy	  context,	  and	  the	  full	  suite	  of	  methods	  selected	  for	  the	  study	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  
Programme	  of	  Study.	  	  
	  
1	   Institutions	  
1.1	   Definition	  and	  Attributes	  of	  Institutions	  
The	   term	   institution	   has	   no	   single	   or	   standard	   definition,	   and	   the	   term	   is	   used	   differently	  
depending	   on	   the	   disciplinary	   perspective	   and	   context.	   Broadly,	   institutions	   can	   be	   described	   as	  
“systems	   of	   established	   and	   prevalent	   social	   rules	   that	   structure	   social	   interactions”	   (Hodgson,	  
2006;	   p.	   2).	   Hodgson	   (2006)	   contends	   that	   the	   prevalence	   of	   institutions	  makes	   them	   the	  most	  
important	   structures	   in	   the	   social	   realm.	   Institutions	   structure	   daily	   life	   and	   guide	   human	  
interactions	   (North,	   1990),	   and	   profoundly	   affect	   the	   beliefs,	   thoughts,	   and	   behaviours	   of	  
individuals	  and	  collective	  entities	  (Lawrence	  and	  Suddaby,	  2006).	   Institutions	  can	  be	  described	  as	  
performance	  scripts,	  as	  they	  guide	  actors’	  behaviour	  and	  assign	  roles	  (Garud	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  They	  can	  
be	   formal	   (e.g.	   laws	   and	   constitutions)	   or	   informal	   (e.g.	   norms,	   strategies,	   codes	   of	   conduct).	  
Although	  they	  can	  be	  tangible	  statements	  on	  paper,	   the	  concept	  of	  an	   institution	  extends	  to	  the	  
more	   abstract,	   often	   unspoken,	   structure	   of	   economic	   markets,	   marriage,	   church,	   and	   family	  
(Ostrom,	   1990;	   Ostrom,	   2005;	   Young,	   2002a).	   While	   these	   definitions	   describe	   institutions	   in	   a	  
broad	   sense,	   more	   precise	   definitions	   are	   generally	   adopted	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   institutional	  
analysis;	  and	  these	  definitions	  vary.	  
	  
The	   variation	   in	   institutional	   definitions	   reflects	   the	   diversity	   not	   only	   of	   the	   institutions	  
themselves	   but	   also	   of	   institutional	   research.	   The	   decision	   to	   adopt	   a	   particular	   definition	   of	   an	  
institution	   can	  be	  based	  on	   a	  number	  of	   considerations,	   including	   the	   theoretical	   perspective	  of	  
the	  research	  question,	  the	  time	  scale	  and	  topic	  of	  interest,	  and	  pragmatic	  considerations	  (Crawford	  
and	  Ostrom,	  1995).	  Rules	  are	  a	  common	  feature	  of	  most	  definitions,	  although	  what	  characterises	  a	  
rule	   and	   how	   these	   rules	   should	   be	   organised	   is	   often	   debated.	   This	   is	   why	   descriptions	   of	  
institutions	   often	   include	   ‘social’	   rules,	   emphasising	   that	   informal	   rules	   are	   also	   institutions	  
(Hodgson,	   2006).	   Although	   some	   analysts	   focus	   only	   on	  written	   institutions	   (i.e.	   rules-­‐on-­‐paper),	  
much	   of	   the	   recent	   literature	   acknowledges	   that	   institutions	   evolve	   over	   time	   and	  may	   deviate	  
substantially	   from	   their	   documented	  origins,	   even	   though	  participants	   know	   them	  well	   (Ostrom,	  
1990).	   These	   are	   commonly	   called	   rules-­‐in-­‐use	   or	   alternatively	   working	   rules.	   Ostrom	   (1990)	  
defines	   working	   rules	   as	   those	   prescriptions	   that	   are	  monitored	   and	   enforced	   by	   those	   directly	  
involved.	  Although	  actors	  may	   know	   these	  unwritten	   rules	   very	  well,	   such	  unspoken	   institutions	  
can	   be	   difficult	   to	   study	   because	   they	   are	   often	   tacit.	   Despite	   this	   challenge,	   the	   contemporary	  
institutionalist	   literature	   emphasises	   rules-­‐in-­‐use	   and	   other	   informal	   institutions	   that	   influence	  
daily	  practices,	  as	  they	  can	  provide	  access	  to	  the	  underlying	  structures	  of	  society.	  	  
	  
Drawing	  primarily	  from	  the	  sociology	  and	  political	  science	  literature,	  institutions	  are	  defined	  in	  this	  
PhD	   research	   as	   the	   habitualised	   behaviour, prescriptions,	   and	   concepts	   (e.g.	   rules,	   norms,	  
strategies,	  decision-­‐making	  procedures,	  beliefs)	   that	  structure	  social	  practices	  and	  assign	  roles	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  ‘Actors’	  refer	  to	  both	  individuals	  and	  organisations.	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actors	  who	  participate	  in	  these	  practices	  (Adger,	  2000;	  Garud	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Healey,	  2006a;	  Ostrom,	  
2005;	  Young,	  2002a).	  The	  habitual	  element	  of	  institutions	  is	  important,	  and	  it	  arises	  from	  repeated	  
interactions	   (Ostrom,	   2005).	   A	   habit	   is	   a	   propensity	   to	   perform	   the	   same	   act	   under	   similar	  
conditions	  or	   in	   a	   similar	   context,	   and	   it	   is	   habit	   that	  provides	   one	  psychological	  mechanism	   for	  
rule-­‐following	  behaviour	  (Hodgson,	  2006).	  Not	  all	  habits	  are	  institutions,	  and	  the	  point	  at	  which	  a	  
habit	   becomes	   an	   institution	   can	   be	   difficult	   to	   identify.	   Hodgson	   (2006)	   contends	   that	   a	   habit	  
becomes	  a	  rule	  –	  and	  thus	  an	  institution	  –	  when	  it	  is	  prevalent	  among	  a	  group,	  acquires	  normative	  
content,	   and	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   be	   codified.	   The	   definition	   of	   institutions	   adopted	   here	   is	  
inclusive,	   as	   it	   includes	   behaviour,	   strategies,	   rules,	   norms,	   and	   other	   concepts,	   rather	   than	   just	  
focusing	  on	  one	  element	  of	  institutions.	  This	  means	  it	  is	  broad	  enough	  to	  accommodate	  the	  wide	  
range	   of	   institutions	   that	   are	   relevant	   to	   biodiversity	   conservation.	   The	   theoretical	   perspectives	  
discussed	   in	   this	   literature	   review,	  many	  of	  which	  emphasise	   the	   role	  of	  both	  structures	  and	  the	  
agency	  of	  actors	  and	  the	  broader	  socio-­‐cultural	  contexts,	  have	   influenced	  this	  decision.	  Adoption	  
of	   this	   definition	   is	   also	   practical	   because	   it	   is	   consistent	   with	   those	   that	   dominate	   the	  
contemporary	  institutionalist	  literature	  from	  which	  this	  research	  will	  draw.	  	  
	  
Several	   additional	   features	   of	   institutions	   are	   worth	   noting.	   Most	   of	   the	   institutional	   literature	  
discusses	   or	   alludes	   to	   the	   role	   of	   institutions	   in	   fundamentally	   shaping	   actor	   behaviour	   and	  
capacity.	  Much	  institutional	  research	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  constraining	  and	  controlling	  attributes	  of	  
institutions	   to	   explain	   how	   institutions	   contribute	   to	   the	   persistence	   and	   homogeneity	   of	  
phenomena	   (Dacin	   et	   al.,	   2002).	   These	   attributes	   are	   important,	   as	   institutions	  make	   social	   and	  
economic	  coordination	  possible	  by	  generating	  tacit	  understanding	  and	  expectation,	  ensuring	  every	  
interaction	   does	   not	   turn	   into	   a	   negotiation	   (Connor	   and	   Dovers,	   2004).	   Although	   institutions	  
create	  structure	  and	  predictability,	  they	  are	  not	  just	  forces	  that	  restrain	  actors.	  They	  also	  have	  the	  
capacity	   to	  enable	   individual	  behaviour	   (Hodgson,	  2006;	  North,	   1990).	   Institutions	   can	  empower	  
and	  support	  actors	  by	  providing	  guidelines	  on	  how	  to	  act	  (Scott,	  2001).	  Institutions	  have	  thus	  been	  
called	   a	   “two-­‐edged	   sword”	   for	   their	   dual	   actions	   of	   enabling	   interaction	   and	   providing	   stability	  
and	  certainty	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	  and	  preventing	   reform	  and	  codifying	  existing	  power	   relations	  on	  
the	   other	   (Klijn	   and	   Koppenjan,	   2006).	   Although	   these	   attributes	   of	   institutions	   are	   widely	  
recognised,	   there	   are	   differences	   in	   how	   researchers	   explain	   the	   observed	   regularities	   and	   the	  
mechanisms	  by	  which	  institutions	  shape	  behaviour.	  
	  
The	   manner	   in	   which	   institutions	   are	   defined	   varies	   in	   part	   because	   explanations	   of	   how	  
institutions	  create	  patterns	  of	  behaviour	  vary.	  Crawford	  and	  Ostrom	  (1995)	  summarise	  three	  broad	  
views	  of	  these	  structures:	  institutions	  as	  equilibria	  (or	  shared	  strategies),	  institutions	  as	  rules,	  and	  
institutions	  as	  norms:	  
• The	   institutions-­‐as-­‐equilibria	   approach	   views	   institutions	   as	   stable	   patterns	   of	   behaviour	  
that	   arise	   from	  actor	   preferences	   and	   the	  pursuit	   and	  optimisation	  of	   these	  preferences	  
(Crawford	   and	   Ostrom,	   1995).	   Actor	   behaviour	   can	   thus	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   logic	   of	  
calculation	   between	   prior	   preferences	   and	   anticipated	   consequences	   (March	   and	   Olsen,	  
1998),	  and	  patterns	  of	  behaviour	  in	  this	  view	  are	  sustained	  by	  mutual	  understandings.	  The	  
contemporary	  roots	  of	  these	  views	  are	  primarily	  works	  of	  political	  scientists	  (Crawford	  and	  
Ostrom,	  1995).	  	  
• The	  perspective	  that	  conceives	  of	  institutions-­‐as-­‐rules	  focuses	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  prescribing,	  
allowing,	   or	   requiring	   actions,	   and	   how	   this	   creates	   observed	   patterns	   of	   interactions.	  
Actions	  that	  are	  inconsistent	  with	  these	  prescriptions	  are	  ineffective	  or	  may	  be	  sanctioned	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by	  actors	  with	  the	  authority	  to	  impose	  punishment.	  The	  origins	  of	  this	  view	  rest	  primarily	  
in	  economics	  (Crawford	  and	  Ostrom,	  1995).	  
• In	   the	   institutions-­‐as-­‐norms	   view,	   actor	  behaviour	   is	   based	  on	  a	   logic	  of	   appropriateness	  
and	   sense	  of	   identity	   (March	  and	  Olsen,	  1998).	   Patterns	  of	  behaviour,	   in	   this	   view,	  have	  
their	  origins	   in	   shared	  group	  perceptions	  of	  what	   is	  proper	  and	   improper	  behaviour	   in	  a	  
particular	   situation.	   This	   perspective	   has	   its	   roots	   in	   sociology,	   and	   requires	   an	  
understanding	   of	   the	   group’s	   shared	   belief	   about	   normative	   obligations	   (Crawford	   and	  
Ostrom,	  1995).	  	  
The	   three	   views	   are	   not	  mutually	   exclusive,	   although	   traditionally	   disciplinary	   perspectives	  were	  
often	   associated	   with	   fairly	   narrow	   perspectives	   of	   institutions.	   For	   example,	   economists	   have	  
often	   focused	   on	   institutions	   as	   prescriptions	   or	   rules.	   	   However,	   in	   contemporary	   literature	  
definitions	   seem	   to	   be	   much	   broader	   and	   incorporate	   all	   three	   elements	   (e.g.	   Ostrom,	   1990,	  
Ostrom,	   2005,	   Young,	   2002a,	   Healey	   2006a,	   Healey	   2006b,	   Scott,	   2001,	   Garud	   et	   al.	   2007).	  
Crawford	   and	   Ostrom	   (1995)	   incorporate	   all	   three	   of	   these	   elements	   in	   their	   examination	   of	  
institutional	  statements.	  They	  offer	  a	  grammar	  tool	  to	  study	  institutional	  statements,	  which	  will	  be	  
employed	  in	  my	  PhD	  (Section	  8.2.4).	  	  
	  
Although	  these	  three	  views	  will	  inform	  examination	  of	  institutional	  statements,	  my	  PhD	  will	  draw	  
mainly	  on	  the	  perspective	  offered	  by	  Scott	  (2001).	  He	  describes	  three	  pillars	  that	  are	  considered	  to	  
be	  essential	   ingredients	  of	   institutions:	  regulative,	  normative,	  and	  cultural-­‐cognitive.	  These	  pillars	  
differ	   slightly	   to	   the	   three	   previous	   views	   (Crawford	   and	   Ostrom,	   1995).	   In	   Scott’s	   (2001)	   view,	  
institutions	  guide	  behaviour:	  
• through	  coercion	  and	  the	  threat	  of	  formal	  sanction	  (regulative);	  	  
• through	  norms	  of	  acceptability,	  morality,	  and	  ethics	  (normative);	  and	  
• through	   the	   categories	   and	   frames	   through	  which	   actors	   interpret	   their	  world	   (cultural-­‐
cognitive).	  
All	  three	  of	  these	  pillars	  support	  institutions	  and	  generate	  compliance	  through	  expedience,	  social	  
obligation,	   and	   shared	   understandings	   (Scott,	   2001).	   Although	   contemporary	   definitions	   of	  
institutions	   now	   tend	   to	   incorporate	   all	   three	   elements,	   differences	   in	   emphasis	   are	   still	   quite	  
evident	   in	  practice.	   The	  divide	   is	  most	  evident	  between	   those	   that	   focus	  on	   regulative	  elements	  
and	   those	   that	   focus	   on	   normative	   and/or	   cultural-­‐cognitive	   origins	   of	   behaviour	   (Ritzer,	   2005).	  
Institutional	  scholars	  can	  also	  be	  divided	  according	  to	  the	  different	  models	  they	  adopt	  to	  explain	  
how	  institutions	  act	  as	  a	  causal	  force.	  	  
	  
In	   addition	   to	   views	   on	   how	   institutions	   create	   patterns	   of	   behaviour,	   there	   are	   also	  models	   to	  
explain	  how	  they	  affect	  decision-­‐making	  and	  actor	  behaviour.	  Young	  (2002a)	  identifies	  two	  clusters	  
of	   models	   in	   the	   institutional	   literature,	   which	   he	   calls	   collective-­‐action	   and	   social-­‐practice.	  
Although	   the	   name	   can	   cause	   some	   confusion,	   the	   collective-­‐action	   model	   does	   not	   refer	  
specifically	  to	  the	  broader	  concept	  of	  collective	  action;	  rather	  it	  refers	  to	  a	  cluster	  of	  models	  based	  
on	   economic	   rational	   choice.	   Collective-­‐action	  models	   view	   actors	   as	   economic	   rationalists	   who	  
make	  decisions	  based	  on	  utilitarian	  calculations	  (e.g.	  cost	  versus	  benefit)	  (Young,	  2002a).	  This	  view	  
is	   called	   the	   collective-­‐action	  model	   because	   it	   focuses	   on	   institutions	   as	   products	   of	   collective	  
interests	   that	   increase	   cooperation	   because	   actors	   have	   an	   interest	   in	   avoiding	   joint	   losses	   or	  
reaping	   joint	   gains	   (Hardin,	   1982;	   North,	   1990;	   Ostrom,	   1990;	   Young,	   2002a).	   Social-­‐practice	  
models	   are	   sociological	   and	   anthropological	   in	   origin.	   Accordingly,	   actor	   behaviour	   originates	   in	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culture,	  norms,	  and	  habits.	   Institutions,	   in	  this	  view,	  provide	  the	  social	  practices	  that	  shape	  actor	  
identity,	  and	  actors	  seek	  to	  behave	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  their	  roles.	  The	  model	  does	  not	  
hinge	  on	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  utilitarian	  calculations	  of	  actors,	  instead	  relying	  on	  the	  role	  of	  routine	  and	  
habit	  as	  driving	  forces	  behind	  institutions	  (Young,	  2002a).	  The	  basic	  features	  of	  these	  models	  are	  
outlined	   in	   Table	   1,	   followed	   by	   a	   summary	   of	   the	   implications	   of	   these	   models	   for	   designing	  
effective	   environmental	   regimes	   in	   Table	   2.	   Although	   the	  models	   have	   their	   origins	   in	   different	  
disciplines,	   working	   within	   a	   particular	   discipline	   does	   not	   confine	   a	   researcher	   to	   a	   particular	  
model.	  My	  PhD	  will	  draw	  primarily	  upon	  the	  social-­‐practice	  model.	  	  
Table	  1.	  Summary	  of	  collective-­action	  and	  social-­practice	  models	  
Category	   Collective-­‐Action	  Models	   Social-­‐Practice	  Models	  
Summary	  of	  
model	  
Draws	  on	  economics	  and	  public	  choice	  
theory	  to	  explain	  actor	  behaviour	  in	  terms	  
of	  rational	  choices	  based	  on	  utilitarian	  
calculations.	  
Draws	  on	  sociology	  and	  anthropology	  to	  
explain	  behaviour	  in	  terms	  of	  culture,	  
norms,	  and	  habits,	  with	  choices	  driven	  by	  





Regimes	  are	  devices	  created	  by	  actors	  
seeking	  to	  avoid	  or	  alleviate	  collective	  
action	  problems.	  Regimes	  can	  affect	  
incentives	  to	  change	  behaviour.	  
Regimes	  are	  arrangements	  that	  give	  rise	  
to	  social	  practices	  that	  shape	  the	  identity	  
of	  actors,	  generate	  common	  discourses,	  
and	  draw	  participants	  into	  routines	  or	  
habits.	  	  
Actor	  identity	   Actors	  have	  identities	  that	  pre-­‐date	  and	  
are	  largely	  unaffected	  by	  institutional	  
arrangements.	  Actors	  are	  generally	  viewed	  
as	  unitary	  parties	  that	  are	  formally	  part	  of	  
the	  regime	  (e.g.	  through	  signing	  
agreements).	  	  
Actors	  express	  their	  interests	  and	  even	  
conceive	  of	  their	  identity	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
membership	  in	  a	  regime,	  engaging	  in	  
behaviour	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  this	  role.	  
Actors	  are	  viewed	  more	  broadly	  and	  less	  
formally,	  and	  can	  even	  include	  individuals	  
that	  are	  not	  formally	  part	  of	  the	  regime.	  
Sources	  of	  
behaviour	  
Narrow	  sources	  of	  behaviour,	  i.e.	  
assessment	  of	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  
individual	  options	  to	  maximise	  net	  benefit	  
(‘logic	  of	  consequences’).	  	  
Wider	  sources	  of	  behaviour,	  i.e.	  
complying	  with	  commitments	  because	  
they	  are	  authoritative	  or	  legitimate	  (‘logic	  
of	  appropriateness’),	  because	  of	  habit,	  or	  
because	  of	  socialisation.	  	  
Social	  
constraints	  
Specific	  choices	  stand	  alone	  in	  that	  they	  
are	  either	  not	  embedded	  in	  the	  larger	  
social	  environment	  or	  this	  environment	  
can	  be	  incorporated	  into	  the	  actor’s	  
calculations.	  	  
Context	  is	  an	  external	  constraint	  (and/or	  
opportunity)	  on	  those	  that	  engage	  in	  
interactive	  decision-­‐making.	  	  
Sources:	  Young,	  2002a;	  Young,	  2008	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Table	  2.	  Implications	  of	  models	  for	  designing	  effective	  environmental	  regimes.	  
Category	   Collective-­‐Action	  Models	   Social-­‐Practice	  Models	  
Compliance	   Actors	  will	  comply	  if	  they	  are	  convinced	  
the	  benefits	  of	  compliance	  outweigh	  the	  
costs	  of	  non-­‐compliance.	  Regimes	  thus	  are	  
designed	  with	  mechanisms	  to	  change	  this	  
ratio	  in	  favour	  of	  compliance.	  	  
Compliance	  less	  of	  a	  concern,	  as	  it	  is	  not	  
decided	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.	  As	  long	  
as	  rules	  are	  accepted	  as	  legitimate	  or	  
authoritative,	  this	  induces	  feelings	  of	  
propriety.	  Routines	  and	  habits	  become	  




Market-­‐based	  instruments	  are	  preferred	  
over	  command-­‐and-­‐control	  regulations	  for	  
both	  effectiveness	  and	  efficiency.	  
Command-­‐and-­‐control	  regulations	  are	  
generally	  favoured	  for	  high	  levels	  of	  
conformance.	  Some	  researchers	  do	  not	  
favour	  market-­‐based	  instruments	  because	  
they	  can	  legitimise	  behaviour	  that	  falls	  
short	  by	  making	  compliance	  and	  
fulfilment	  of	  commitment	  into	  
commodities	  (e.g.	  bad	  behaviour	  is	  okay,	  
as	  long	  as	  it’s	  paid).	  	  
Behavioural	  
Consistency	  
Actor	  behaviour	  is	  consistent	  because	  it	  is	  
based	  on	  careful	  calculations	  and	  
participation	  in	  the	  regime	  does	  not	  
change	  their	  identity.	  
Individually	  and	  collectively,	  behaviour	  
can	  vary	  substantially	  because	  actors	  vary	  
in	  their	  responses	  and	  decisions	  depend	  
on	  interactions	  between	  a	  variety	  of	  
interest	  groups	  and	  stakeholders.	  
Durability	  
	  
Regimes	  are	  fragile	  and	  tend	  to	  fail	  when	  
one	  or	  more	  key	  members	  lose	  interest	  or	  
become	  dissatisfied.	  This	  is	  because	  they	  
tend	  to	  be	  “lightly	  institutionalised”	  
arrangements,	  meaning	  they	  are	  
negotiated	  by	  key	  members	  of	  the	  group	  
concerned	  about	  an	  issue	  through	  
bargaining.	  	  
Regimes	  are	  persistent	  and	  often	  highly	  
resistant	  to	  change,	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  
pressure	  from	  influential	  actors.	  This	  is	  
due	  to	  the	  deeper	  behavioural	  roots	  of	  
institutions	  in	  this	  model,	  i.e.	  shared	  
discourses,	  socialisation,	  and	  institutional	  
culture	  actually	  influence	  the	  way	  actors	  
see	  themselves.	  	  
Sources:	  Young,	  2002a;	  Young,	  2008	  
	  
The	  dichotomy	  of	  the	  two	  models	  is	  a	  simplification,	  and	  there	  is	  variance	  even	  within	  the	  models	  
themselves.	   However,	   they	   provide	   a	   useful	   way	   to	   think	   about	   the	   implications	   for	   designing	  
effective	   institutional	   regimes.	   Young	   (2002a)	   contends	   that	   both	   hold	   significant	   promise;	  
however,	  neither	  offers	  a	  complete	  understanding	  of	  how	  institutions	  work.	  The	  collective-­‐action	  
model	  is	  parsimonious	  and	  elegant;	  it	  directs	  attention	  to	  a	  small	  number	  of	  actors	  and	  variables.	  
However,	   with	   this	   parsimony	   comes	   a	   trade-­‐off	   in	   terms	   of	   explanatory	   power.	   In	   particular,	  
collective-­‐action	  models	   fail	   to	  account	  for	  many	  of	  the	  factors	  that	  help	  researchers	  understand	  
how	   institutions	   can	   solve	   environmental	   problems	   and	  why	   some	   regimes	   are	  more	   successful	  
than	  others.	  Social-­‐practice	  models	  include	  those	  factors	  that	  are	  typically	  omitted	  from	  collective-­‐
action	  models;	   however,	   these	  models	   are	  messier	   and	   less	   conducive	   to	   formalisation	   (Young,	  
2002a).	  In	  the	  context	  of	  biodiversity	  and	  climate	  change,	  social-­‐practice	  models	  may	  prove	  more	  
powerful	  to	  explain	  the	  range	  of	  factors	  that	  contribute	  to	  a	  regime’s	  effectiveness.	  	  	  
The	  evaluation	  of	  the	  robustness	  of	  both	  models	  is	  incomplete	  and	  there	  is	  neither	  a	  unified	  theory	  
of	  institutions,	  nor	  evidence	  that	  one	  model	  is	  more	  realistic	  than	  the	  other.	  In	  some	  cases	  Young	  
(2002a)	  suggests	  it	  may	  be	  best	  to	  draw	  upon	  elements	  of	  both,	  and	  in	  others	  he	  suggests	  it	  may	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be	   prudent	   to	   select	   a	   model	   based	   on	   which	   pathways	   are	   likely	   to	   prevail	   in	   a	   particular	  
environmental	   regime.	   As	   yet	   there	   is	   no	   clear	   evidence	   that	   either	   model	   is	   preferable	   for	  
studying	   biodiversity	   conservation	   institutions.	   The	   social-­‐practice	   model	   has	   been	   selected	  
because	  it	  does	  not	  treat	  behaviour	  as	  a	  cost-­‐benefit	  calculation,	  suggesting	  its	  potential	  power	  to	  
explain	   the	   richer	   set	  of	   actor	  motivations	   to	   conserve	  biodiversity	   (Section	  1.3).	   This	  model	   has	  
also	  been	  selected	  because	  it	   fits	  with	  the	  discursive	   institutionalist	  perspective	  (Section	  1.3)	  and	  
interpretive	  paradigm	  (Section	  6)	  adopted	  in	  this	  research.	  	  	  
1.2	   Clarification	  of	  Key	  Terms	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  term	  “institution”,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  associated	  terms	  that	  will	  be	  used	  in	  
this	  research	  and	  require	  clarification.	  	  
	  
Organisations	  
The	  concept	  of	  institutions	  is	  sometimes	  conflated	  with	  organisations.	  This	  research	  will	  distinguish	  
the	  two	  concepts	  to	  avoid	  confusion;	  however,	  there	   is	  debate	  over	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  distinction	  
between	  them.	  The	  two	  concepts	  are	  often	  separated	  in	  the	  economics	  literature	  for	  the	  purpose	  
of	   analysis.	   In	   this	   view,	   organisations	   are	   treated	   as	   unitary	   actors	   whose	   actions	   shaped	   by	  
institutional	   arrangements,	   rather	   than	   as	   a	   type	   of	   institution	   with	   variations	   (Hodgson,	   2006;	  
North,	   1990;	   Young,	   2002a).	   	   This	   is	   a	   simplification,	   but	   assists	   in	   analytical	   abstraction.	   Here	  
institutions	  are	  conceived	  as	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game,	  and	  organisations	  are	  treated	  as	  players	  in	  the	  
game	  that	  use	  and	  are	  shaped	  by	   institutions	   (North,	  1990).	  Hodgson	   (2006)	  contends	   that	  even	  
using	  North’s	  abstraction,	  organisations	  are	  a	  particular	   type	  of	   institution	  because	  they	  must	  be	  
made	  up	  an	  internal	  system	  of	  players	  and	  rules.	  Specifically,	  he	  defines	  organisations	  as	  “special	  
institutions	  that	  involve	  (a)	  criteria	  to	  establish	  their	  boundaries	  and	  to	  distinguish	  their	  members	  
from	   nonmembers,	   (b)	   principles	   of	   sovereignty	   concerning	   who	   is	   in	   charge,	   and	   (c)	   chains	   of	  
command	  delineating	  responsibilities	  within	  the	  organisation”	  (Hodgson,	  2006,	  p.	  8).	  Dovers	  (2005;	  
p.	  12)	  defines	  organisations	  as	  “manifestations	  of	  institutions”	  and	  notes	  that	  some	  organisations	  
may	  be	  persistent	  enough	  to	  be	  classified	  as	  an	  institution.	  He	  notes,	  however,	  that	  institutions	  are	  
more	  durable	  than	  organisations,	  which	  he	  suggests	  can	  be	  changed	  more	  dramatically	  and	  quickly	  
disbanded	  (Dovers,	  2005).	  
	  
The	   distinction	   between	   institutions	   and	   organisations	   ultimately	   depends	   on	   the	   researcher’s	  
perspective	   and	   question.	   Organisations	   can	   be	   treated	   as	   unitary	   actors	   within	   a	   broader	  
institutional	   framework,	   as	   an	   entity	   that	   provides	   institutions	   (e.g.	   rules,	   norms,	   etc.)	   for	  
individuals,	   or	   as	   the	   manifestation	   of	   institutions.	   This	   PhD	   research	   is	   interested	   primarily	   in	  
examining	   the	   institutions	   that	   drive	   organisational	   and	   actor	   behaviour,	   thus	   it	   is	   more	  
appropriate	  to	  distinguish	  organisations	  from	  the	  institutions	  that	  shape	  them.	  	  
	  
Institutional	  Frameworks	  and	  Policy	  Instruments	  
The	   term	   institutional	   framework	   is	   often	   used	   to	   refer	   to	   a	   particular	   policy	   or	   set	   of	   policy	  
instruments.	   Policy	   instruments	   are	   the	   “myriad	   techniques	   at	   the	   disposal	   of	   governments	   to	  
implement	   their	   policy	   objectives”	   (Howlett,	   1991;	   p.	   2).	   There	   are	   many	   types	   of	   policy	  
instruments,	  and	  researchers	  organise	  them	  differently	  depending	  on	  the	  theoretical	  perspectives	  
and	  models	  they	  adopt.	  Broadly,	  policy	  instruments	  fall	  into	  three	  categories:	  regulation,	  economic	  
means,	   and	   information	   (Vedung,	  2003).	  Alternatively,	   they	  have	  been	   called	   carrots,	   sticks,	   and	  
sermons	  (Bemelmans-­‐Videc	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  No	  matter	  how	  they	  are	  categorised,	  policy	  instruments	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are	   essential	   tools	   in	   addressing	   environmental	   problems.	   Driven	   by	   the	   social,	   political,	   and	  
economic	  context,	  instrument	  choice	  is	  considered	  by	  some	  to	  be	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  politics	  (Howlett,	  
1991).	  	  
	  
Policy	  instruments	  can	  be	  conceived	  narrowly,	  confined	  to	  traditional	  command-­‐and-­‐control	  style	  
regulations	   and	   incentives.	   In	   reality	   there	   are	   many	   types	   of	   instruments	   that	   can	   be	   used	   to	  
address	  environmental	  problems.	  The	  type	  of	  policy	  instruments	  of	  interest	  depends	  in	  part	  on	  the	  
research	  question	  of	   interest.	   For	   example,	   in	   examining	  policy	   instruments	   that	   can	  be	  used	   to	  
improve	  to	  biodiversity	  conservation	  on	  private	  land,	  Stoneham	  et	  al.	  (2000)	  focuses	  on	  regulation,	  
land	   purchase,	   voluntary	   agreements	   (e.g.	   short-­‐term	  management	   agreements),	   and	   voluntary	  
legally	  binding	  agreements	  (e.g.	  conservation	  covenants),	  tax	  incentives,	  and	  government-­‐assisted	  
community	  programs	  (Stoneham	  et	  al.,	  2000).	  This	  list	  considers	  the	  network	  of	  actors	  involved	  in	  
the	   environmental	   problem,	   which	   is	   an	   important	   consideration	   for	   policy	   instrument	   choice	  
(Bressers	   and	   O'Toole,	   1998).	   Jordan	   et	   al.	   (2005)	   divide	   policy	   instruments	   into	   the	   traditional	  
command-­‐and-­‐control	  regulatory	  measures	  and	  the	  “softer”	  instruments	  that	  have	  become	  more	  
popular	   since	   the	   1970s	   in	   the	   European	   Union.	   In	   the	   latter	   category,	   which	   they	   call	   ‘new’	  
environmental	   policy	   instruments,	   the	   authors	   focus	   on	   market-­‐based	   instruments,	   eco-­‐labels,	  
voluntary	  agreements,	  and	  environmental	  management	  systems.	  Based	  on	  these	  categories,	  they	  
develop	  a	   simple	   typology	  of	  policy	   instruments	   centred	  on	  who	  or	  what	  determines	   the	  means	  
and	  ends	  of	  a	  policy	  (e.g.	  the	  state,	  non-­‐state	  actors)	  (Jordan	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  	  
	  
Dovers	   (Dovers,	   1995;	   2005)	   takes	   a	   different	   approach,	   describing	   15	   categories	   of	   policy	  
instruments	  for	  environmental	  management	  and	  sustainability.	  This	   includes	  the	  usual	  categories	  
of	   regulation,	   common	   law,	   and	   market	   mechanisms,	   but	   he	   takes	   a	   broad	   view	   of	   policy	  
instruments.	   For	   example,	   Dover’s	   typologies	   include	   research	   and	   monitoring,	   communication	  
and	   information	   flow,	   self-­‐regulation	   by	   sectors	   and	   firms,	   and	   community	   involvement	   in	  
management	   (Dovers,	  1995).	  This	  PhD	   research	  will	  use	  Dover’s	   typologies	  as	  a	   starting	  point	   to	  
create	   an	   annotated	   database	   of	   policy	   instruments,	   and	   a	   selection	   of	   the	   most	   relevant	  
instruments	  will	  be	  analysed.2	  
	  
Institutional	  Regime	  
The	   term	   institutional	   framework	   is	   sometimes	  used	   to	   refer	   to	   the	  entire	   system	  of	   institutions	  
that	   address	   a	   common	   problem;	   however,	   this	   is	   perhaps	   more	   appropriately	   called	   an	  
institutional	  regime.	  Authors	  often	  use	  this	  term	  interchangeably	  with	  institutional	  framework,	  but	  
here	  regime	  will	  be	  reserved	  for	  the	  broader	  suite	  of	  institutional	  arrangements.	  This	  includes	  not	  
only	   formal	   arrangements	   originating	   from	   the	   state,	   but	   informal	   and	   private	   arrangements.	   A	  
regime	   is	   more	   complex	   than	   a	   set	   of	   rules,	   as	   it	   is	   the	   space	   where	   institutions	   and	   actor	  
expectations	   converge	   (Krasner,	   1982).	   Environmental	   regimes	   are	   established	   to	   protect	  
environmental	  values	  by	  changing	  human	  behaviour	  (Miles	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  An	  institutional	  regime	  for	  
biodiversity	   is	   thus	   the	   full	   suite	   of	   institutional	   arrangements	   and	   the	   institutional	   setting	   that	  
aims	   to	   conserve	   biodiversity.	   The	   concept	   of	   regimes	   will	   be	   re-­‐visited	   in	   the	   discussion	   of	  
governance	  (Section	  2).	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Refer	  to	  the	  Programme	  of	  Study	  (Section	  4.2).	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1.3	   New	  Institutionalism	  
Although	   the	   two	   clusters	   of	   models	   discussed	   in	   Section	   1.1	   broadly	   reflect	   the	   different	  
conceptions	   of	   how	   institutions	   act	   as	   a	   causal	   force,	   the	   field	   of	   institutionalism	   is	   even	  more	  
varied.	   Institutionalism,	   as	   it	   is	   used	   here,	   is	   an	   approach	   to	   study	   politics	   that	   concerns	   the	  
relationship	   between	   the	   characteristics	   of	   institutions	   and	   political	   agency,	   performance,	   and	  
change.	  Its	  purpose	  is	  to	  understand	  and	  improve	  political	  systems	  (March	  and	  Olsen,	  2006).	  Most	  
contemporary	   work	   sits	   within	   a	   broad	   field	   referred	   to	   as	   new	   institutionalism.	   New	  
institutionalism	   takes	   many	   forms	   but	   is	   grounded	   in	   the	   view	   that	   people	   are	   surrounded	   by	  
constraints	   of	   various	   forms,	   but	   that	   they	   also	   actively	   construct	   their	   worlds	   (DiMaggio	   and	  
Powell,	  1983;	  Healey,	  2003).	  New	  institutionalism	  heavily	  emphasises	  the	  importance	  of	  examining	  
rules-­‐in-­‐use	  in	  institutional	  analysis	  (Ostrom,	  1990;	  Young,	  2002a).	  	  
	  
Several	  perspectives	  have	  emerged	  within	   the	  new	   institutionalist	   literature,	  which	   is	   too	  vast	   to	  
be	  distilled	  into	  a	  single	  institutional	  theory.	  There	  are	  several	  types	  of	  new	  institutionalisms,	  with	  
their	   roots	   in	  history,	   sociology,	   economics,	   political	   science,	   and	  broader	   social	   theory.	  My	  PhD	  
adopts	  the	  new	  institutionalist	  perspective	  most	  closely	  associated	  with	  the	  discursive	  tradition	  in	  
the	  political	  sciences,	  although	  it	  also	  draws	  from	  rational	  choice	  (RC)	  institutionalist	  perspectives	  
as	   well.	   Researchers	   in	   RC	   institutionalism	   tend	   to	   be	   neo-­‐positivist,	   whilst	   those	   in	   discursive	  
institutionalism	  tend	  to	  operate	  from	  an	  interpretivist	  or	  constructivist	  paradigm	  (Section	  6).	  
	  
RC	  Institutionalism	  
RC	   institutionalism	   dominates	   the	   common	   pool	   resource	   (CPR)	   literature.	   CPRs	   are	   resource	  
systems	  where	  the	  exclusion	  of	  any	  of	   those	  who	  benefit	   from	  using	  the	  resources	   is	  costly,	  and	  
exploitation	  by	  one	  user	  reduces	  the	  availability	  of	  the	  resource	  to	  others	  (Ostrom,	  1990).	  CPRs	  are	  
associated	  with	  Hardin’s	   (1968)	   concept	   of	   the	   ‘tragedy	  of	   the	   commons’.	  He	   contended	   that	   in	  
commons	   situations,	   individuals	  acting	   in	   their	  own	   rational	   self-­‐interest	  extract	  more	   than	   their	  
fair	  share	  of	  a	  resource,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  not	  in	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  all.	  Overexploitation,	  he	  proposed,	  
was	  the	  natural	  result:	  “Freedom	  in	  a	  commons	  brings	  ruin	  to	  all.”	  (Hardin,	  1968;	  p.	  1244).	  Grazing	  
areas,	  groundwater	  and	  irrigation	  systems,	  forests,	   fisheries,	  and	  the	  Internet	  are	  all	  examples	  of	  
CPRs	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  resources	  are	  shared	  (Basurto	  and	  Ostrom,	  2009).3	  Case	  studies	  have	  since	  
shown	   that	   this	   tragedy	   is	   not	   inevitable,	   but	   the	   capacity	   of	   actors	   to	   escape	   this	   trap	   varies	  
markedly	   from	   situation	   to	   situation	   (Basurto	   and	   Ostrom,	   2009;	   Ostrom,	   1990;	   Ostrom,	   2010).	  
From	   an	   RC	   institutionalist	   perspective,	   institutions	   provide	   incentive	   structures	   and	   reduce	  
uncertainties	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  present	  due	  to	  individual	  preferences	  (Ostrom,	  1990).	  This	  
perspective	   is	   most	   compatible	   with	   the	   collective-­‐action	   model	   of	   institutions	   summarised	   in	  
Table	  1	  (Section	  1.1). 
	  
Perhaps	   its	  most	  distinct	   feature	   is	   its	   conception	  of	   the	  actor.	   It	   also	  heavily	   favours	  use	  of	   the	  
tools	   and	   theories	   of	   economics	   such	   as	   game	   theory,	   microeconomic	   theory,	   and	   cost-­‐benefit	  
analysis	   (Ostrom,	   2005).	   RC	   institutionalism	   general	   adopts	   a	   model	   of	   the	   actor	   as	   rational	   or	  
boundedly	  rational,	  in	  which	  actors	  have	  fixed	  preferences	  and	  calculate	  strategically	  to	  maximise	  
their	  preferences,	  i.e.	  a	  ‘logic	  of	  calculation’	  (Schmidt,	  2010).	  The	  view	  of	  bounded	  rationality	  takes	  
many	  forms,	  although	  most	  models	  originated	  from	  the	  work	  of	  Simon	  (Simon,	  1972).	  A	  boundedly	  
rational	   actor	   displays	   goal-­‐seeking	   behaviour,	   but	   their	   rationality	   is	   limited	   by	   cognitive	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  This	  last	  attribute	  is	  important.	  A	  privately	  owned	  forest	  or	  farm,	  for	  example,	  is	  not	  a	  CPR.	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information-­‐processing	  capability	  and	  available	  information	  (McGinnis,	  2011b).	  	  
	  
Researchers	  in	  this	  school	  of	  thought	  generally	  adopt	  a	  neo-­‐positivist	  paradigm,	  so	  its	  strengths	  lie	  
in	   collecting	   empirical	   data,	   systematic	   analysis,	   and	   synthesizing	   across	   cases	   (Steinberg,	   2009).	  
Most	  of	  the	  well-­‐known	  theoretical	  and	  analytical	  frameworks	  for	  institutional	  and	  policy	  analysis	  
adopt	   a	   neo-­‐positivist	   paradigm	   and	   rest	   on	   the	   foundation	   of	   RC	   institutionalism,	   even	   though	  
they	  do	  not	  all	  explicitly	   identify	  with	  this	  perspective	  (e.g.	  see	  the	  seven	  frameworks	  outlined	  in	  
Sabatier,	   1999).	   This	   form	   of	   institutionalism	   thus	   offers	   researchers	   clear	   guidance	   on	   the	  
variables	  of	  interest,	  compatible	  theories	  and	  models,	  and	  (in	  some	  cases)	  hypotheses.	  
	  
RC	   institutionalism	   is	  also	   limited	   in	  a	  number	  of	  ways.	  Any	  attempt	   to	  model	   the	   complexity	  of	  
human	   behaviour	   will	   require	   some	   degree	   of	   simplification,	   but	   many	   researchers	   have	  
emphasised	  the	  prevalence	  of	  these	  shortcomings	  in	  RC	  institutionalism.	  In	  particular,	  researchers	  
have	   critiqued	   the	   lack	  of	   richness	   in	   the	  modelling	  of	  both	  actors	   and	   context	   in	   this	   dominant	  
paradigm.	   Bounded	   rationality	   models	   can	   enrich	   the	   view	   of	   the	   actor	   and	   move	   institutional	  
analysis	   closer	   to	   ‘real	   world’	   conditions,	   but	   they	   also	   complicate	   the	   analysis	   of	   choice.	   Any	  
treatment	   of	   the	   bounds	   on	   rationality	   is	   necessarily	   informal	   and	   incomplete	   (Tversky	   and	  
Kahneman,	   1986),	   but	   boundaries	   are	   necessary	   to	   create	   useable	   models.	   Setting	   clear	  
boundaries	  is	  the	  key	  to	  making	  empirical	  analysis	  of	  actor	  behaviour	  possible.	  There	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  
of	  variance	  between	  models	  of	  bounded	  rationality	  (Dequech,	  2001).	  The	  most	  popular	  of	  these,	  
the	  bounded	  rationality	  model	  developed	  by	  Simon	  (1972),	  has	  been	  criticised	  for	  neglecting	  social	  
context,	   habits	   and	   the	   tacit	   aspects	   of	   institutions	   (Dequech,	   2001).	   At	   their	   core,	   they	   are	   all	  
based	  on	  a	  logic	  of	  calculation	  and	  the	  focus	  is	  primarily	  on	  how	  actors	  calculate	  costs	  and	  benefits,	  
necessitating	  neglect	  or	  partial	  treatment	  of	  many	  real-­‐world	  considerations	  and	  motivations.	  	  
	  
Dequech	   (2001)	   also	   argues	   that	   rationality	   is	   beyond	   bounded	   in	   situations	  where	   novelty	   and	  
creativity	   are	   involved	   and	   in	   situations	   of	   uncertainty.	   For	   example,	   the	   theory	   of	   bounded	  
rationality	  implies	  that	  an	  optimal	  choice	  exists,	  even	  if	  a	  person	  cannot	  identify	  it	  due	  to	  cognitive	  
limitations.	  In	  situations	  of	  uncertainty,	  however,	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  unimagined	  states	  may	  occur	  
in	   the	   future,	  suggesting	  the	  problem	   is	  beyond	  the	  way	  actors	  make	  decisions	   (Dequech,	  2001).	  
Some	   researchers	   recognise	   that	   the	   characteristics	   of	   the	   biophysical	   world	   and	   cultural	  
predispositions	  and	  beliefs	  influence	  actor	  decisions	  (McGinnis,	  2011b),	  however,	  as	  these	  factors	  
become	  more	  abstract	  it	  is	  not	  always	  clear	  how	  they	  have	  been	  integrated	  into	  the	  models	  used	  
by	  RC	  institutionalists.	  	  
	  
There	   are	   other	   criticisms	   that	   are	   perhaps	  more	   significant	   than	  RC	   institutionalism’s	   preferred	  
model	  of	  the	  individual.	  The	  sub-­‐field	  has	  been	  criticised	  for	  neglecting	  institutional	  change;	  weak	  
consideration	   of	   politics	   and	   power;	   and	   not	   accounting	   for	   the	   social	   origins	   of	   preferences	  
(Agrawal,	  2003;	  Hall	  and	  Taylor,	  1996;	  Moe,	  2005;	  Schmidt,	  2010;	  Steinberg,	  2009).	  Some	  of	  this	  is	  
related	   to	   their	   emphasis	   on	   rule	   following	   and	   tendency	   to	   overlook	   rule	   breaking,	   neglecting	  
innovation	  or	   even	   implying	   it	   is	   irrational	   (Dequech,	   2001).	   Even	  when	  RC	   institutionalism	  does	  
address	   change,	   it	   is	  mainly	   concerned	  with	   incremental	   change	   (Dudley	   et	   al.,	   2000)	   and	   lacks	  
guidance	  on	  how	  to	   influence	  change	  (Weible	  et	  al.,	  2012).	   	  The	   insufficient	  attention	  to	  politics,	  
power,	   and	   change	   is	   of	   particular	   interest	   for	  my	  PhD,	  which	   is	   informed	  by	   resilience	   thinking	  
(Section	  5),	  and	  the	  processes	  of	  institutional	  learning,	  innovation,	  and	  change	  (Section	  4).	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Discursive	  Institutionalism	  
It	  is	  notable	  that	  institutional	  theory	  in	  general	  –	  not	  just	  RC	  institutionalism	  –	  has	  been	  criticised	  
for	   providing	   static	   descriptions	   of	   institutions,	   rather	   than	   dynamic	   accounts	   of	   change.	   This	   is	  
likely	   a	   result	   of	   focusing	  on	   the	   constraining	   aspects	   of	   institutions,	   such	   as	   how	  and	  why	   they	  
persist,	   and	   how	   they	   create	   homogeneity	   and	   predictability	   (Dacin	   et	   al.,	   2002;	   Ritzer,	   2005).	  
While	   some	  RC	   institutionalists	   have	   sought	   to	   understand	   endogenous	   change	   through	   existing	  
institutionalist	   lenses,	   others	   have	   turned	   to	   ideas	   and	   discourse	   (Schmidt,	   2010).	   This	   is	   the	  
discursive	   institutionalism,	  or	  deliberative	  policy	   analysis,	   as	  made	  popular	  by	  Hajer,	   Fischer	   and	  
others	   (Fischer,	   2003b;	   Hajer	   and	   Wagenaar,	   2003).	   Whereas	   a	   neo-­‐positivist	   approach	   sees	  
separation	   between	   the	   objective	   practice	   of	   policy	   analysis	   and	   the	   practice	   of	   politics,	  
deliberative	  policy	  analysis	  is	  interpretive	  and	  practice-­‐oriented.	  	  
	  
In	  contrast	  to	  the	  view	  that	  actors	  have	  well-­‐ordered	  preferences	  and	  behave	  like	  participants	  in	  a	  
game,	   the	   deliberative	   or	   discursive	   approach	   holds	   that	   policymakers	   and	   administrators	   are	  
actors	   with	   legal	   and	   organisational	   obligations.	   Decisions	   are	   made	   in	   response	   to	   concrete	  
problems,	   ‘on	   the	   fly’	   or	   ‘in	   the	   trenches’,	   meaning	   there	   are	   struggles	   with	   power,	   conflict,	  
uncertainty	   and	   unpredictability	   (Hajer	   and	  Wagenaar,	   2003).	   This	   perspective	   is	   similar	   to	   the	  
social-­‐practice	   model	   of	   institutions	   summarised	   in	   Table	   1	   (Section	   1.1),	   but	   with	   one	   very	  
significant	   difference.	   While	   the	   social-­‐practice	   model	   as	   outlined	   by	   Young	   (2002)	   emphasised	  
institutional	   stability,	   discursive	   institutionalists	   are	   specifically	   interested	   in	   institutional	   change	  
(Schmidt,	  2010).	  
	  
Discursive	  institutionalism	  is	  a	  useful	  approach	  for	  examining	  biodiversity	  governance	  for	  a	  number	  
of	   reasons.	   Institutional	   change	   is	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   reforming	   biodiversity	   governance,	   so	   a	  
framework	   that	   pays	  particular	   attention	   to	   the	  mechanics	   of	   change	   is	   required.	   In	   biodiversity	  
conservation,	  outcomes	  are	  influenced	  by	  changes	  in	  the	  biophysical	  world,	  social	  conditions	  and	  
political	  preferences:	  “The	  stakes	  are	  high,	  the	  politics	  are	  uncertain,	  and	  the	  resources	  at	  risk	  are	  
highly	   vulnerable	   to	   social	   change,	   presenting	   serious	   challenges	   for	   institutional	   design”	  
(Steinberg,	  2009,	  p.	  62).	  Discursive	   institutionalism	  addresses	  a	  richer	  set	  of	  factors	  underpinning	  
actor	   behaviour.	   Rational	   choice	   models	   explain	   actor	   behaviour	   by	   defining	   well-­‐ordered	  
preferences,	   accounting	   for	   costs	   and	   benefits,	   incentives,	   and	   sanctions;	   but	   they	   provide	  
incomplete	  accounts	  of	  the	  diverse	  motivations	  for	  conserving	  biodiversity	  (Steinberg,	  2009).	  The	  
field	  of	  economics	  has	  made	  major	  strides	  in	  developing	  ways	  to	  ascribe	  tangible	  economic	  value	  
to	  biodiversity	  assets;	  however,	  such	  value	   is	  still	  quite	  obscure	  to	  many	  people	  and	   incomplete.	  
Economic	  value	  cannot	  fully	  account	  for	  the	  diverse	  values	  that	  people	  derive	  from	  nature.	  There	  
are	   varied	   motivations	   for	   conserving	   biodiversity	   that	   are	   poorly	   accounted	   for	   in	   RC	  
institutionalism,	  as	  well	  as	  diverse	  values	  that	  people	  derive	  from	  nature.	  Failing	  to	  account	  for	  the	  
full	   spectrum	   of	   motivations	   for	   conserving	   biodiversity	   can	   neglect	   actors	   whose	   stake	   in	  
biodiversity	  conservation	  are	  predominantly	  non-­‐economic	  (Steinberg,	  2009).	  	  
	  
Working	  with	  a	  discursive	  framework	  can	  provide	  a	  platform	  to	  better	  understanding	  these	  values	  
from	   the	  perspective	   of	   the	   actors	   involved.	  A	   discursive	   perspective	   also	   aids	   the	   researcher	   in	  
focusing	  greater	  analytical	  attention	  on	  the	  practice	  of	  politics	  in	  networked	  governance	  (Hajer	  and	  
Wagenaar,	  2003).	  Not	  only	  does	  this	  fit	  the	  form	  of	  biodiversity	  governance	  that	  exists	  in	  Australia,	  
but	   it	   emphasises	   that	   politics	   cannot	   always	   be	   explained	   by	   a	   rational	   choice	   perspective.	   An	  
emphasis	  on	  discourse	  provides	  a	  richer	  understanding	  of	  environmental	  politics	  in	  action	  and	  can	  
assist	   in	  developing	  new	  criteria	   for	   institutional	  design	  (Steinberg,	  2009).	   	  A	  discursive	  approach	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acknowledges	   that	   language	   itself	   is	   an	   institution,	  and	   that	   it	   can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  powerful	   tool	   in	  
politics.	  	  
	  
This	   work	   will	   draw	   from	   the	   work	   of	   RC	   institutionalists,	   but	   it	   will	   supplement	   this	   with	   a	  
politicised,	  discursive	  approach.	  This	   is	  mainly	  for	  practical	  reasons	   in	  that	  the	  RC	  institutionalists	  
offer	  clear	  guidance	  on	  the	  factors	  and	  variables	  that	  should	  be	  included	  in	  institutional	  and	  policy	  
analysis.	  Discursive	  institutionalism	  is	  not	  associated	  with	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  that	  provides	  a	  
clear	  and	  consistent	  concepts	  and	  propositions,	  with	  a	  specified	  set	  of	  causal	  drivers,	  factors,	  and	  
hypotheses	  (Dudley	  et	  al.,	  2000).	  Although	  discursive	  institutionalists	  have	  outlined	  their	  theories	  
of	   the	   policy	   process	   (e.g.	   Dryzek,	   2000;	   Fischer,	   2003a;	   Hajer	   and	  Wagenaar,	   2003;	   Schweber,	  
2011),	   their	   explanations	   are	   qualitative	   in	   nature	   and	   have	   been	   criticised	   for	   not	  meeting	   the	  
criteria	  of	  scientific	   framework.	  The	   interpretive	  approach	  taken	  by	  these	  authors,	   it	   is	  argued,	   is	  
not	  “clear	  enough	  to	  be	  proven	  wrong”	  (Dudley	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  Shanahan	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  This	  is	  mainly	  
due	  to	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  qualitative	  elements	  of	  the	  policy	  process.	  For	  example,	  the	  discursive	  
approach	   emphasises	   the	   role	   of	   narrative	   storylines,	   which	   bind	   actors	   together	   in	   discourse	  
coalitions.	   In	   recent	   years,	   approaches	   have	   been	   introduced	   to	   study	   these	   narratives	   in	   a	  
quantitative	   way	   (Jones	   and	   McBeth,	   2010;	   Shanahan	   et	   al.,	   2011).	   While	   Fischer	   (2003b)	  
acknowledges	   that	   narratives	   can	   be	   studied	   through	   quantitative	   methods,	   he	   posits,	   “their	  
meaning	   and	   role	   in	   change	   is	   qualitative	   in	   nature	   and	   has	   to	   be	   interpreted	   in	   the	   specific	  
contexts	  of	  action”	  (p.	  102).	  While	  the	  discursive	  approach	  allows	  access	  to	  a	  richer	  understanding	  
of	  the	  policy	  process,	   its	   interpretive	  approach	  has	  practical	   limitations	   in	  that	   it	  does	  not	  clearly	  
dictate	  the	  factors	  of	  interest,	  making	  it	  challenging	  to	  implement.	  	  
	  
Although	   sometimes	   presented	   as	   a	   dichotomy,	   RC	   institutionalism	   and	   the	   discursive	   approach	  
are	  not	  completely	  at	  odds.	  For	  example,	  Giddens	  (1984)	  theory	  of	  structuration	  reconciles	  the	  two	  
views	   somewhat,	  by	  maintaining	   that	   social	   structure	  provides	   grounds	   for	  behaviour,	   but	   these	  
structures	   are	   shaped	   by	   behaviours,	   i.e.	   agency	   is	   also	   social	   constructed.	   Giddens	   thus	  
recommended	  looking	  not	  only	  at	  structural	  elements	  of	  political,	  economic,	  and	  legal/sanctioning	  
institutions	   but	   also	   institutions	   at	   the	   symbolic	   or	   discursive	   level	   (Ritzer,	   2005).	   A	   further	  
advancement	   can	  be	   seen	   in	   the	  morphogenetic	   approach	   (Buckley,	   1967),	  which	   integrates	   the	  
theory	   of	   structuration	   and	   other	   sociological	   theories	   into	   a	   systems	   approach.	  Morphogenesis	  
refers	  to	  processes	  in	  complex	  systems	  which	  “tend	  to	  elaborate	  or	  change	  a	  systems	  given	  form,	  
structure	   or	   state”	   (Archer,	   2010;	   p.	   250).	   Archer	   (2010)	   agrees	   with	   the	   interdependence	   of	  
structure	   and	   agency	   presented	   by	   Giddens	   in	   principle,	   but	   provides	   an	   analytical	   approach	   to	  
separate	  the	  two	  based	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  they	  operate	  on	  different	  time	  scales.	  The	  approach	  can	  
provide	   a	   useful	   way	   to	   understand	   how	   structures,	   such	   as	   rules,	   can	   constrain	   or	   enable	   an	  
actor’s	  ability	  to	  act	  and	  change	  a	  situation.	  Combining	  structure,	  agency,	  and	  politics	   in	  this	  way	  
enriches	   the	   understanding	   of	   institutions	   and	   moves	   toward	   a	   richer	   understanding	   of	   the	  
processes	  of	  governance.	  	  
2	   Governance	  
2.1	   Definitions	  and	  Key	  Concepts	  
Definitions	  of	  both	  governance	  and	  institutions	  vary	  across	  disciplines	  and	  paradigms,	  and	  the	  line	  
between	   the	   two	   concepts	   is	   often	   blurred.	   Institutions	   are	   one	   part	   of	   a	   broader	   system	   of	  
governance.	   Broadly,	   governance	   is	   a	   system	   of	   social	   coordination	   for	   resolving	   common	  
problems	  (Lee,	  2003).	  The	  term	  applies	  to	  the	  entire	  system	  of	  institutions	  for	  social	  coordination	  
(McGinnis	   and	   Ostrom,	   1996).	   While	   institutions	   are	   the	   sets	   of	   rules,	   norms	   and	   strategies,	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governance	   is	   the	   process	   by	   which	   these	   institutions	   are	   formed,	   applied,	   interpreted,	   and	  
reformed	   (McGinnis,	   2011b).	   Simply	   put,	   “governance	   encompasses	   policies,	   institutions,	  
processes	  and	  power”	  (Swiderska	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  
	  
Although	  governance	  includes	  actions	  undertaken	  by	  the	  state,	  the	  new	  governance	  perspective	  is	  
more	  aligned	  with	   the	  actual	   form	  of	  environmental	   governance.	   The	  new	  governance	   literature	  
recognises	   that	   the	   capacity	   and	   responsibility	   for	   social	   coordination	   does	   not	   sit	   solely	   with	  
government.	  Use	  of	  the	  term	  governance	  in	  lieu	  of	  the	  term	  government	  is	  emblematic	  of	  this	  shift	  
in	   philosophy	   (Rhodes,	   1996).	   Power	   dependence	   between	   institutions	   and	   actors	   feature	  
prominently	   in	   this	  body	  of	   literature,	  as	  does	   the	  capacity	  of	   these	  networks	   to	  self-­‐govern	  and	  
self-­‐enforce	   (Lee,	   2003).	   Paavola	   (2007;	   p.	   94)	   defines	   governance	   as	   “the	   establishment,	  
reaffirmation	   or	   change	   of	   institutions	   to	   resolve	   conflicts	   over	   environmental	   resources”.	  
Adopting	   this	   definition	   puts	   institutions	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   governance,	   but	   it	   also	   alludes	   to	   the	  
importance	  of	  politics,	  power,	  and	  values	  in	  understanding	  governance.	  	  
	  
Empirical	   case	   studies	   suggest	   that	   a	   polycentric	   form	   of	   governance	   is	   better	   suited	   than	  
centralised	  government	   in	  dealing	  with	   the	  complexity	  of	  natural	   resource	   issues	   (Ostrom,	  2010;	  
Poteete	   et	   al.,	   2010).	   In	   polycentric	   forms	   of	   governance,	   authority	   does	   not	   lie	   with	   a	   single,	  
central	  entity.	  Rather,	   it	   is	  comprised	  of	  a	  nested	  set	  of	  enterprises	   from	  national	   to	   local	   levels,	  
with	   networked	   sets	   of	   institutions	   and	   actors	   both	   within	   and	   beyond	   government	   (McGinnis,	  
2011a;	  Ostrom,	  2005).	  Theesfeld	  (2008)	  notes	  that	  polycentric	  and	  centralised	  governance	  are	  on	  
two	  ends	  of	  a	  spectrum	  with	  a	  range	  of	  options	  in	  between.	  Biodiversity	  governance	  in	  Australia	  is	  
toward	   the	   polycentric	   end	   of	   the	   spectrum,	   but	   it	   does	   not	   lie	   at	   the	   extreme.	   It	   is	   not	   fully	  
decentralised	  because,	  for	  example,	  regional	  activity	   is	  still	  reliant	  on	  the	  central	  authority	  of	  the	  
Commonwealth	  and	  its	  resources.	  	  
	  
Governance	  and	  institutions	  are	  both	  distinct	  from	  management.	  Governance	  sets	  the	  vision	  and	  
direction	   (e.g.	   through	   policy),	   and	   management	   operationalises	   the	   vision	   (Folke	   et	   al.,	   2005).	  
Management	   is	   generally	   used	   to	   describe	   on-­‐the-­‐ground	   activities.	   This	   includes	   both	  
implementing	   the	   directives	   in	   policy	   instruments	   as	   well	   as	   the	  more	   tangible	   physical	   actions	  
required.	  Managers	  and	  policy-­‐makers	  can	  be	   the	  same	  actors,	  or	   they	  can	  be	  separate	   (Dovers,	  
2005).	   For	   example,	   the	  Commonwealth	   government	  may	   set	   biodiversity	   policy,	   but	   individuals	  
and	   agencies	   carry	   out	   these	   activities	   on	   the	   ground.	   There	   is	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   management	  
activities	  that	  affect	  biodiversity	  assets	  and	  processes	  (e.g.	  prescribed	  burning,	  re-­‐vegetation,	  and	  
weed	  control),	  and	  these	  activities	  may	  be	  undertaken	  by	  individuals	  within	  government	  agencies,	  
non-­‐governmental	  organisations,	  or	  individual	  landholders.	  	  
	  
Paavola	  et	  al.	   (2009)	  make	  a	  useful	  distinction	  between	  governance	  frameworks	  and	  governance	  
regimes,	   positioned	   in	   a	   biodiversity	   context.	   A	   governance	   framework	   is	   a	   specific	   governance	  
intervention	  that	  is	  developed	  and	  delivered	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  conserving	  biodiversity,	  whereas	  a	  
governance	  regime	  is	  much	  broader.	  A	  governance	  regime	  encompasses	  the	  full	  range	  of	  customs	  
and	   institutions	   that	   shape	   biodiversity	   outcomes	   by	   influencing	   actor	   behaviour.	   This	   could	  
include	   other	   governance	   frameworks	   that	   are	   interlinked	   (e.g.	   agriculture,	   forestry)	   as	   well	   as	  
economic	   structures,	   incentive	   systems,	   and	   social,	   cultural	   and	  psychological	   factors	   that	   shape	  
behaviour	   (Paavola	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   Examination	   of	   the	   influence	   of	   governance	   regimes	   thus	  
emphasises	   the	   interaction	   between	   a	   number	   of	   governance	   processes	   at	   multiple	   levels.	   For	  
practical	  reasons	  this	  PhD	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  narrower	  biodiversity	  governance	  framework,	  although	  
it	  will	  also	  consider	  elements	  of	  the	  broader	  governance	  regime	  (e.g.	  agriculture).	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The	  multi-­‐layered	  nature	  of	  biodiversity	  governance	  means	  that	  cooperation	  and	  partnerships	  are	  
commonplace.	   As	   the	   definitions	   of	   governance	   suggest,	   cooperation	   is	   a	   central	   feature	   of	   the	  
decentralised	  new	  governance.	  Cooperation	  is	  alternatively	  referred	  to	  as	  collaboration,	  although	  
Zbicz	   (2003)	   developed	   a	   hierarchy	   of	   cooperation	   in	   which	   collaboration	   is	   only	   one	   level.	  
Although	   her	   work	   is	   focused	   on	   cooperation	   across	   international	   boundaries,	   the	   hierarchy	  
illustrates	   that	   all	   cooperation	   is	   not	   equal.	   Zbicz	   (2003)	   found	   five	   levels	   of	   cooperation:	   no	  
cooperation,	   communication,	   consultation,	   collaboration,	   coordination	   of	   planning,	   and	   full	  
cooperation.	  She	  differentiates	  the	   levels	  primarily	  based	  on	  the	  level	  of	   information	  sharing	  and	  
the	   coordination	   of	   activities	   and	   planning.	   At	   the	   top	   level	   (full	   cooperation),	   there	   is	   a	   joint	  
decision-­‐making	  committee,	  activities	  are	   fully	   integrated,	   and	  planning	   is	  ecosystem-­‐based.	  This	  
form	   of	   planning	   requires	   decision-­‐makers	   to	   transcend	   both	   political	   and	   protected	   area	  
boundaries	  (Zbicz,	  2003).	  	  
	  
Collaboration	  can	  also	  be	  considered	   in	  the	  context	  of	  public	  participation.	  Approaches	  modelled	  
on	   a	   public	   participation	   ladder	   (Arnstein,	   1969)	   classify	   the	   level	   of	   public	   participation	   in	   a	  
hierarchy	   according	   to	   the	   degree	   in	   which	   government	   dominates	   or	   shares	   power	   with	   the	  
community,	   with	   equal	   power	   sharing	   between	   government	   and	   communities	   on	   the	   most	  
collaborative	  end	  of	  the	  ladder	  (Ross	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  The	  influence	  of	  this	  ladder	  is	  evident	  in	  one	  of	  
the	  most	  commonly	  used	  typologies	  of	  public	  engagement,	  the	  spectrum	  of	  types	  outlined	  by	  the	  
International	   Association	   for	   Public	   Participation.	   This	   characterizes	   public	   participation	   into	   five	  
categories	  according	  the	  strength	  of	  public	  impact:	   informing,	  consulting,	  involving,	  collaborating,	  
and	  empowering	  citizens	  (International	  Association	  for	  Public	  Participation,	  2007).	  Each	  category	  is	  
linked	  to	  a	  particular	  goal	  of	  the	  public	  engagement	  exercise.	  
	  
Ross	  et	  al.	  (2002,	  p.	  205)	  have	  created	  a	  more	  nuanced	  typology	  of	  public	  participation	  in	  natural	  
resource	  management	  (NRM)	  in	  Australia,	  incorporating	  “differences	  in	  agency	  (which	  parties	  carry	  
the	   initiative),	   tenure	   (the	   nature	   of	   the	   parties'	   control	   over	   the	   resources),	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  
participants,	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   task,	   and	   its	   duration.”	   They	   describe	   the	   characteristics	   of	   eight	  
types	  of	  public	  participation	  in	  NRM: 
• Two	   no	   participation	   categories	   (individual	   management	   and	   agency	   or	   corporation	  
management);	  	  
• Community-­‐based	  management;	  
• Community	  collective	  activity;	  
• Composite	  stakeholder	  bodies;	  
• Shared	  management;	  
• Stakeholder-­‐based	  planning	  or	  negotiation;	  and	  
• Consultation.	  
This	   typology	   distinguishes	   voluntary	   actions	   from	   formal	   collaborations	   and	   other	   types	   of	  
management,	   and	   the	   authors	   provide	   examples	   of	   each,	   although	   they	   could	   not	   provide	   a	  
contemporary	  Australian	  example	  of	  management	  that	  was	  solely	  agency	  or	  corporation,	  without	  
any	  participation	  (Ross	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  The	  appeal	  of	  this	  typology	  is	  not	  only	  that	  it	  was	  developed	  in	  
an	  Australian	  NRM	  context,	  but	  also	  its	  lateral	  structure.	  It	  emphasises	  public	  participation	  in	  terms	  
of	   its	  suitability	   for	  a	  particular	  NRM	  task,	  rather	  than	  viewing	  public	  participation	  as	  a	  hierarchy	  
Biodiversity	  Governance	  in	  the	  Tasmanian	  Midlands	  and	  Australian	  Alps	  	  
	  Sarah	  Clement	  –	  Literature	  Review	   15	  
from	  best	  to	  worst	  (Ross	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  
	  
Healey	   (2006b)	   makes	   collaboration	   explicit	   to	   governance	   in	   her	   discussions	   of	   collaborative	  
governance	   and	   collaborative	   planning.	   In	   collaborative	   governance,	   the	   formal	   institutions	   of	  
government	  provide	  not	  only	  the	  hard	  infrastructure	  of	  the	  planning	  system,	  but	  also	  a	  soft	  form	  of	  
infrastructure	   she	   calls	   “relation-­‐building”	   (Healey,	   2006b;	   p.	   200).	   This	   soft	   infrastructure	   is	   the	  
locally	   specific	   space	   where	   social,	   political,	   and	   intellectual	   capital4	   is	   formed.	   Collaborative	  
planning	  is	  central	  to	  collaborative	  governance.	  Planning	  is	  an	  important	  part	  of	  governance	  in	  that	  
it	   injects	   a	   strategic,	   long-­‐term	   vision	   into	   governance	   and	   provides	   a	   space	   for	   actors	   to	  
collectively	  think	  and	  act	  on	  issues	  (Healey,	  2006b).	  In	  the	  collaborative	  planning	  model,	  planning	  
occurs	   through	   a	   series	   of	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   dialogues	   between	   experts	   and	   stakeholders,	   i.e.	   actors	  
with	   an	   interest	   in	   the	   outcomes	   at	   hand	   (Innes	   and	   Booher,	   2000).	   Collaborative	   planning	   is	  
thought	  to	  increase	  institutional	  capacity	  by	  bolstering	  formal	  institutions,	  filling	  institutional	  gaps,	  
producing	   action	   agendas,	   and	   generating	   innovative	   ways	   of	   solving	   problems	   (Healey,	   2006b;	  
Innes	  and	  Booher,	  2003a).	  Healey	   (2006b)	  notes	   that	   the	   social,	  political,	   and	   intellectual	   capital	  
that	  is	  built	  through	  collaboration	  also	  provides	  a	  new	  resource	  for	  building	  institutional	  capacity.	  
	  
Over	  the	  past	  several	  decades,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  push	  toward	  ecosystem-­‐based	  management.	  This	  
move	   represents	   a	   shift	   in	   understanding	   of	   environmental	   problems	   from	   isolated	   incidents	  
contained	  within	  cultural	  borders	  to	  a	  set	  of	  interrelated	  problems	  that	  should	  be	  managed	  as	  an	  
integrated	   system	   (Imperial,	   1999).	   This	   requires	   cooperation	   across	   borders;	   but	   although	   such	  
collaboration	   can	   improve	   management	   of	   natural	   resources,	   there	   is	   plenty	   of	   evidence	   of	  
noncooperative	  behaviour.	  Imperial	  (1999)	  notes	  that	  incentives	  can	  favour	  noncooperation	  rather	  
than	   collective	   action	   for	   three	   main	   reasons.	   First,	   organisations	   and	   programs	   often	   have	  
competing	   interests,	   including	   different	   constituencies,	   regulatory	   authority,	   priorities	   and	  
objectives,	   and	   technical	   expertise.	   Collaboration	   between	   programs	   often	   requires	   institutional	  
changes	   that	   create	   political	   conflict.	   Second,	   shifting	   to	   a	   new	   approach	   (e.g.	   ecosystem-­‐based	  
management)	   may	   also	   require	   a	   change	   in	   policy,	   and	   that	   change	  may	   be	   costly,	   against	   the	  
disposition	  of	  the	  actors	  involved,	  or	  in	  competition	  with	  other	  interests.	  This	  leads	  to	  resistance.	  
Finally,	  collaboration	  requires	  information	  sharing	  and	  coordination	  of	  program	  activities,	  and	  this	  
requires	   significant	   time	   and	   resources.	   If	   incentives	   to	   encourage	   cooperation	   do	   not	   outweigh	  
these	  costs,	  collaboration	  may	  be	  met	  with	  resistance	  (Imperial,	  1999).	  
	  
Collaborative	  resource	  management	  is	  the	  process	  of	  resolving	  shared	  dilemmas	  through	  a	  diverse	  
group	   of	   stakeholders,	   from	   many	   levels	   of	   governance,	   from	   users	   to	   government	   agencies	  
(Heikkila	  and	  Gerlak,	  2005).	  This	  process,	   also	  known	  as	   comanagement,	   requires	   transboundary	  
cooperation	   since	   political	   and	   natural	   boundaries	   often	   do	   not	   align	   (Fall,	   2002).	   In	   addition	   to	  
cooperation	   across	   boundaries,	   there	   is	   an	   increasing	   focus	   on	   cooperation	   across	   governance	  
levels,	  reflected	  in	  the	  increasing	  attention	  to	  partnerships	  in	  NRM.	  Partnerships	  can	  be	  formed	  to	  
facilitate	   interagency	   collaboration,	   but	   the	   need	   to	   move	   beyond	   interagency	   relationships	   is	  
reflected	  in	  the	  increasing	  formation	  of	  partnerships	  between	  government,	  the	  private	  sector,	  and	  
even	   the	   community	   level.	   Such	   joint	   ventures	   give	   stakeholders	   a	   voice	   in	   the	  management	   of	  
natural	  resources,	  reflecting	  a	  more	  inclusive	  approach	  to	  governance	  (Laing	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Capital	  is	  as	  a	  resource	  that	  can	  be	  invested	  to	  generate	  returns.	  	  Capital	  has	  value	  because	  it	  produces	  a	  flow	  of	  
benefits,	  and	  it	  can	  refer	  to	  the	  mobilisation	  of	  material	  or	  symbolic	  goods	  (Berkes	  and	  Folke,	  1998;	  Lin,	  2001).	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The	   rise	   in	   partnerships	   in	   natural	   resource	   governance	   has	   also	   contributed	   to	   the	   increasingly	  
blurry	   line	   between	   public	   and	   private	   (Sikor,	   2008).	   Traditionally,	   the	   notions	   of	   public	   versus	  
private	   and	   state	   versus	   market	   were	   presented	   as	   dichotomies.	   When	   the	   government	   owns	  
natural	  resources,	  they	  are	  often	  open	  to	  the	  public	  to	  use	  and	  enjoy;	  however,	  open	  access	  can	  
lead	  to	  the	  tragedy	  of	  the	  commons	  (Section	  1.3).	  Privatisation	  has	  often	  been	  presented	  as	  a	  tool	  
to	  solve	  tragedy	  of	  the	  commons	  dilemmas,	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  private	  actors	  will	  act	  rationally	  to	  
maximise	  personal	  benefit.	  This	  leads	  to	  its	  own	  set	  of	  undesirable	  outcomes,	  such	  as	  loss	  of	  social	  
value	  (Evans,	  2012).	  Contemporary	  governance,	  however,	  often	  disposes	  of	  the	  divide	  and	  comes	  
in	  the	  form	  of	  public-­‐private	  hybrid	  (Sikor	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  Public-­‐private	  partnerships	  are	   important	  
not	  only	  in	  areas	  where	  biodiversity	  values	  are	  held	  on	  private	  property.	  Quasi-­‐private	  actors	  such	  
as	  NGOs	   also	   play	   a	   role	   in	  managing	   some	   publicly	   owned	   protected	   areas	   (Sikor	   et	   al.,	   2008).	  
Biodiversity	  exists	  on	  both	  public	  and	  private	  land	  in	  Australia,	  and	  conservation	  of	  this	  biodiversity	  
relies	  on	  not	  only	  public	  and	  private	  managers	  but	  also	  public-­‐private	  hybrids.	  
	  
Protected	   area	   governance	   is	   also	   often	   characterised	   by	   partnerships.	   There	   are	   several	   dozen	  
governance	   models	   for	   protected	   areas,	   although	   a	   much	   smaller	   number	   are	   currently	   used	  
(Eagles,	  2008).	  These	  models	  can	  be	  classified	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways,	  but	  a	  common	  approach	  is	  to	  
cluster	  them	  according	  to	  ownership	  and/or	  management.	  Borrini-­‐Feyerabend	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  identify	  
four	   types	   based	   on	  who	   holds	   the	   decision-­‐making	   authority:	   government	   protected	   areas,	   co-­‐
managed	   protected	   areas	   (various	   actors),	   private	   protected	   areas	   (private	   landholders),	   and	  
community	  conservation	  areas	  (indigenous	  and	  community).	  They	  further	  divide	  these	  models	  into	  
sub-­‐types	  based	  on	  management	  categories,	  as	  classified	  by	   the	   IUCN	  (Borrini-­‐Feyerabend	  et	  al.,	  
2006).	  
	  
Another	   approach	   is	   to	   cluster	   them	  according	   to	   three	   elements	   of	   conservation	  management:	  
ownership	  of	  the	  resources,	  sources	  of	  income	  for	  management,	  and	  the	  management	  body.	  This	  
suggests	  seven	  protected	  area	  governance	  models	  that	  are	  most	  commonly	  used	  (Eagles,	  2008):	  
1. Golden	   Era	   National	   Park	   Model:	   This	   is	   characterised	   by	   government	   ownership	   and	  
management	  of	  the	  resources	  and	  funding	  support	  that	  comes	  primarily	  from	  public	  taxes.	  	  
2. Parastatal	   Model:	   Here	   government	   also	   owns	   the	   resource,	   but	   management	   is	  
undertaken	  by	  a	  government-­‐owned	  corporation	  and	  funded	  by	  user	  fees.	  
3. Non-­‐profit	  Organisation	  Model:	  Protected	  areas	  that	  are	  owned	  and	  managed	  non-­‐profit	  
organisations	  and	  funded	  by	  donations	  are	  included	  in	  this	  model.	  	  
4. Ecolodge	  Model:	   This	   is	   characterised	   by	   private,	   for-­‐profit	   organisation	   ownership	   and	  
management,	  with	  funding	  from	  user	  fees.	  	  
5. Public	  and	  For-­‐Profit,	  Private	  Combination	  Model:	  This	  is	  a	  hybrid	  approach	  that	  involves	  
several	   different	   players.	   In	   this	   model	   the	   government	   owns	   the	   resource,	   but	  
management	   and	   funding	   are	   provided	   by	   a	   combination	   of	   public	   and	   private	  
organisations	  
6. Public	   and	  Non-­‐profit,	   Private	  Combination	  Model:	  Similar	   to	   the	  model	   above	  but	   less	  
common,	   the	   government	   owns	   the	   resources,	   but	   funding	   comes	   from	   taxes	   and	   user	  
fees.	   The	   responsibility	   for	  management	   rests	  with	   government	   agencies	   and	   non-­‐profit	  
organisations.	  
7. Aboriginal	   Ownership	   and	   Government	   Management	   Model:	   Using	   Australia	   as	   an	  
example,	   he	   describes	   the	   protected	   area	   governance	  model	   in	  which	   Aboriginal	   people	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own	   the	   land,	   funding	   is	   provided	   by	   taxes	   and	   user	   fees,	   and	   government	   agencies	  
manage	  the	  land	  in	  partnership	  with	  the	  local	  community.	  	  
	  
Later	   an	   eighth	   approach,	   called	   the	   traditional	   community	   model,	   was	   added	   because	   of	   its	  
increasing	  popularity,	  although	  it	  is	  only	  used	  in	  a	  small	  fraction	  of	  protected	  areas.	  This	  is	  similar	  
to	   the	   ecolodge	   model,	   with	   private	   ownership	   and	   management	   and	   funding	   from	   user	   fees	  
(Eagles,	   2009).	   It	   is	   difficult	   to	   say	  which	   single	   governance	  model	   is	   “best”.	   Eagles	   (2008)	  notes	  
that	   government	   ownership	   is	   by	   far	   the	   most	   popular,	   but	   all	   three	   types	   of	   ownership	  
(government,	   non-­‐profit,	   for-­‐profit)	   can	  be	   effective.	   Their	   success	   depends	  on	   the	   locale,	   scale,	  
institutional	  structure,	  and	  available	  funds.	  For	  example,	  community	  and	  non-­‐profit	  models	  can	  be	  
very	  successful	  in	  managing	  small	  areas	  (Borrini-­‐Feyerabend	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  Government	  ownership	  
is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  viable	  option	  for	  large	  areas	  (Eagles,	  2008).	  	  
	  
Each	   of	   these	   models	   was	   assessed	   against	   ten	   principles	   of	   good	   governance	   (e.g.	   public	  
participation,	  efficiency,	  strategic	  vision,	  responsiveness),	  scoring	  them	  on	  a	  five-­‐point	  scale	  from	  
very	  weak	  (1)	  to	  very	  strong	  (5).	  The	  public	  and	  non-­‐profit	  combination	  model	  (model	  6)	  received	  
the	   highest	   score,	   and	   it	   was	   rated	   very	   strong	   or	   strong	   in	   all	   areas	   except	   transparency.	  
Interestingly,	   no	   model	   scored	   well	   on	   this	   criterion,	   suggesting	   it	   is	   given	   relatively	   little	  
importance	   in	   protected	   area	   governance.	   The	   Aboriginal	   and	   government	   model	   (model	   7)	  
received	   the	   lowest	  score,	  with	  weak	  or	  moderate	   rankings	  across	  all	   criteria	   (Eagles,	  2009).	  The	  
most	   prevalent	   forms	   of	   protected	   area	   governance	   (models	   1,	   2,	   and	   5)	   received	   moderate	  
rankings,	  indicating	  they	  may	  not	  be	  optimal.	  Eagles	  (2009)	  notes	  that	  this	  may	  be	  due	  to	  a	  flawed	  
assumption	   that	   all	   ten	   criteria	   should	   be	   equally	   weighted.	   Their	   popularity	   may	   also	   reflect	  
historical	   or	   cultural	   preferences	   for	   these	   models,	   rather	   than	   their	   ability	   to	   provide	   good	  
governance.	  
	  
From	  the	  perspective	  of	  conservation	  outcomes,	  there	   is	  a	  notable	   lack	  of	  data	  on	  the	   long-­‐term	  
effectiveness	   some	   of	   these	   governance	  models.	   This	  makes	   systematic	   evaluation	   of	   outcomes	  
against	   the	   source	   of	   funding	   and	   the	   type	   of	   management	   body	   difficult.	   For	   example,	   Eagles	  
(2008)	  notes	  a	  lack	  of	  published	  research	  on	  the	  efficacy	  of	  conservation	  under	  the	  non-­‐profit	  and	  
ecolodge	   models.	   Funding	   is	   also	   an	   issue,	   with	   varying	   levels	   of	   reliability	   and	   constraints	   on	  
spending.	   For	   example,	   while	   the	   government	   owned	   and	   tax-­‐funded	   models	   can	   offer	   large	  
amounts	  of	   stable	   funding;	   the	  money	  must	  be	   requested	   far	   in	  advance,	   spent	  during	   the	   fiscal	  
year,	  and	  is	  tied	  up	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  government.	  Government	  models,	  he	  notes,	  tend	  to	  be	  most	  
effective	   in	   situations	   that	   are	   predictable	   and	   unchanging	   (Eagles,	   2008).	   This	   could	   be	   an	  
important	  consideration	  from	  a	  resilience	  thinking	  perspective,	  as	  sometimes	  threats	  can	  increase	  
relatively	   quickly	   and	   require	   a	   timely	   response,	   which	   can	   be	   challenging	   in	   these	   government	  
owned	  and	  public-­‐funded	  models.	  	  
	  
Lockwood	  (2010)	  explicitly	  deals	  with	  this	  tension	  between	  stability	  and	  flexibility	  in	  protected	  area	  
governance.	   Resilience	   is	   included	   in	   his	   seven	   principles	   for	   good	   governance.	   Noting	   that	  
resilience	   requires	   the	   right	   balance	   between	   flexibility	   and	   security,	   he	   suggests	   that	   adaptive	  
management	  is	  one	  way	  to	  achieve	  the	  former.	  The	  importance	  of	  land	  tenure	  is	  also	  noted,	  with	  
legislation	   providing	   a	   source	   of	   security	   for	   government-­‐owned	   protected	   areas	   and	   covenants	  
and	  long-­‐term	  contracts	  providing	  security	  in	  the	  hybrid	  models	  (Lockwood,	  2010).	  Although	  there	  
are	  a	  number	  of	  different	  approaches	  to	  evaluating	  good	  governance,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  none	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of	  them	  points	  to	  a	  single	  “ideal”	  model.	  Rather,	  it	  seems	  that	  a	  range	  of	  approaches	  can	  produce	  
good	  governance	  outcomes.	  
	  
2.2	   Adaptive	  Management,	  Governance,	  and	  Comanagement	  
Adaptive	  management,	  adaptive	  governance,	  and	  adaptive	  comanagement	  are	  important	  concepts	  
in	   contemporary	   natural	   resource	   governance.	   Although	   each	   offers	   the	   promise	   of	   improved	  
outcomes,	  each	  also	  have	   their	  own	  pitfalls.	  Adaptive	  management	   is	  an	  approach	   to	  ecosystem	  
management	   that	   copes	  with	   the	   uncertainty	   and	  unpredictability	   that	   occurs	  when	   ecosystems	  
and	   people	   interact	   and	   evolve	   together	   (Berkes	   and	   Folke,	   1998).	   Adaptive	   management	  
emphasises	  learning	  over	  control	  (Pahl-­‐Wostl,	  2007).	   It	  encourages	  ‘learning	  by	  doing’	  by	  actively	  
testing	  and	   learning	   from	   the	   implementation	  of	  policies	   and	   strategies	   (Allan	  and	  Curtis,	   2005).	  
The	  approach	  builds	  adaptive	  capacity,	  which	  means	  learning	  from	  mistakes,	  responding	  to	  system	  
feedbacks	  and	  employing	  innovative	  solutions	  (Armitage,	  2005;	  Armitage	  and	  Plummer,	  2010).	  The	  
management	   approach	   has	   intuitive	   appeal	   as	   a	   way	   to	   cope	   with	   the	   uncertainty	   in	   complex	  
ecological	  systems,	  where	  cause-­‐and-­‐effect	  is	  often	  indirect	  and	  the	  dynamics	  of	  many	  interactions	  
between	  social	  and	  ecological	  processes	  does	  not	  favour	  traditional	  hypothesis	  testing.	  	  
	  
Adaptive	   management	   policies	   respond	   to	   these	   challenges	   by	   encouraging	   development	   of	  
flexibly	  institutions	  that	  can	  monitor,	  evaluate,	  and	  take	  corrective	  actions	  as	  required	  (McLain	  and	  
Lee,	  1996).	  Despite	  many	  policies	   that	   favour	   this	  approach	  since	   it	  was	   introduced	   in	   the	  1970s	  
(Holling,	  1978),	  adaptive	  management	  is	  notoriously	  difficult	  to	  implement	  in	  practice.	  McLain	  and	  
Lee	   (1996)	   contend	   failures	   are	   related	   in	   part	   to	   flawed	   assumptions	   about	   how	  management	  
decisions	  are	  implemented.	  Using	  the	  example	  of	  budworm	  control	  in	  New	  Brunswick,	  Canada,	  the	  
authors	  note	   that	   the	   adaptive	  management	  proponents	   failed	   to	   account	   for	   the	   complexity	  of	  
decision-­‐making.	  The	  management	  program	  favoured	  centralised	  control	  and	  allowed	  the	  views	  of	  
one	   stakeholder	   group	   to	   dominate,	   rather	   than	   including	   the	   range	   of	   stakeholder	   values	   and	  
knowledge	  that	  should	  be	  involved	  (McLain	  and	  Lee,	  1996).	  Although	  written	  16	  years	  ago,	  many	  
of	   the	   same	   issues	   highlighted	   by	   McLain	   and	   Lee	   remain	   problematic;	   and	   implementation	   of	  
adaptive	  management	  principles	  remains	  challenging.	  	  
	  
One	   of	   these	   challenges	   is	   the	  way	   the	   term	   is	   used	   by	   different	   actors	  within	   governance.	   The	  
term	   adaptive	   management	   is	   used	   widely,	   but	   tends	   to	   be	   interpreted	   very	   differently	   by	  
scientists	   and	   policymakers.	   In	   its	   original	   scientific	   form,	   adaptive	   management	   seeks	   to	   use	  
surprise	   as	   a	   learning	   tool,	   rather	   than	   simply	   avoiding	   or	   reacting	   to	   surprises,	   which	   are	  
unavoidable	   in	   the	  management	  of	  natural	   systems	   (McLain	  and	  Lee,	  1996).	  Walters	  and	  Holling	  
(1990)	   distinguish	   three	   forms	   of	   adaptive	   management,	   evolutionary	   (trial	   and	   error),	   passive	  
(decisions	  based	  on	  a	  model	  from	  historical	  data	  that	  is	  presumed	  correct),	  and	  active	  (data	  is	  used	  
to	   develop	   alternative	   response	  models	   and	  policy	   choices	   are	   based	  on	  balancing	   alternatives).	  
Although	  the	  active	  adaptive	  management	  model	  holds	  the	  most	  promise	  for	  ecological	  outcomes,	  
policymakers	  tend	  to	  seek	  single,	  ideal	  solutions,	  thus	  adaptive	  management	  is	  often	  interpreted	  in	  
a	  passive	  way	  (Walters	  and	  Holling,	  1990).	  Recent	  studies	  in	  Australia	  confirm	  the	  popularity	  of	  this	  
passive	  approach	  to	  adaptive	  management	  in	  NRM	  practice,	  even	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  ideal	  of	  active	  
adaptive	   management	   was	   acknowledged	   in	   principle	   (Allan	   and	   Curtis,	   2005;	   Lockwood	   et	   al.,	  
2009).	   Although	   the	   approach	   holds	   promise	   as	   a	   bridge	   between	   science,	   policy,	   and	   practice	  
(Angelstam	   et	   al.,	   2003),	   it	   often	   falls	   short	   of	   expectations.	   Adaptive	   management	   requires	  
reflection,	   learning,	   and	   experimentation,	   but	   cultural	   and	   institutional	   conditions	   have	   acted	   as	  
barriers	  (Lockwood	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  wider	  context	  of	  governance	  has	  a	  role	  in	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facilitating	  adaptive	  management.	  
	  
Adaptive	   governance	   is	   distinct	   from	   adaptive	   management,	   but	   it	   incorporates	   some	   of	   the	  
principles	  of	  the	  approach	  to	  a	  wider	  social	  context	  (Folke	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  Like	  adaptive	  management,	  
it	   stresses	   the	   importance	   of	   learning	   from	   and	   preparing	   for	   change	   (Dietz	   et	   al.,	   2003).	   This	  
approach	   to	   governance	   requires	   collaboration	   across	   governance	   levels,	   thus	   requiring	  
information	   sharing,	   conflict	   resolution,	   institutional	   support	   (e.g.	   infrastructure	   and	   rule	  
compliance),	  analytic	  deliberation	  amongst	  diverse	  stakeholders,	  and	  nested	  institutions	  (Dietz	  et	  
al.,	   2003).	   It	   is	   one	   aspect	   of	   a	   three-­‐pronged	   adaptive	   ecosystem	   approach,	  where	   governance	  
provides	   the	   vision	   and	   direction,	   management	   operationalises	   it,	   and	   monitoring	   provides	   the	  
feedback	  (Folke	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  	  
	  
In	   examining	   adaptive	   management	   in	   water	   management,	   Pahl-­‐Wostl	   (2007)	   positions	   the	  
practice	   in	   the	   wider	   governance	   regime.	   Adaptive	   management	   requires	   a	   governance	   regime	  
that	   allows	   management	   systems	   to	   respond	   to	   change	   and	   social	   learning.	   When	   this	  
management	  approach	  is	  inserted	  in	  a	  governance	  regime	  that	  is	  not	  adaptive,	  learning	  may	  not	  be	  
stimulated	  and	  institutions	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  grapple	  with	  the	  complexity	  and	  uncertainty	  (Pahl-­‐
Wostl,	   2007).	   She	   suggests	   that	   in	   order	   for	   adaptive	   management	   to	   be	   successful,	   the	  
governance	  regime	  must	  transition	  to	  a	  form	  that	  has	  the	  built-­‐in	  capacity	  to	  change	  the	  structure	  
of	  a	  system.	  This	  can	  involve	  wholesale	  changes	  to	  the	  way	  information	  and	  risks	  are	  managed,	  and	  
mechanisms	   that	   allow	   transformation	   in	   response	   to	   this	   information	   (Evans,	   2012;	   Pahl-­‐Wostl,	  
2007).	  The	  dynamics	  of	   these	  transitions	  and	  how	  they	  can	  be	   implemented	  are	  still	  not	  entirely	  
understood.	  Pahl-­‐Wostl	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  have	  developed	  a	  framework	  to	  examine	  how	  these	  changes	  
occur	  in	  water	  management	  regimes	  	  
	  
The	   concepts	   of	   comanagement	   and	   adaptive	   management	   have	   also	   been	   combined	   into	   a	  
governance	   approach	   called	   ‘adaptive	   comanagement’.	   This	   term	   refers	   to	   a	   management	  
approach	   that	   links	   horizontally	   and	   vertically	   across	   governance,	   incorporating	   the	   dynamic	  
learning	   element	   of	   adaptive	   management	   and	   linking	   and	   cooperation	   elements	   of	  
comanagement	  (Olsson	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  Advocates	  of	  the	  approach	  aim	  to	  address	  the	  shortcomings	  
of	  both	  approaches	  by	   shifting	   from	   the	  heavy	  emphasis	  on	   science	   to	  practice	   (Armitage	  et	   al.,	  
2009).	   Adaptive	   comanagement	   extends	   adaptive	  management	   into	   the	   social	   realm	   by	   sharing	  
management	   power	   and	   responsibility,	   and	   is	   thus	   presented	   as	   a	   means	   of	   operationalising	  
adaptive	  governance	  (Dietz	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  Folke	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  	  
	  
This	   type	   of	  management	   arrangement	   takes	   advantage	   of	   the	   polycentric	   form	   of	   governance,	  
linking	   institutions	   and	   networks.	   Networks,	   in	   adaptive	   comanagement,	   are	   viewed	   as	  
heterogenous	  groups	  of	  actors	  that	  are	  linked	  by	  social	  learning	  (Armitage	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  It	  requires	  
cooperation	   between	   communities,	   governmental	   and	   non-­‐governmental	   agencies,	   and	   user	  
groups,	   thus	   social	   capital,	   trust,	   and	   leadership	   play	   important	   roles	   (Folke	   et	   al.,	   2005).	   The	  
approach	   accepts	   uncertainty	   as	   a	   given	   in	   the	   social	   realm,	   and	   it	   rests	   on	   the	   principle	   that	  
problem	   solving	   requires	   multiple	   sources	   and	   types	   of	   knowledge	   (Armitage	   et	   al.,	   2009).	  
Indigenous	   knowledge	   in	   particular	   is	   often	   emphasised	   in	   such	   systems	   (Armitage	   et	   al.,	   2009;	  
Robards	   and	   Lovecraft,	   2010).	   Integrating	   indigenous	   knowledge	   with	   western	   science	   can	   be	  
challenging,	  and	  how	  this	   integration	  should	  occur	  is	  highly	  contested	  (Hill	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  Hill	  et	  al.	  
(2012)	  contend	  that	  forms	  of	  governance	  that	  involve	  power	  sharing,	  for	  example,	  co-­‐governance,	  
hold	   the	   most	   promise	   for	   integrating	   indigenous	   knowledge	   into	   Australian	   natural	   resource	  
governance.	  Similar	  to	  the	  way	  adaptive	  governance	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	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adaptive	   management	   to	   be	   successful,	   it	   appears	   that	   adaptive	   co-­‐management	   also	   calls	   for	  
wider	  changes	  to	  governance,	  to	  an	  adaptive	  co-­‐governance	  approach.	  
	  
Although	  the	  philosophy	  of	  adaptive	  comanagement	  has	  gained	  ground	  in	  recent	  years,	  there	  is	  a	  
need	   for	  more	  monitoring	   to	  evaluate	   the	  processes	  and	  outcomes	  of	   the	  approach	   (Cundill	  and	  
Fabricius,	   2010;	   Lindenmayer	   et	   al.,	   2011).	   Cundill	   and	   Fabricus	   (2010)	   note	   that	   the	   tools	   to	  
evaluate	   comanagement	   are	   blunt,	   and	   they	   offer	   a	   framework	   for	   monitoring	   governance	  
outcomes	  in	  an	  adaptive	  co-­‐management	  regime.	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  practical	  challenges	  that	  
have	   contributed	   to	   the	   dearth	   of	   data.	   For	   example,	   there	   is	   inadequate	   understanding	   of	   the	  
mechanisms	   that	  drive	   transformations	   in	   social	   and	  ecological	   systems	   (Section	  5),	   and	   there	   is	  
also	   a	   lack	   of	   appropriate	   methods	   to	   monitor	   change	   in	   these	   complex	   systems.	   Monitoring	  
governance	  in	  general	  is	  challenging,	  since	  it	  involves	  a	  dynamic	  and	  complex	  set	  of	  drivers,	  can	  be	  
subject	   to	   dramatic	   shifts	   due	   to	   politics,	   and	   no	   single	   perspective	   on	   what	   makes	   good	  
governance	  (Cundill	  and	  Fabricius,	  2010).	  These	  concerns	  suggest	  that	  the	  shift	  toward	  new	  forms	  
of	  governance	  not	  only	  faces	  the	  challenge	  of	  changing	  institutional	  culture,	  but	  also	  the	  practical	  
challenges	  of	  ensuring	  new	  paradigms	  are	  able	  to	  outperform	  the	  old.	  
	  
3	   Networks	  and	  Social	  Capital	  
3.1	   Networks	  and	  Governance	  
The	  concepts	  of	  social	  and	  policy	  networks	  and	  the	  related	  concept	  of	  social	  capital	  are	  important	  
elements	   in	   the	  dynamics	  of	  governance.	  Networks	  are	  a	  core	   focus	  of	   the	  new	  governance	  and	  
emblematic	  of	  the	  shift	  from	  government	  to	  governance	  (Evans,	  2012).	  As	  with	  governance,	  there	  
is	  no	  single	  definition	  of	  networks.	  The	  basic	  principle	  of	  networks	  is	  that	  the	  structure	  of	  relations	  
between	  actors	  determines	  the	  content	  of	  their	  relationships	  (Ritzer,	  2005).	  The	  language	  used	  in	  
the	  network	   governance	   literature	   can	  be	   confusing.	   For	   example,	   governance	  networks	   are	   the	  
units	  of	  governance,	  while	  the	  term	  network	  governance	  is	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  way	  governance	  
regimes	  are	  organised	  (Evans,	  2012).	  A	  governance	  network	  is	  comprised	  of	  a	  group	  of	  actors	  from	  
the	  public	   and	  private	   sector	   that	   come	   together	   to	   solve	   common	  problems	  or	   deliver	   services	  
(Evans,	  2012;	  Rhodes,	  1996).	  Although	   state	  agencies	  are	  part	  of	   these	  networks,	   there	   is	  also	  a	  
range	   of	   voluntary	   actors	   involved.	   This	   range	   of	   actors	   can	   complicate	   governance,	   but	   it	   also	  
comes	   with	   a	   number	   of	   advantages.	   For	   example,	   networks	   pool	   resources	   from	   disparate	  
individuals	  and	  organisations,	  enhancing	  the	  capacity	  of	  governance	  regimes.	  In	  addition,	  many	  of	  
these	   actors	   are	   in	   positions	   outside	  of	   bureaucracy	   and	   thus	   networks	   are	   thought	   to	   be	  more	  
capable	  of	  responding	  to	  emerging	  needs	  and	  opportunities	  (Evans,	  2012).	  
	  
A	   particular	   form	   of	   network	   known	   as	   a	   policy	   network	   plays	   an	   important	   role	   in	   the	   policy	  
process.	   These	   networks	   include	   the	   sets	   of	   formal	   and	   informal	   institutional	   linkages	   between	  
governmental	   and	   other	   actors.	   Policies	   emerge	   from	   the	   interactions	   between	   actors	   in	   these	  
networks,	  which	  are	  structured	  around	  shared	  beliefs	  and	  interests	  (Rhodes,	  1997;	  Rhodes,	  2006;	  
Rhodes,	  2007).	  Policy	  networks	  are	  one	  of	  the	  key	  characteristics	  of	  new	  governance	  because,	  as	  
emphasised	   in	   Section	   2,	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   actors	   outside	   of	   government	   are	   required	   to	   deliver	  
services.	   	  Exchange	   theory	   is	  one	  way	   to	  understand	  decision-­‐making	  activity	   in	  policy	  networks.	  
This	  theory	   is	  based	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  actors	  (e.g.	  organisations)	  are	  dependent	  on	  other	  actors	  
for	   resources,	   and	   they	   have	   to	   exchange	   resources	   to	   achieve	   their	   goals.	   Decisions	   within	  
organisations	  are	  thus	  constrained	  by	  other	  organisations	  (Rhodes,	  2007).	  Policy	  networks	  tend	  to	  
have	   a	   dominant	   coalition	   that	   is	   less	   constrained,	   retaining	   discretion,	   and	   influencing	   which	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relationships	  will	  be	  held	  and	  the	  resources	  that	  will	  be	  sought.	  Power	  potential	  in	  these	  networks	  
is	  “a	  product	  of	  the	  resources	  of	  each	  organization,	  of	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  and	  of	  the	  process	  of	  
exchange	  between	  organisations”	  (Rhodes,	  2007,	  p.	  1245).	  Power	  is	  thus	  an	  enduring	  and	  dynamic	  
feature	  of	  policy	  networks.	  
	  
Although	   network	   analysis	   can	   be	   conducted	   from	   three	   perspectives	   (instrumental,	   interactive	  
and	   institutional),	   the	   institutional	   perspective	   is	   most	   relevant	   here.	   From	   an	   institutional	  
perspective,	  networks	  are	  analysed	  as	  a	  whole	  with	  special	  attention	  to	  institutions	  and	  how	  they	  
shape	  networks,	  rather	  than	  specific	  actors	  or	  interactions.	  In	  this	  sense,	  government	  can	  improve	  
network	  governance	  by	  influencing	  the	  structure	  and	  culture	  of	  the	  policy	  network,	  creating	  better	  
conditions	  for	  problem-­‐solving	  and	  policy-­‐making	  (Lee,	  2003).	  This	  suggests	  that	  action	  from	  both	  
state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  dynamics	  of	  networks.	  	  
	  
3.1	   Social	  Capital	  
Social	  capital	  is	  an	  essential	  feature	  of	  networks.	  Although	  the	  term	  social	  capital	  has	  much	  earlier	  
roots,	   the	  concept	  moved	   into	  popular	  consciousness,	  and	  subsequently	   into	  government	  policy,	  
after	  being	  popularised	  by	  Robert	  Putnam	   (1995).	   In	   this	   essay	  Putnam	   (1995,	  p.	   67)	  uses	   social	  
capital	   to	   refer	   to	  “features	  of	   social	  organisation	  such	  as	  networks,	  norms,	  and	  social	   trust	   that	  
facilitate	  coordination	  and	  cooperation	  for	  mutual	  benefit”.	  Although	  a	  widely	  used	  definition,	  it	  is	  
too	  similar	  to	  the	  definitions	  of	  governance	  to	  prove	  useful.	  The	  World	  Bank	  defines	  social	  capital	  
as	   “the	   institutions,	   relationships,	   and	   norms	   that	   shape	   the	   quality	   and	   quantity	   of	   a	   society’s	  
social	  interactions...	  Social	  capital	  is	  not	  just	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  institutions	  which	  underpin	  a	  society	  –	  
it	   is	   the	  glue	  that	  holds	  them	  together”	   (World	  Bank,	  1999).	   It	   is	   this	   last	  analogy,	  wherein	  social	  
capital	  is	  the	  glue	  that	  binds	  networks,	  that	  illuminates	  the	  relationship	  between	  social	  capital	  and	  
concepts	  such	  as	  networks	  and	  institutions.	  	  
	  
Social	  capital	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  another	  form	  of	  capital,	  although	  perhaps	  a	  more	  abstract	  one.	  
Just	  as	  economic	  capital	  can	  be	  found	  in	  people’s	  bank	  accounts,	  social	  capital	  can	  be	  understood	  
as	  the	  value	  inherent	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  relationships	  (Portes,	  1998).	  Social	  capital	  is	  prized	  in	  the	  
social	   realm	   for	   its	   contribution	   to	  human	  health	  and	  well-­‐being.	   	   In	   governance	   social	   capital	   is	  
prized	  because	  it	  facilitates	  cooperation	  within	  or	  among	  groups	  (Healy	  et	  al.,	  2001).	  Social	  capital	  
in	   the	   institutionalised	   realm	   focuses	   on	   the	   reciprocity	   between	   networks.	   It	   recognises,	   for	  
example,	  that	  successful	  collective	  action	  depends	  on	  forums	  where	  the	  state,	  private	  sector,	  and	  
citizens	   can	   participate	   and	   pursue	   common	   goals	   (World	   Bank,	   1999).	   Social	   capital	   is	   built	   in	  
these	  forums.	  
	  
There	   are	   several	   forms	   of	   social	   capital,	   all	   of	   which	   play	   different	   roles	   in	   society	   and	   are	  
characterised	  by	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  bond.	  Putnam	  (2000)	  identified	  two	  types:	  
• Bonding	   social	   capital	   refers	   to	   the	   strong	   (horizontal)	   ties	  or	  bonds	  within	  homogenous	  
groups	   that	   form	   between	   people	   with	   more	   commonalities	   and	   reflect	   greater	  
interdependence.	   This	   form	   of	   social	   capital	   is	   associated	   with	   closed	   networks	   (e.g.	  
organizations	   that	  mainly	  encompass	  people	  with	   the	  same	  background),	  and	   it	   supports	  
specific	  reciprocity	  and	  solidarity	  within	  these	  groups.	  	  
• Bridging	  social	  capital	   refers	  to	  the	  weak	  ties	   (vertical)	   that	   link	  or	  bridge	  heterogeneous	  
groups.	   This	   type	   of	   social	   capital	   is	   of	   particular	   interest	   in	   governance	   for	   its	   role	   in	  
facilitating	   the	   flow	  of	   new	   resources,	   ideas,	   and	   information.	   This	   form	  of	   social	   capital	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links	   individuals	   to	   external	   assets	   and	   provides	   opportunities	   for	   those	   who	   may	   be	  
excluded	   from	  more	   formal	   avenues	   to	   affect	   change.	   In	   the	  words	  of	   Putnam	   (2000,	   p.	  
23),	  	  “Bonding	  social	  capital	  constitutes	  a	  kind	  of	  sociological	  superglue,	  whereas	  bridging	  
social	  capital	  provides	  a	  sociological	  WD-­‐40.”	  	  
	  
Bracing	   is	   the	   third	   type	  of	   social	   capital	   that	   is	   relevant	   for	  governance.	  Proposed	  by	  Rydin	  and	  
Holman	  (2004),	  bracing	  social	  capital	  strengthens	  links	  between	  and	  across	  scales	  and	  sector,	  but	  
only	  operates	  within	  a	  limited	  set	  of	  actors.	  Expanding	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  social	  capital	  as	  the	  glue	  
that	  binds,	   it	   is	  perhaps	  more	  accurate	   to	  say	   that	  bonding	  capital	   is	   the	  glue	   that	  brings	  people	  
together	  and	  makes	  them	  closer.	  Bridging	  capital	  builds	  bridges	  out	  between	  people,	  and	  bracing	  
capital	   strengthens	   social	   scaffolding	   that	  brings	   some	  people	   together	  and	  others	   further	  apart.	  
Rydin	   and	  Holman	   (2004,	   p.	   123-­‐124)	   introduced	   the	   concept	   to	   describe	   a	   type	   of	   relationship	  
observed	  in	  many	  partnerships	  and	  governance	  initiatives:	  	  
Such	   linkages	   go	   beyond	   the	   bonding	   of	   any	   speciﬁc	   group	   but	   are	   more	   speciﬁc	   than	  
suggested	  by	  the	  rather	  broad	  concept	  of	  bridging.	  The	  use	  of	  bracing	  capital	  encourages	  
common	  values	  and	  norms	  among	  those	  linked	  together,	  but	  these	  may	  be	  more	  strategic	  
and	   less	  all-­‐embracing	  than	  suggested	   in	  the	  case	  of	  bonding	  capital.	  Bridging	  capital,	  by	  
contrast,	   is	   rarely	   considered	   in	   relation	   to	   common	   norms	   and	   values,	   more	   emphasis	  
being	  placed	  on	  the	  networks	  created	  (Bærenholdt	  and	  Aarsæther,	  2002).	  This	  signiﬁcantly	  
limits	   its	   usefulness	   in	   describing	  many	   partnership	   or	   collaborative	   situations	  where	   the	  
development	  of	  common	  norms	  is	  key.	  	  
	  
In	   governance,	   bracing	   capital	   supports	   long-­‐term	   strategic	   relationships	   that	   build	   trust	   and	  
reciprocity	  between	  government	  and	  community	  actors,	   respecting	   their	  distinctive	   interests	  but	  
recognising	  the	  utility	  of	  the	  relationships	  (Colliver,	  2012).	  The	  multiple	  dimensions	  of	  social	  capital	  
are	  important	  because	  different	  combinations	  of	  each	  type	  are	  believed	  to	  account	  for	  a	  range	  of	  
outcomes,	   and	   these	   combinations	   are	   dynamic	   (Woolcock,	   2001).	  While	   bonding	   capital	   keeps	  
networks	   viable	   internally	   by	   creating	   and	   continuing	   connections	   between	   individuals,	   bridging	  
capital	   allows	   connections	   between	   otherwise	   disconnected	   networks.	   Bonding	   social	   capital	  
breeds	   strong	   ‘thick’	   trust	   within	   a	   network	   and	   is	   inwardly	   focused,	   bridging	   capital	   builds	  
outward	  connections	  and	  ‘thin’	  trust	  (Kavanaugh	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  It	  is	  believed	  that	  communities	  with	  
both	  types	  of	  social	  capital	  are	  the	  most	  effective	  in	  organising	  collective	  action,	  and	  it	  would	  stand	  
to	  reason	  that	  the	  third	  type	  (i.e.	  bracing)	  would	  also	  foster	  collective	  action	  by	  building	  common	  
norms	  in	  partnerships.	  
	  
4	   Change,	  Learning,	  and	  Innovation	  
4.1	   Institutional	  Change	  and	  Learning	  
Drivers	  of	  biodiversity	  loss	  such	  as	  climate	  change	  will	  place	  pressure	  on	  institutions	  to	  change	  to	  
address	  uncertain	  and	  often	  unpredictable	  threats.	  This	   includes	  changes	   in	  the	  ways	   institutions	  
learn	  and	  make	  decisions	  (Dovers	  and	  Hezri,	  2010).	  Among	  the	  key	  features	  of	  institutions	  is	  that	  
they	  structure	  interactions,	  providing	  stability,	  predictability,	  and	  certainty	  (Goodin,	  1996).	  This	   is	  
exactly	  why	   they	   are	   prized,	   particularly	   in	   economics	   and	   politics,	  where	   predictability	   reduces	  
transaction	   costs	   and	   provides	   stability.	   Although	   these	   characteristics	   have	   often	   led	   to	   static	  
descriptions	  of	   institutions,	   institutions	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  enable	  actor	  behaviour	  and	  they	  can	  
change	  over	  time	  (Hodgson,	  2006;	  North,	  1990;	  Scott,	  2001).	  Institutions	  do,	  however,	  have	  strong	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status	  quo	  biases	  and	  are	  often	  resistant	  to	  change	  (Jamieson,	  2011).	  	  As	  previously	  noted,	  this	  bias	  
has	  influenced	  the	  field	  of	  institutional	  analysis,	  directing	  its	  attention	  to	  the	  constraining	  force	  of	  
institutions	   in	   lieu	   of	   research	   on	   the	   mechanisms	   and	   pathways	   to	   change	   in	   institutionalised	  
situations	   (Dacin	   et	   al.,	   2002;	   Ritzer,	   2005;	   Weible	   et	   al.,	   2012).	   In	   recent	   years,	   institutional	  
analysis	   has	   increasingly	   focused	   on	   issues	   of	   institutional	   change,	   both	   in	   how	   institutions	  
themselves	  change	  over	  time	  and	  how	  they	  can	  generate	  change	  (Dacin	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  In	  addition	  to	  
drawing	  on	   the	  perspectives	   of	   discursive	   institutionalists,	  my	  PhD	  will	   draw	  on	   the	   institutional	  
change	   literature	   to	  understand	  how	   institutions	   can	  better	   respond	   to	  drivers	  and	  disturbances	  
that	  may	  threaten	  or	  help	  protect	  biodiversity.	  	  
	  
The	   institutional	   change	  perspective	   is	   adopted	   in	   response	   to	   the	  poor	  performance	  of	   existing	  
biodiversity	   governance	   regimes.	   Change	   comes	   in	   two	   general	   forms:	   incremental	   and	   radical.	  
Institutional	   change	   is	   often	   slow	   and	   incremental,	   responding	   to	   challenges	   as	   they	   arise.	   In	   a	  
process	   called	   institutional	   bricolage,	   actors	   respond	   to	   changing	   circumstances	   by	   drawing	   on	  
existing	   social	   and	   cultural	   arrangements	   to	   shape	   institutions	   (Cleaver,	   2001).	   There	   are	   times,	  
however,	   when	   challenges	   become	   so	   great	   that	   major	   changes	   are	   required	   (Mintrom	   and	  
Norman,	  2009).	   This	   concept	   incorporates	  both	   radical	   and	   incremental	   change,	   and	   can	   involve	  
transforming	   existing	   institutions	   or	   even	   deinstitutionalisation	   (Lawrence	   and	   Suddaby,	   2006).	  
Although	   researchers	   may	   disagree	   about	   the	   extent	   and	   nature	   of	   change	   required,	   many	  
researchers	  have	  emphasised	  a	  need	  for	   institutional	  change	  to	  address	  environmental	  problems	  
(e.g.	  Cleaver,	  2002;	  Coffey	  and	  Wescott,	  2010;	  Connor	  and	  Dovers,	  2004;	  Young,	  2002a).	   	   In	   the	  
context	  of	  biodiversity,	  not	  only	  have	  current	  governance	  regimes	  been	  unsuccessful	   in	  efforts	  to	  
slow	  or	  halt	  biodiversity	   loss,	  but	   the	  expectation	  of	  additional	  pressures	  such	  as	  climate	  change	  
increases	  the	  urgency	  of	  reform	  (Coffey	  and	  Wescott,	  2010).	  	  
	  
Policy-­‐making	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  form	  of	  social	  learning	  in	  which	  actors	  collectively	  solve	  puzzles.	  
This	   interaction	  is	  a	  process	  of	  social	   learning,	  with	  lessons	  expressed	  through	  policy	  (Hall,	  1993).	  
Social	  learning	  is	  an	  essential	  part	  of	  policy-­‐making	  and	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  “a	  deliberate	  attempt	  to	  
adjust	   the	   goals	   or	   techniques	   of	   policy	   in	   response	   to	   past	   experience	   and	   new	   information.	  
Learning	  is	  indicated	  when	  policy	  changes	  as	  the	  result	  of	  such	  a	  process”	  (Hall,	  1993,	  p.	  278).	  	  This	  
suggests	  social	   learning	   is	  a	  significant	  catalyst	   for	   institutional	  change.	  For	  example,	   in	  order	   for	  
governance	   to	  cope	  with	   the	  complexity	  of	   social	  and	  ecological	   systems,	  data	  on	  processes	  and	  
implementation	  of	  policy	  should	  be	  collected	  and	  analysed,	  and	  adjustments	  to	  the	  regime	  should	  
be	  made	  accordingly.	  Sometimes	   these	  adjustments	  will	   require	  small,	   incremental	   changes,	  and	  
sometimes	  they	  will	  require	  radical	  shifts	  in	  approach.	  
	  
The	   institutional	  and	  political	  science	   literature	  generally	  focuses	  on	  the	  relevance	  of	  a	  particular	  
form	  of	  learning	  known	  as	  policy	  learning.	  May	  (1992)	  describes	  two	  types	  of	  policy	  learning:	  social	  
and	   instrumental.	   Social	   learning	   here	   is	   slightly	   narrower	   than	   the	   definition	   provided	   by	   Hall	  
(1993)	   above.	   May	   (1992)	   limits	   the	   concept	   of	   social	   learning	   to	   policy	   learning	   that	   involves	  
lessons	   about	   how	   policy	   problems	   are	   constructed	   and	   how	   solving	   the	   problem	   should	   be	  
approached	  (i.e.	  scope	  of	  policy	  and	  its	  goals).	  Instrumental	  learning,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  focused	  
around	   the	   technical	   aspects	   of	   policy-­‐making,	   and	   involves	   lessons	   about	   policy	   design	   and	  
knowledge	   about	   when	   a	   particular	   policy	   instrument	   is	   appropriate	   or	   viable	   (May,	   1992).	  
Although	  policy	   learning	   is	  dynamic,	   it	   is	   important	  to	  note	  that	   it	   is	  not	  only	   involved	   in	  change.	  
Learning	  can	  also	  aid	  in	  sustaining	  existing	  policy	  practices	  (Yanow,	  2003).	  If	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  
a	   particular	   practice	   is	   working	   or	   that	   better	   alternatives	   do	   not	   exist,	   then	   the	   lesson	   is	   that	  
change	  is	  not	  required.	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Policy-­‐relevant	   learning	  can	  also	  be	  characterized	  by	   its	  depth	  and	  scope.	  One	  common	  typology	  
classifies	  learning	  into	  three	  groups:	  single-­‐,	  double-­‐,	  and	  triple-­‐loop	  learning.5	  Single-­‐loop	  learning	  
entails	   learning	   new	   facts	   and	   perspectives,	   but	   it	   does	   not	   delve	   deeper	   into	   the	   underlying	  
assumptions	  or	  goals,	  nor	  does	   it	  question	  fundamental	  questions	  of	  design	  or	  activities	   (Argyris,	  
1976;	  Argyris,	  1993;	  Innes	  and	  Booher,	  2003b).	  	  Cultural	  norms	  tend	  to	  favour	  single-­‐loop	  learning,	  
particularly	   in	   regard	   to	   controversial	   issues,	   thus	   this	   type	   of	   learning	   is	  most	   prevalent	  within	  
groups	   and	   organizations	   (Argyris,	   1976).	   Single-­‐loop	   learning	   can	   lead	   to	   incremental	  
improvements	  in	  policy	  and	  action	  strategies	  (Pahl-­‐Wostl	  et	  al.,	  2010),	  and	  in	  some	  situations	  this	  
is	   an	  effective	  way	   to	   solve	   the	  policy	  problem	   (Innes	   and	  Booher,	   2003b).	   For	  more	   intractable	  
and	   complex	   problems,	   double-­‐loop	   learning	   is	   required.	   Here	   actors	   question	   underlying	  
assumptions	  of	  a	  policy,	  program,	  organisation,	  etc.;	  and	   this	  often	   requires	   re-­‐evaluation	  of	   the	  
theories	  of	  cause	  and	  effect	  that	  underpin	  their	  rationale	  (Argyris,	  1976;	  Pahl-­‐Wostl	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  
Double-­‐loop	   learning	   thus	   involves	   reframing	   the	   problem,	   re-­‐thinking	   goals	   and	   interests,	   and	  
even	   applying	   different	   values	   (Innes	   and	   Booher,	   2003b).	   Triple-­‐loop	   learning	   goes	   one	   step	  
further,	  and	  occurs	  when	  current	  assumptions	  no	  longer	  appear	  to	  hold.	  Actors	  start	  to	  reconsider	  
the	  values,	  beliefs,	  and	  worldviews.	  Pahl-­‐Wostl	  (2009)	  posits	  that	  social	  learning	  proceeds	  through	  
each	  of	  these	  three	  forms	  of	  learning	  in	  turn.	  	  
	  
Although	  essential,	   learning	  is	  not	  easy.	  If	  actors	  were	  perfectly	  rational,	  they	  would	  update	  their	  
beliefs	  as	  new	  information	  arises.	  The	  learning	  process	  would	  occur	  smoothly	  and	  institutional	  and	  
other	   changes	   would	   occur	   logically	   and	   progressively.	   Many	   formal	   models,	   especially	   older	  
economic	  models,	  assume	  that	   learning	   is	  unproblematic	  and	  that	  people	  update	  their	  beliefs	  as	  
new	   information	   arises	   (Sniderman	   and	   Levendusky,	   2007).	   Cognitive	   biases	   and	   limitations	   in	  
information	  processing	  ability,	  however,	  can	  act	  as	  significant	  barriers	   in	  the	   learning	  process	   for	  
both	   experts	   and	   non-­‐experts	   within	   governance	   regimes	   (Gilovich	   et	   al.,	   2002;	   Sniderman	   and	  
Levendusky,	   2007).	   This	   includes	   a	   range	   of	   cognitive	   biases	   that	   favour	   rejection	   of	   new	  
information,	  even	  if	   it	   is	  objective,	  particularly	   if	   it	  disagrees	  with	  our	  pre-­‐existing	  beliefs.	   In	  fact,	  
there	   is	   ample	   evidence	   that	   earnestly	   attending	   to	   facts	   and	   arguments	   that	   differ	   from	   our	  
current	  beliefs	  or	  practices	  can	  actually	  serve	  to	  further	  entrench	  those	  beliefs	  (Pronin	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  
This	   is	  not	   just	  a	  phenomenon	  among	  non-­‐experts.	  Experts	  are	  also	  prone	  to	   the	  same	  cognitive	  
biases,	  and	  in	  some	  instances	  issue	  involvement	  and	  education	  can	  make	  people	  even	  more	  prone	  
to	  such	  biases.	  	  
	  
Cognitive	  scientists	  and	  social	  psychologists	  contend	  that	  part	  of	  the	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  the	  emotive	  
process	   known	   as	   motivated	   reasoning	   (Kunda,	   1990).	   Motivated	   reasoning	   is	   one	   strategy	   for	  
reducing	  cognitive	  dissonance,	  and	  people	  use	   it	   to	  arrive	  at	   their	  desired	  conclusion	  (Druckman	  
and	  Bolsen,	  2011).	  Rather	  than	  assessing	  new	  information	   logically	  sans	  emotion,	  people	  tend	  to	  
seek	  out	  evidence	  or	  view	  new	  evidence	  through	  the	   lens	  of	  their	  existing	  views,	  even	   if	   it	   is	  not	  
objectively	  accurate	  (Druckman	  and	  Bolsen,	  2011;	  Kunda,	  1990).	  Kahan	  and	  Braman	  (2006)	  see	  the	  
issue	   slightly	   differently,	   contending	   that	   cultural	   values	   orient	   (rather	   than	   motivate)	  
interpretation	  of	  empirical	  evidence.	  They	  contend	  that	  cultural	  values,	  rather	  than	  knowledge	  or	  
facts,	  are	  at	  the	  core	  of	  many	  policy	  conflicts.	  In	  a	  set	  of	  processes	  they	  call	  cultural	  cognition,	  they	  
contend	   that	   people	   accept	   or	   reject	   empirical	   claims	   about	   policies	   (e.g.	   environmental	  
regulation,	   gun	   control,	   and	   the	   death	   penalty)	   through	   their	   worldviews.	   Such	   processes	   have	  
important	   implications	   for	   policy	   debates,	   since	   they	   indicate	   that	   simply	   disseminating	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Alternatively	  called	  first,	  second,	  and	  third	  order	  social	  learning	  (Grin	  and	  Loeber	  2007).	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information	   and	   expecting	   opinion	   to	   shift	   is	   futile	   (Kahan	   and	   Braman,	   2006).	   These	   cognitive	  
biases	  also	  have	  important	  implications	  for	  policy-­‐oriented	  learning,	  suggesting	  that	  this	  process	  of	  
learning	  is	  by	  no	  means	  straightforward	  and	  involves	  much	  more	  than	  empirical	  evidence.	  
	  
As	  the	  cultural	  cognition	  theory	  suggests,	  policy	  learning	  involves	  more	  than	  individual	  cognition.	  It	  
is	   also	   a	   social	   process.	   Policy-­‐relevant	   knowledge	   binds	   groups	   together	   and	   is	   rooted	   in	   the	  
interactive	   context	   of	   the	   policy	   process	   (Yanow,	   2003).	   The	   process	   by	   which	   policy-­‐oriented	  
learning	  occurs	  between	  different	   groups	   can	  be	   viewed	   through	  a	   theoretical	   framework	   called	  
the	   Advocacy	   Coalition	   Framework	   (ACF)	   (Sabatier,	   1988;	   Sabatier	   and	   Jenkins-­‐Smith,	   1993;	  
Sabatier	  and	  Jenkins-­‐Smith,	  1999).	  The	  framework	  aggregates	  actors	  into	  coalitions	  that	  are	  bound	  
together	  by	  beliefs	  and	  stable	  over	   time.	  There	  are	   three	   levels	  of	  beliefs	   in	   the	  ACF:	  deep	  core,	  
policy	   core,	   and	   secondary	   aspects.	   Deep	   core	   beliefs	   are	   the	   fundamental	   normative	   and	  
ontological	   beliefs	   that	   actors	   hold.	   These	   might	   be	   beliefs	   about	   human	   nature;	   the	   relative	  
priority	   of	   values	   such	   as	   freedom,	   knowledge,	   etc.;	   sociocultural	   identity	   (including	   profession);	  
and	   the	   fundamental	   criteria	   of	   justice.	   Policy	   core	   beliefs	   are	   the	   fundamental	   policy	   positions	  
about	   how	   to	   achieve	   core	   values.	   This	   includes	   beliefs	   such	   as	   the	   cause	   and	   severity	   of	   the	  
problem,	   distribution	   of	   authority	   (state	   versus	  market),	   policy	   instrument	   priorities,	   and	   policy	  
preferences.	   Finally,	   secondary	   aspects	   are	   the	   easiest	   to	   change	   because	   they	   relate	   to	  
instrumental	  decisions	   such	  as	   administrative	   rules,	   statutory	   interpretation,	   specifics	  of	   a	  policy	  
problem	   in	  a	  particular	   location,	   and	   information	   regarding	  performance	  of	   specific	  programs	  or	  
institutions	  (Sabatier	  and	  Jenkins-­‐Smith,	  1999).	  	  
	  
The	  framework	  suggests	  that	  policy	  learning	  does	  not	  occur	  through	  a	  simple	  process	  of	  accepting	  
new	   information.	   Rather,	   as	   the	   aforementioned	   research	   on	   cognitive	   biases	   suggests,	   this	  
information	  is	  filtered	  through	  pre-­‐existing	  belief	  systems,	  and	  actors	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  accept	  new	  
information	  if	   it	   is	  consistent	  with	  their	  beliefs	  –	  particularly	  their	  core	  beliefs.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  
they	   tend	   to	   filter	   out	   information	   that	   is	   inconsistent	   (Sabatier	   and	   Jenkins-­‐Smith,	   1999).	   The	  
framework	  has	  four	  hypotheses	  that	  predict	  when	  learning	  will	  occur,	  and	  it	   includes	  hypotheses	  
relevant	  to	  learning	  across	  coalitions	  (Sabatier	  and	  Jenkins-­‐Smith,	  1999,	  p.	  124):	  6	  
• Policy-­‐oriented	   learning	  across	  belief	  systems	   is	  most	   likely	  when	  there	   is	  an	   intermediate	  
level	  of	  informed	  conflict	  between	  the	  two	  coalitions.	  This	  requires	  that	  
a. Each	  have	  the	  technical	  resources	  to	  engage	  in	  such	  a	  debate.	  
b. The	  conflict	  be	  between	  secondary	  aspects	  of	  one	  belief	  system	  and	  core	  elements	  
of	  the	  other	  or,	  alternatively	  between	  secondary	  aspects	  of	  the	  two	  belief	  systems.	  	  
• Problems	   for	   which	   accepted	   quantitative	   data	   and	   theory	   exist	   are	   more	   conducive	   to	  
policy-­‐oriented	   learning	   across	   belief	   systems	   than	   those	   in	   which	   data	   and	   theory	   are	  
generally	  qualitative,	  quite	  subjective,	  or	  altogether	  lacking.	  	  
• Problems	   involving	  natural	  systems	  are	  more	  conducive	  to	  policy	  oriented	   learning	  across	  
belief	  systems	  than	  those	  involving	  purely	  social	  or	  political	  systems	  because,	  in	  the	  former,	  
many	  of	  the	  critical	  variables	  are	  not	  themselves	  active	  strategists	  and	  because	  controlled	  
experimentation	  is	  more	  feasible.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  The	  ACF	  neglects	  the	  process	  of	  policy	  learning	  within	  coalitions,	  assuming	  that	  learning	  within	  a	  coalition	  is	  relatively	  
unproblematic	  (Sabatier	  and	  Jenkins-­‐Smith,	  1999).	  This	  is	  because	  advocacy	  coalitions	  are	  treated	  as	  unitary	  actors,	  
thereby	  neglecting	  important	  dynamics	  within	  coalitions	  (Fischer,	  2003b).	  The	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  ACF	  are	  discussed	  in	  
more	  detail	  in	  Section	  8.2.	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• Policy-­‐oriented	  learning	  across	  belief	  systems	  is	  most	  likely	  when	  there	  exists	  a	  forum	  that	  
is	  
a. Prestigious	   enough	   to	   force	   professionals	   from	   different	   coalitions	   to	   participate	  
and	  	  
b. Dominated	  by	  professional	  norms.	  
	  
These	  hypotheses	  highlight	  a	  number	  of	  important	  points	  regarding	  policy	  learning,	  although	  these	  
points	   apply	   only	   to	   situations	   in	  which	   there	   is	   some	   degree	   of	   conflict	   between	   two	   different	  
coalitions.	  They	  highlight	  that	  policy	  learning	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  occur	  when	  both	  groups’	  core	  beliefs	  
are	   not	   under	   threat.	   It	   is	   also	   notable	   that	   the	   ACF	   considers	   policy	   learning	   to	   be	  more	   likely	  
when	  natural	  systems	  are	  involved	  because	  these	  systems	  are	  not	  active	  strategists	  and	  controlled	  
experimentation	   is	  more	   feasible	   (Sabatier	   and	   Jenkins-­‐Smith,	   1999).	  While	   this	  may	   be	   true	   in	  
some	   situations,	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   this	   might	   apply	   to	   environmental	   problems	   such	   as	  
biodiversity	  conservation	  is	  questionable.	  Controlled	  experimentation	  is	  difficult	  in	  natural	  settings.	  
Although	   the	   feedback	   from	   natural	   systems	   is	   mainly	   objective,	   environmental	   problems	   still	  
involve	   subjective	   decisions	   (e.g.	   what	   to	   monitor,	   how	   data	   should	   be	   interpreted,	   where	  
resources	  should	  be	  focused)	  and	  generate	  fundamental	  questions	  about	  core	  beliefs.	  	  
	  
4.2	   Institutional	  Entrepreneurship	  and	  Innovation	  
Although	   adopting	   an	   institutional	   change	   perspective	   is	   appropriate,	   it	   can	   be	   challenging	   to	  
identify	   pathways	   to	   change.	   Institutions	   constrain	   and	   shape	   behaviour	   through	   many	   (often	  
subtle)	  processes,	  whilst	  also	   legitimising	  certain	  behaviours,	  making	  deviation	  difficult	   (Garud	  et	  
al.,	   2007).	   	   Given	   this	   power	   to	   prevent	   deviation,	   a	   number	   of	   interesting	   questions	   arise	   in	  
studying	  how	  institutional	  change	  occurs.	  If	  actors	  are	  embedded	  in	  these	  institutional	  structures,	  
how	  are	  they	  able	  to	  envision	  new	  ways	  of	  doing	  things	  and	  encourage	  others	  to	  adopt	  them?	  This	  
debate,	   often	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   embedded	   agency	   or	   structure-­‐agency	   paradox,	   has	   been	   of	  
interest	   to	   institutional	   theorists	   for	   several	   decades	   (Garud	   et	   al.,	   2007;	   Powell	   and	   DiMaggio,	  
1991;	  Sewell	  Jr,	  1992).	  At	  the	  centre	  of	  this	  debate	  are	  institutional	  entrepreneurs,	  the	  actors	  who	  
actively	   work	   to	   transform	   existing	   institutions	   or	   create	   new	   ones	   (DiMaggio,	   1988).	   This	   PhD	  
seeks	   to	   identify	   these	   entrepreneurs	   as	   well	   as	   other	   change	   agents	   involved	   in	   the	   formal	   or	  
informal	   networks	   in	   the	   biodiversity	   governance	   regime,	   and	   determine	   how	   they	   use	   their	  
networks	  to	  enable	  change	  and	  foster	  collective	  action	  in	  biodiversity	  governance.	  	  
	  
Attempts	  to	  impose	  governance	  reform	  from	  the	  outside	  can	  only	  be	  successful	  if	  actors	  within	  the	  
governance	  regime	  cooperate.	  Reform	  can	  also	  come	  from	  within	  the	  existing	  governance	  regime,	  
and	  this	  is	  where	  the	  work	  of	  institutional	  entrepreneurs	  and	  their	  networks	  becomes	  critical.	  The	  
institutional	  entrepreneurship	  literature	  attempts	  to	  combine	  the	  literature	  on	  institutions	  and	  the	  
literature	  on	  entrepreneurship	   to	  aid	  understanding	  of	  both	  continuity	  and	  change	   (Garud	  et	  al.,	  
2007).	  An	   institutional	  entrepreneur	  can	  refer	   to	   individuals,	  groups	  of	   individuals,	  organisations,	  
or	  groups	  of	  organisations,	  although	  individuals	  in	  an	  organisational	  setting	  are	  perhaps	  the	  most	  
widely	  studied.	  Institutional	  entrepreneurs	  seek	  change	  that	  diverges	  from	  existing	  institutions	  and	  
actively	  participate	  in	  pursuing	  such	  change.	  Successful	  institutional	  entrepreneurs	  are	  able	  to	  not	  
only	   recognise	  when	   the	   dominant	   regime	   is	   not	  working,	   but	   they	   seize	   these	   opportunities	   to	  
pursue	  interests	  they	  value	  highly	  (Mintrom	  and	  Norman,	  2009).	  These	  actors	  seek	  to	  change	  the	  
institutional	   setting	   through	   a	   range	   of	   strategies,	   including	   technical	   leadership,	   lobbying,	   and	  
discourse	  (Lawrence	  and	  Suddaby,	  2006).	  This	  requires	  skills	  not	  unlike	  entrepreneurship	  in	  other	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fields	  (e.g.	  business).  
 
These	   entrepreneurs	   can	   be	   important	   forces	   in	   institutions	   where	   there	   is	   constant	   pressure	  
toward	   stasis.	   For	   these	   actors	   the	   pursuit	   of	   change	   is	   a	   highly	   political	   process	   that	   requires	  
energy,	   creativity,	   political	   skills,	   and	   resources.	   It	   requires	   not	   only	   breaking	   free	   of	   existing	  
patterns	   to	  develop	  new	  ones,	  but	   it	  also	   requires	   institutionalisation	  of	  alternative	  processes	  or	  
rules	  (Battilana	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Garud	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Mintrom	  and	  Norman,	  2009).	  Such	  a	  task	  requires	  
envisioning	  new	  ways	  of	  doing	  things,	  as	  well	  as	  mobilisation	  of	  allies	  within	  the	  regime,	  reducing	  
their	  embeddedness	  in	  the	  process	  (Battilana	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  This	  means	  they	  have	  to	  not	  only	  break	  
away	  from	  institutional	  structures	  themselves,	  but	  also	  find	  ways	  to	  bring	  allies	  along	  with	  them.	  
Inevitably,	   such	   entrepreneurs	   encounter	   resistance	   from	   “institutional	   defenders”	   who	   benefit	  
from	  the	  status	  quo,	  and	  not	  all	  attempts	  at	  divergent	  change	  will	  be	  successful	   (Battilana	  et	  al.,	  
2009;	  DiMaggio,	  1988).	  Successful	  attempts	  require	  entrepreneurs	  to	  legitimise	  innovations,	  often	  
by	  embedding	  them	  in	  familiar	  designs	  to	  make	  adoption	  of	  change	  more	  palatable	  (Dacin	  et	  al.,	  
2002).	  	  
	  
It	   is	   important	   to	   understand	   what	   innovation	   is	   in	   this	   context.	   Innovation	   is	   distinct	   from	  
invention,	   thus	   in	  policy	   terms	   innovation	  does	  not	  mean	  an	  entirely	  new	   idea,	   rather	  a	  policy	   is	  
innovative	  when	   it	   is	  new	  to	   the	  government	  or	   jurisdiction	   (Berry	  and	  Berry,	  1999).	   In	  addition,	  
there	  are	  two	  concepts	  discussed	   in	  the	  entrepreneurship	   literature	  that	  are	  worth	  noting:	  social	  
entrepreneurship	   and	   social	   innovation.	   Social	   entrepreneurs	   pursue	   change	   when	   existing	  
institutions	   and	   organisations	   are	   inadequately	   addressing	   social	   problems,	   and	   they	   are	   more	  
interested	   in	  social	  values	  than	  economic	  gain	  (Mair	  and	  Martı,	  2006).	  When	  such	  entrepreneurs	  
work	   to	   change	   institutions,	   they	   are	   both	   a	   social	   and	   an	   institutional	   entrepreneur.	   	   Social	  
innovations	   are	   new	   products,	   ideas	   and	   initiatives	   that	   profoundly	   change	   the	   basic	   routines,	  
resource	   and	   authority	   flows,	   and	   beliefs	   of	   a	   social	   system	   (Moore	   and	   Westley,	   2011).	   Such	  
innovations	   differ	   from	  other	   types	   in	   that	   they	   do	   not	   require	  mass	   adoption	   to	   be	   successful.	  
Instead,	   they	   generate	   systemic	   change,	   altering	   the	   institutional	   context	   (Westley	   and	  Antadze,	  
2010).	   The	   process	   of	   social	   innovation	   in	   an	   institutional	   setting	   involves	   the	   dynamics	   of	  
institutional	   bricolage	   and	   diffusion	   (Biggs	   et	   al.,	   2010).	   This	   means	   new	   ideas	   about	   how	  
institutions	  should	  be	  designed	  not	  only	  have	  to	  be	  conceived,	  but	  these	  ideas	  have	  to	  spread.	  
	  
The	  study	  of	  institutional	  entrepreneurship	  is	  often	  approached	  as	  the	  work	  of	  unique	  individuals,	  
but	  generally	  these	  individuals	  do	  not	  work	  alone.	  Institutional	  change	  in	  many	  situations	  is	  beyond	  
the	   capacity	  of	   individual	   actors,	   and	   requires	   cooperation	   among	  many	   individuals	  with	  diverse	  
interests,	  some	  of	  which	  may	  work	  against	  cooperation	  and	  promote	  collective	  inaction	  (Wijen	  and	  
Ansari,	   2007).	   Although	   most	   research	   has	   focused	   on	   the	   individual	   characteristics	   of	   these	  
entrepreneurial	   actors,	   environmental	   problems	   suggest	   a	   need	   for	   collective	   institutional	  
entrepreneurship,	   which	   has	   received	   comparatively	   little	   attention.	   This	   is	   the	   process	   of	  
overcoming	  collective	   inaction	  and	  achieving	  sustained	  collaboration	  among	  numerous	  dispersed	  
actors	   to	  create	  new	   institutions	  or	   transform	  existing	  ones.	   In	   collective	  action	   situations,	   there	  
are	   many	   factors	   (e.g.	   free	   riders,7	   apathy,	   start-­‐up	   failure)	   that	   not	   only	   work	   against	  
collaboration,	  but	  generally	   create	  an	  environment	  where	  non-­‐participation	  and	   inaction	  are	   the	  
norm	  (Wijen	  and	  Ansari,	  2007).	  Overcoming	  inaction	  in	  such	  situations	  may	  require	  the	  efforts	  of	  
institutional	   entrepreneurs,	   leaders,	   and	   the	  participation	  of	  multiple	  other	   actors	   that	  have	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Free	  riders	  are	  those	  that	  reap	  the	  benefits	  of	  a	  situation	  without	  absorbing	  the	  costs.	  This	  is	  a	  common	  concern	  in	  CPR	  
situations	  (Ostrom,	  1990).	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capacity	  to	  pursue	  change,	  either	  within	  or	  outside	  of	  the	  governance	  regime.	  
	  
Collective	   institutional	   entrepreneurship	   requires	   collaborative	   leadership	   and	   institutional	  work,	  
which	  is	  “the	  purposive	  action	  of	  individuals	  and	  organizations	  aimed	  at	  creating,	  maintaining,	  and	  
disrupting	   institutions”	   (Lawrence	   and	   Suddaby,	   2006;	   p.	   215).	   Lawrence	   and	   Suddaby	   (2006)	  
identified	   nine	   categories	   of	   institutional	   work	   in	   the	   literature:	   advocacy,	   defining,	   vesting,	  
constructing	   identities,	   changing	   normative	   associations,	   constructing	   normative	   networks,	  
mimicry,	   theorising,	   and	   educating. These	   categories	   range	   from	   overtly	   political	   (advocacy)	   to	  
subtly	  introducing	  change	  by	  aligning	  it	  with	  existing	  practice	  (mimicry),	  and	  these	  categories	  can	  
provide	   a	   framework	   for	   analysing	   the	   actions	   undertaken	   by	   entrepreneurs.	   This	   can	   be	  
productive	  work	  to	  actively	  maintain	  the	  efficacy	  of	  institutions	  in	  times	  of	  entropy,	  but	  it	  can	  also	  
be	   destructive	   in	   that	   the	   entrepreneurs	   may	   seek	   to	   tear	   down	   institutions	   or	   render	   them	  
ineffectual.	  There	  are	  also	  elements	  of	  institutional	  work	  that	  are	  relatively	  unstudied,	  such	  as	  the	  
way	  these	  entrepreneurs	  might	  work	  to	  change	  the	  cultural-­‐cognitive	  pillars	  of	  institutions	  through	  
social	  construction	  of	  rules,	  scripts,	  schemas	  and	  cultural	  accounts	  (Lawrence	  and	  Suddaby,	  2006).	  	  
	  
Collective	  institutional	  entrepreneurship	  has	  only	  been	  explicitly	  examined	  in	  a	  few	  studies.	  Wijen	  
and	  Ansari	  (2007)	  enlighten	  the	  concept	  through	  the	  use	  of	  regime	  theory,	  which	  focuses	  on	  how	  
actors	   are	   able	   to	   realise	   their	   common	   interests	   by	   collaborating	   in	   areas	   that	   serve	   those	  
interests.	   This	   theory	   generally	   applies	   at	   the	   level	   of	   the	   nation-­‐state	   and	   focuses	   on	   how	   this	  
collaboration	  occurs	  despite	  the	   lack	  of	  a	  supernational	  authority.	  Wijen	  and	  Ansari	   (2007)	  apply	  
this	  to	  the	  collective	  process	  involved	  in	  signing	  the	  Kyoto	  protocol.	  From	  this	  study,	  they	  propose	  
six	   endogenous8	   drivers	   of	   collective	   institutional	   entrepreneurship:	   manipulating	   power	  
configuration,	   creating	   common	   ground,	   mobilizing	   bandwagons,	   devising	   appropriate	   incentive	  
structures,	  applying	  ethical	  guidelines,	  and	  using	   implementation	  mechanisms	  (Wijen	  and	  Ansari,	  
2007).	  	  
	  
Meijerink	   and	   Huitema	   (2010)	   analysed	   16	   cases	   of	   transition	   in	   water	   management	   in	   15	   EU	  
countries	  and	  the	  USA	  to	  determine	   if	   individuals	  affected	  radical	  policy	  changes	  and,	   if	  so,	  what	  
strategies	   they	   used.	   They	   confirmed	   that	   institutional	   entrepreneurs	   (which	   they	   call	   policy	  
entrepreneurs)	  played	  a	  role	  in	  the	  transitions	  at	  many	  different	  levels	  within	  government,	  as	  well	  
as	   outside	   of	   government.	   They	   also	   highlighted	   the	   important	   role	   of	   collective	   institutional	  
entrepreneurship,	  underlining	  the	  effects	  of	  shadow	  networks	  (Section	  4.3).	  	  
	  
The	  authors	  found	  many	  similar	  strategies	  across	  studies.	  Donor	  organisations,	  for	  instance,	  played	  
a	   role	   in	   affecting	   change	   by	   placing	   conditions	   on	   funding.	   Policy	   entrepreneurs,	   in	   contrast,	  
cannot	  enforce	  changes	  from	  the	  top	  down,	  so	  use	  strategies	  to	  convince	  others	  of	  the	  merits	  of	  
their	   ideas.	   This	   often	   came	   in	   the	   form	   of	   pilot	   studies	   demonstrating	   new	   technologies	   (e.g.	  
floodplain	   restoration).	   These	   entrepreneurs	   were	   particularly	   skilled	   at	   taking	   their	   findings	   to	  
media	   to	   change	   hearts	   and	   minds	   (Meijerink	   and	   Huitema,	   2010).	   They	   are	   also	   successful	   at	  
building	  bridges	  across	  networks	  that	  may	  have	  different	  ways	  of	  conceptualising	  the	   issue.	  Both	  
entrepreneurs	   and	   those	   trying	   to	   block	   change	   can	   successfully	   use	   discursive	   strategies,	  
generating	   narratives	   that	   garner	   support	   for	   their	   position	   (Meijerink	   and	  Huitema,	   2010).	   This	  
highlights	   the	   potential	   value	   of	   discursive	   institutionalism	   (Section	   1.3)	   in	   understanding	   how	  
change	  occurs	  in	  institutionalised	  environments.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  They	  recognize	  external	  ‘jolts’	  but	  focus	  on	  endogenous	  drivers.	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Another	   strategy	   identified	   in	   the	   case	   studies	   was	   the	   formation	   of	   three	   types	   of	   coalitions	  
(Meijerink	  and	  Huitema,	  2010):	  	  
1) Advocacy	  coalitions,	  which	  are	  bound	  by	  similar	  beliefs	  and	  values.	  These	  are	  similar	  
to	   the	   coalitions	   of	   the	  ACF,	   and	  might	   include	   environmental	   and	   pro-­‐development	  
coalitions.	  	  
2) Strategic	  alliances,	  which	  do	  not	  necessarily	  have	  similar	  beliefs	  but	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  
realising	  a	  particular	  policy	  change.	  These	  are	  similar	  to	  the	  issue	  networks	  discussed	  in	  
Section	  3.	  	  
3) Resource	  dependent9	  coalitions	  consist	  of	  actors	  with	  divergent	  interests,	  but	  who	  are	  
dependent	  on	  each	  other	  to	  achieve	  their	  objectives.	  These	  are	  akin	  to	  the	  coalitions	  
formed	  by	  different	  parties	  in	  government.	  
Coalition	  formation	  may	  account	  for	  the	  structure	  of	  collective	  institutional	  entrepreneurship.	  The	  
author	   noted	   that	   actors	   within	   these	   coalitions	   often	   play	   complementary	   roles	   and	   offer	  
different	   skills,	   whether	   that	   be	   generating	   new	   ideas,	   advocacy,	   brokering,	   or	   negotiation	  
(Meijerink	  and	  Huitema,	  2010).	  Both	  the	  formation	  of	  these	  coalitions	  and	  the	  strategies	  they	  use	  
to	   advance	   their	   ideas	   require	   further	   research	   to	   understand	   how	   change	   occurs	   in	   collective	  
action	  (or	  inaction)	  situations.	  
	  
In	   addition	   to	   such	   strategies	   as	   successfully	   using	   narratives	   and	   building	   coalitions,	   policy	  
entrepreneurs	  are	  able	  to	  anticipate	  and	  exploit	  windows	  of	  opportunity.	  This	  will	  allow	  them	  to	  
garner	   the	   support	   required	   to	   achieve	   policy	   change.	   These	   can	   be	   windows	   of	   opportunity	  
relevant	  to	  the	  issue	  itself	  (e.g.	  a	  major	  flood)	  or	  windows	  presented	  by	  the	  political	  system	  (e.g.	  
regime	   change	   (Meijerink	   and	  Huitema,	   2010).	   A	   trend	   across	   studies	  was	   that	   successful	   policy	  
entrepreneurs	  develop	  alternatives	  that	  account	  for	  many	  stakeholder	  interests	  and	  are	  successful	  
in	   marketing	   them.	   Policy	   entrepreneurs	   often	   seek	   new	   venues	   for	   the	   dissemination	   of	   their	  
ideas	  and	  views,	  either	  by	  tapping	  into	  existing	  formal	  venues	  within	  the	  policy	  process	  or	  creating	  
new	   ones.	  Whatever	   the	   institutional	   setting,	   policy	   entrepreneurs	   often	   try	   to	  manipulate	   this	  
setting.	   Interestingly,	   the	   authors	   posit	   that	   the	   entrepreneurs	   may	   take	   advantage	   of	   those	  
settings	   that	   they	   know	   are	   open	   to	   learning	   and	   experimentation.	   Rather	   than	   encouraging	  
continued	   learning,	   however,	   the	   authors	   suggest	   they	   use	   this	   learning	   environment	   to	  
institutionalise	   their	   innovation	   (Meijerink	   and	   Huitema,	   2010).	   This	   finding	   highlights	   the	  
importance	   of	   actor	  motivations	   in	   pursuing	   change	   and	   embedding	   innovations	   in	   institutional	  
settings.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note,	  however,	  that	  the	  concepts	  of	  institutional	  change	  and	  innovation	  
are	  not	  only	  associated	  with	  change	  for	  the	  better.	  Settings	  that	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  manipulation	  are	  
open	   for	   both	   positive	   and	   negative	   change,	   and	   the	   direction	   of	   change	   may	   depend	   on	   the	  
motivation	  of	  the	  entrepreneur	  and	  the	  implications	  of	  their	  innovation.	  
	  
To	  explore	  the	  factors	  that	  foster	  institutional	  bricolage	  and	  innovation	  in	  ecosystem	  management,	  
Biggs	   et	   al.	   (2010)	   reviewed	   three	   case	   studies	   of	   transformational	   change	   in	   freshwater	  
management	   regimes.	   Using	   case	   studies	   were	   from	   Sweden,	   South	   Africa,	   and	   the	   USA,	   the	  
researchers	  looked	  for	  common	  factors	  that	  enabled	  transformation.	  The	  study	  was	  exploratory	  in	  
nature,	  with	  the	  aim	  to	  identify	  potential	  policies	  to	  stimulate	  bricolage	  and	  innovation	  that	  merit	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Here	  “resource	  dependent”	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  the	  natural	  resources	  on	  which	  these	  coalitions	  depend,	  rather	  the	  
resources	  held	  by	  other	  individuals	  in	  the	  coalition.	  This	  might	  include	  skills,	  social	  connections,	  money,	  or	  popular	  
support.	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further	  research.	  They	  identified	  five	  factors	  underlying	  transformation	  in	  ecosystem	  management:	  
(1)	   environmental	   crises,	   (2)	   reframing	   of	   perspectives,	   (3)	   engaging	   stakeholders,	   (4)	   social	  
entrepreneurship,	  and	  (5)	  institutional	  support	  (Biggs	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  	  
	  
No	  single	  factor	  was	  sufficient	  to	  tip	  these	  institutional	  regimes	  into	  transformation,	  and	  they	  were	  
interdependent.	  For	  example,	  an	  environmental	  crisis	  alone	  was	  insufficient	  to	  set	  the	  process	  of	  
change	  into	  motion.	  There	  were	  two	  necessary	  co-­‐factors:	  growing	  appreciation	  of	  the	  values	  that	  
would	  be	  lost	  and	  evidence	  that	  existing	  approaches	  were	  not	  adequate,	  even	  if	  modified	  (Biggs	  et	  
al.,	   2010).	   In	   regard	   to	   reframing	   the	   issue,	   the	   authors	   noted	   that	   all	   three	   cases	   required	   the	  
notion	   of	   environmental	   conservation	   to	   be	   reframed	   in	   a	   way	   that	  made	   economic	   and	   social	  
concerns	  explicit.	  Social	  entrepreneurs	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  reframing,	  engaging	  stakeholders,	  and	  
managing	   conflict.	   This	   is	   unsurprising	   given	   that	   entrepreneurs	   tend	   to	   be	   key	   nodes	   linking	  
multiple	  social	  networks,	  making	  them	  a	  carrier	  of	  new	  ideas	  between	  groups	  (Biggs	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  
The	  institutional	  support	  identified	  by	  Biggs	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  was	  government	  support	  for	  the	  relatively	  
mundane	   aspects	   of	   starting	   new	   forms	   of	   governance,	   e.g.	   finance,	   personnel,	   management,	  
planning,	   and	   office	   space.	   They	   also	   contend	   that	   these	   links	   to	   government	   provided	   an	  
additional	  pathway	  for	  the	  diffusion	  of	  ideas	  to	  other	  areas	  and	  groups.	  Although	  these	  factors	  are	  
interesting,	  this	  study	  was	  exploratory	   in	  nature	  and	   included	  a	  small	  number	  of	  case	  studies.	  As	  
yet	  it	  is	  uncertain	  if	  these	  factors	  would	  hold	  in	  the	  context	  of	  other	  environmental	  problems,	  such	  
as	  biodiversity	  conservation,	  or	  what	  policies	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  institutional	  support	  might	  foster	  
this	  sort	  of	  innovation.	  
	  
In	  situations	  characterised	  by	  collective	  inaction,	  institutional	  entrepreneurs	  still	  play	  an	  important	  
role;	   but	   their	   actions	   alone	   are	   insufficient	   to	   overcome	   collective	   inaction.	   In	   these	   situations,	  
other	   actors	   are	   required	   to	   support	   and	   facilitate	   change	   (Lawrence	   and	   Suddaby,	   2006).	   For	  
example,	   change	   often	   requires	   mobilisation	   of	   issue	   networks,	   which	   are	   loose,	   issue-­‐based	  
coalitions	  who	  pursue	  institutional	  change	  via	  collective	  action.	  Actors	  in	  these	  networks	  generally	  
have	  asymmetrical	  resources	  and	  power,	  and	  the	  process	   is	  dynamic.	  Although	  actors	  may	  argue	  
about	  policy	  options,	   values,	  and	  norms,	  many	   issue	  networks	   still	  mobilise	   to	  achieve	  collective	  
goals.	  Motivated	   actors,	   including	   institutional	   entrepreneurs	   but	   also	   other	   change	   agents,	   are	  
able	   to	  mobilise	   these	   networks	   through	  mechanisms	   that	   include	   framing	   of	   the	   issue,	   agenda	  
setting,	   and	   social	   networking	   (Ritvala	   and	   Salmi,	   2010).	   These	   actors	   and	   their	   mechanisms	   of	  
mobilisation	   can	   be	   powerful	   forces	   for	   change	   in	   a	   polycentric,	   networked	   biodiversity	  
governance	  regime.	  	  
	  
4.3	   Change	  through	  Networks	  
In	  networked	  governance	  arrangements,	  any	  attempt	  to	  change	  the	  design	  of	  institutions	  requires	  
change	   that	   reaches	   these	  networks.	  A	  common	  criticism	  of	  policy	  network	  analysis,	  however,	   is	  
that	  it	  does	  not	  or	  cannot	  explain	  change	  (Rhodes,	  2006).	  Institutions	  are	  formed	  through	  enduring	  
interactions	   between	   actors	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   resolve	   conflicting	   interests.	   In	   the	   process,	  
institutional	   capital	   is	   formed,	   and	   this	   capital	   is	   not	   easily	   replaced	   by	   newly	   designed	  
arrangements	  (Klijn	  and	  Koppenjan,	  2006).	  In	  this	  case,	  institutional	  capital	  refers	  to	  resources	  held	  
by	   individuals	   and	  organisations.	   This	  usage	  of	   institutional	   capital	   refers	   to	   the	   stock	  of	   cultural	  
knowledge	  and	  skills	  about	  rules,	  norms,	  and	  values	  that	  are	  sanctioned	  in	  a	  particular	  institutional	  
setting.	  The	  concept	  of	   institutional	  capital	  also	   incorporates	  social	  capital,	  specifically	  the	  extent	  
of	  social	  connections	  and	  how	  these	  can	  be	  used	  to	  maintain	  or	  gain	  resources,	  such	  as	  power	  (Lin,	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2001)10.	   Policy	   network	   literature	   tends	   to	   emphasise	   that	   rules	   within	   networks	   codify	   power	  
relations	  by,	  for	  example,	  distributing	  advantages	  and	  excluding	  actors.	  This	  provides	  stability	  and	  
continuity,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  enlighten	  the	  process	  of	  change	  (Rhodes,	  2006).	  	  
	  
There	   is	   no	   consensus	   in	   the	   literature	   about	   how	   change	   occurs.	   Klijn	   and	   Koppenjan	   (2006)	  
propose	   that	   networks	   are	   institutional	   frameworks	   in	  which	   the	   characteristics	   of	   the	   network	  
(e.g.	   power	   relations)	   are	   codified	   as	   rules.	   Most	   rules	   are	   formed	   as	   the	   result	   of	   interaction	  
between	   actors.	   They	   posit	   that	   rule	   changes	   in	   networks	   occur	   for	   three	  main	   reasons:	   1)	   as	   a	  
result	   of	   conscious	   design	   or	   intervention	   by	   a	   legitimate	   actor	   within	   the	   network,	   2)	  
reinterpretation	   of	   existing	   rules	   in	   a	   new	  way,	   and	   3)	  when	   non-­‐compliance	   by	  multiple	   actors	  
without	   sanction	   causes	   the	   rule	   to	   lose	   meaning	   (Klijn	   and	   Koppenjan,	   2006).	   Any	   attempt	   to	  
change	  institutions	  thus	  requires	  changing	  rules	  in	  the	  network	  and	  necessitates	  a	  power	  struggle	  
within	   a	   network.	   Deliberate	   institutional	   design	   involves	   pushing	   and	   pulling	   between	   actors	   in	  
the	   network.	   Change	   can	   occur	   through	   direct	   intervention	   in	   rules	   (e.g.	   changes	   in	   legislation,	  
attempts	  to	  change	  informal	  rules)	  or	  indirect	  interventions	  that	  attempt	  to	  influence	  perceptions	  
and	  interactions	  within	  network.	  The	  latter	  involves	  reframing	  strategies,	  which	  are	  usually	  done	  in	  
conjunction	   with	   direct	   intervention.	   These	   strategies	   might	   include	   using	   crisis	   situations	   or	  
discussing	  major	  policy	  documents	  to	  encourage	  reinterpretation	  of	  existing	  rules	  or	  formation	  of	  
new	  ones	  (Klijn	  and	  Koppenjan,	  2006).	  	  
	  
More	  broadly,	  Rhodes	  (2006)	  identifies	  three	  of	  the	  most	  promising	  categories	  of	  explanations	  for	  
how	   change	   occurs	   through	   networks:	   advocacy	   coalitions,	   the	   dialectal	  model,	   and	   decentered	  
analysis.	  Among	  those	  that	  employ	  the	  advocacy	  coalition	  approach	  (Section	  4.1),	  change	  in	  policy	  
networks	  is	  driven	  by	  coalition	  attempts	  to	  translate	  their	  beliefs	  into	  public	  policy	  (Rhodes,	  2006).	  
In	   the	   dialectical	  model	   (Marsh	   and	   Smith,	   2000),	   networks	   can	   constrain	   or	   enable	   action,	   but	  
they	   are	   not	   the	   driving	   force	   of	   change.	   In	   this	   model,	   change	   is	   a	   result	   of	   the	   interaction	  
between	  the	  network	  and	  one	  or	  more	  factors,	  i.e.	  agents	  within	  the	  network,	  context,	  and	  policy	  
outcomes	  (Rhodes,	  2006).	  	  Hay	  and	  Richards	  (2000)	  note	  that	  this	  interaction	  is	  strategic,	  and	  that	  
strategic	  actions	  change	  the	  setting	  itself.	  Actors	  must	  then	  adjust	  their	  strategies	  accordingly,	  thus	  
in	  this	  view	  of	  change	  networks	  are	  constantly	  evolving.	  The	  final	  body	  of	  knowledge	  to	  explaining	  
change	  through	  networks	  advocates	  for	  a	  decentered	  approach.	  This	  is	  heavily	  focused	  at	  the	  level	  
of	   individual	   who	   are	   dealing	   with	   everyday	   policy	   problems.	   Networking	   is	   often	   informal	   and	  
decisions	   are	   ad	   hoc,	   made	   by	   activists	   seeking	   concrete	   outcomes	   (Rhodes,	   2006).	   This	   is	  
consistent	  with	  the	  practice-­‐oriented	  view	  of	  the	  discursive	  institutionalists	  (Section	  1.3).	  
	  
Particular	   types	  of	  networks	  can	  also	  be	   influential	   in	  enabling	   institutional	  change.	  This	   includes	  
shadow	  networks,	  which	  are	  “informal	  networks	  that	  work	  both	  outside	  and	  within	  the	  dominant	  
system	  to	  develop	  alternatives	  that	  can	  potentially	  replace	  the	  dominant	  regime	  if	  and	  when	  the	  
right	  opportunity	  occurs”	  (Westley	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  p.	  771).	  Shadow	  networks	  are	  partly	  independent	  
because	  although	  they	  may	  have	  members	  that	  sit	  within	  the	  governance	  regime,	  they	  generally	  sit	  
at	  the	  boundaries	  of	  formal	  institutions,	  “out	  on	  the	  fray”	  (Gunderson,	  1999;	  Olsson	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  
Members	   of	   these	   networks	   do	   not	   have	   to	   agree	   on	   particular	   institutional	   designs	   and	   their	  
views	  on	  the	  appropriate	  policy	  and	  value	  choices	  can	  vary	  (Olsson	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  Such	  a	  network	  
might	  include,	  for	  example,	  actors	  from	  government	  agencies	  alongside	  academics,	  NGOs,	  activists	  
and	  other	  interested	  members	  of	  the	  public.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Institutional	  capital	  can	  also	  be	  used	  more	  generally	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  stock	  of	  organisational	  ability	  and	  social	  structures	  
in	  society	  (i.e.	  the	  stock	  of	  institutions)	  (Berkes	  and	  Folke,	  1998).	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Shadow	   networks	   are	   thought	   to	   play	   an	   important	   role	   in	   the	   genesis	   of	   novel	   ideas	   and	  
approaches.	  Sitting	  at	  the	  boundaries	  places	  them	  between	  the	  stability	  of	  formal	  institutions	  and	  
the	  instability	  of	  informal	  institutions.	  This	  “bounded	  instability”	  creates	  a	  space	  for	  new	  ideas	  to	  
emerge	   but	   the	   network	   membership	   ensures	   at	   least	   some	   degree	   of	   continuity	   with	   earlier	  
innovations	   (Pelling	   et	   al.,	   2008).	   	   Free	   from	   their	   formal	   connections	   to	   their	   respective	  
organisations,	   shadow	  networks	  have	   the	   flexibility	   and	  willingness	   to	  experiment	  with	  new	  and	  
innovative	  ways	  of	  solving	  issues,	  thus	  they	  can	  contribute	  to	  the	  adaptive	  capacity	  of	  governance	  
regimes.	  Along	  with	  key	  leaders,	  shadow	  networks	  prime	  a	  system	  for	  change	  by	  providing	  a	  space	  
for	   social	   leaning,	   exploring	   new	   ideas,	   designing	   and	   testing	   alternative	   policies	   and	   system	  
configurations,	   and	   developing	   ways	   to	   choose	   between	   potential	   future	   scenarios	   (Gunderson,	  
1999;	  Olsson	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  Pelling	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  	  
	  
Given	  the	  importance	  of	  shadow	  networks	  in	  fostering	  change,	  researchers	  have	  sought	  to	  identify	  
the	   factors	   that	   facilitate	   formation	   of	   shadow	   networks.	   Gunderson	   (1999,	   p.5)	   contends	   that	  
shadow	   networks	   “always	   seem	   to	   emerge”	   in	   cases	   of	   successful	   adaptive	   assessment	   and	  
management.	  The	  nodes	  of	  these	  networks	  become	  banks	  of	  knowledge	  and	  memory	  that	  can	  be	  
drawn	   upon	   in	   times	   of	   uncertainty	   and	   change	   (Olsson	   et	   al.,	   2006).	   Formation	   of	   shadow	  
networks	   can	   be	   fast	   or	   slow,	   and	   it	   often	   occurs	   in	   response	   to	   a	   social	   or	   ecological	   crisis.	  
Examining	   five	   case	   studies	   of	   systems	   in	   transition,	   Olsson	   et.	   al.	   (2006)	   identify	   emergence	   of	  
leadership	   as	   an	   important	   precursor	   to	   shadow	  network	   formation.	   Response	  may	   start	  with	   a	  
few	  key	  individuals	  working	  separately,	  but	  eventually	  evolve	  into	  multi-­‐actor	  processes	  (Olsson	  et	  
al.,	   2004;	   Olsson	   et	   al.,	   2006).	   Even	   when	   leaders	   emerge,	   improved	   governance	   is	   not	   an	  
inevitable	  result.	  In	  addition,	  due	  to	  their	  varied	  interests	  and	  the	  time	  it	  takes	  to	  build	  trust,	  these	  
networks	  can	  take	  some	  time	  to	  build	  (Olsson	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  The	  emergence	  of	  dialogue	  and	  spaces	  
for	   collaboration	   is	   still	   an	   important	   part	   of	   shadow	  network	   formation,	   however,	   and	   creating	  
space	   for	   this	   dialogue	   to	   explore	   pathways	   to	   transformation	   and	   adaptation	   is	   one	   way	   to	  
encourage	   their	   formation	   (Olsson	   et	   al.,	   2006;	   Sendzimir	   et	   al.,	   2008;	   Westley	   et	   al.,	   2011).	  
Westley	   et	   al.	   (2011)	   suggest	   a	   few	   pathways	   to	   build	   “shadow	   tracks”,	   primarily	   focused	   on	  
bringing	   as	  many	  minds	   together	   as	   possible	   (e.g.	   via	   the	   Internet)	   and	   providing	   incentives	   for	  
innovation.	  Most	   of	   these	   strategies	   for	   deliberately	   facilitating	   formation	   of	   shadow	   networks,	  
however,	  remain	  untested.	  
	  
5	   Social-­‐Ecological	  Systems	  (SES)	  and	  Resilience	  Thinking	  
5.1	   Overview	  of	  SES	  and	  Resilience	  Thinking	  
Biodiversity	  conservation	  is	  a	  challenging	  problem	  to	  address	  because	  social	  and	  ecological	  systems	  
are	  complex	  systems	  in	  which	  many	  factors	  interact.	  Like	  many	  policy	  and	  planning	  problems,	  this	  
is	  a	  ‘wicked	  problem’,	  that	  cannot	  be	  defined	  completely	  and	  where	  most	  solutions	  are	  less	  than	  
optimal	   (Rittel	   and	   Webber,	   1973).	   In	   response	   to	   such	   challenges,	   some	   researchers	   and	  
practitioners	   have	   issued	   calls	   for	   adaptation	   and	   even	   transformation	   of	   existing	   institutional	  
arrangements	  (Biggs	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Boyd	  and	  Folke,	  2011;	  Westley	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  This	  suggests	  a	  need	  
for	   institutional	   change,	  whether	   that	   be	   radical	   or	   incremental,	   to	   improve	   the	  performance	  of	  
biodiversity	  conservation	  governance	  regimes.	  	  
	  
There	   are	   a	   number	   of	   ways	   to	   approach	   institutional	   change,	   but	   my	   PhD	   will	   draw	   on	   the	  
theoretical	   perspectives	   of	   SES	   and	   resilience	   thinking.	   These	   approaches	   call	   for	   a	   fundamental	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change	  to	  the	  way	  ecosystems	  are	  understood	  and	  managed.	  Adopting	  an	  SES	  perspective	  requires	  
a	   shift	   from	   the	   conventional	   efficiency-­‐focused,	   top-­‐down	   approach	   that	   seeks	   to	   achieve	   an	  
‘optimal’	   state	   to	   one	   that	   recognises	   complex	   interactions	   across	   scales	   and	   the	   existence	   of	  
multiple	  stable	  states	   in	  nature	  (Gunderson	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Holling	  and	  Gunderson,	  2002;	  Resilience	  
Alliance,	  2007). Rooted	  in	  complex	  systems	  thinking,	  an	  SES	  perspective	  acknowledges	  that	  social	  
and	  biophysical	  systems	  are	  interlinked	  and	  interdependent	  and	  should	  be	  treated	  as	  such	  (Berkes	  
et	   al.,	   2003;	  Walker	   and	   Salt,	   2006).	   The	   approach	   emphasises	   that	   SESs	   are	   complex	   adaptive	  
systems,	   in	   which	   change	   is	   not	   predictable,	   linear	   or	   incremental.	   As	   such,	   responses	   to	  
interventions	   are	   not	   wholly	   predictable	   and	   cannot	   be	   understood	   by	   isolating	   variables	   or	  
examining	  a	  particular	  interaction	  (Walker	  and	  Salt,	  2006).	  
	  
Two	   concepts	   that	   are	   central	   to	   resilience	  
thinking	   are	   system	   state	   and	   thresholds.	  
System	   state	   “refers	   to	   a	   set	   of	   social	   and	  
ecological	   variables	   that	   can	   fluctuate	   and	  
create	  either	  stabilising	  feedbacks	  to	  keep	  a	  
system	  in	  a	  particular	  state	  (e.g.	  a	  clear	  lake)	  
or	   amplifying	   feedbacks	   that	   push	   the	  
system	   toward	   a	   new	   configuration	   and	  
system	  state	  (e.g.	  a	  murky	  lake)”	  (Resilence	  
Alliance,	   2010;	   p.	   7).	   Rather	   than	   viewing	  
system	   states	   as	   locked	   in	   and	   static,	  
resilience	   thinkers	   tend	   to	   emphasise	   the	  
dynamic	   nature	   of	   these	   states.	   There	   can	  
be	  multiple	  stable	  equilibria	  and	  domains	  of	  
stability	  around	  these	  equilibria.	  Even	  these	  
domains	   are	   dynamic,	   expanding,	  
contracting,	   and	   even	   disappearing	   in	  
response	   to	   drivers	   (Holling,	   2010).	   Walker	  
et	  al.	  (2004)	  explains	  these	  dynamics	  through	  the	  metaphor	  of	  basins	  of	  attraction	  and	  a	  stability	  
landscape	  (Figure	  1).	  A	  basin	  of	  attraction	  is	  the	  state	  space	  in	  which	  a	  system	  tends	  to	  remain,	  and	  
systems	  that	   tend	  toward	  equilibrium	  are	  drawn	  toward	  this	  basin	   (Walker	  et	  al.,	  2004).11	  Under	  
real	  world	  conditions,	  systems	  are	  affected	  by	  exogenous	  variables,	  such	  as	  biophysical	  and	  social	  
drivers,	  so	  systems	  move	  around	  within	  a	  basin,	  rather	  than	  directly	  toward	  equilibria.	  The	  stability	  
landscape	  is	  comprised	  of	  the	  multiple	  basins	  that	  a	  system	  may	  occupy,	  and	  the	  boundaries	  that	  
separate	  them.	  The	   landscape	   itself	  can	  shift	  through	  pressure	  from	  exogenous	  (e.g.	  rainfall)	  and	  
endogenous	  drivers	   (e.g.	  management	  practices).	   Such	  drivers	  may	  change	   the	  borders	  between	  
basins	  or	  the	  number	  of	  basins	  across	  the	  landscape	  (Walker	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  When	  a	  system	  leaves	  a	  
basin	  of	   attraction,	   it	   is	   said	   to	   cross	  a	   threshold.	  Griffith	  et	  al.	   (2010;	  p.	  9)	  define	   thresholds	  as	  
“points	  on	  a	  trajectory	  of	  change	  for	  a	  particular	  variable	  (especially	  one	  that	  changes	  slowly)	  that,	  
when	  crossed,	  can	  potentially	  change	  the	  structure,	  function	  and	  identify	  of	  the	  system	  affected.”	  
Thresholds	  can	  thus	  be	  described	  as	  the	  breakpoint	  between	  two	  system	  states	  (Walker	  and	  Salt,	  
2006).	   To	   explain	   how	   the	   dynamics	   of	   stability	   and	   change	  work	  with	   respect	   to	   these	   system	  
states,	  resilience	  thinking	  tends	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  metaphor	  of	  an	  adaptive	  cycle. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  The	  term	  regime	  is	  used	  in	  the	  resilience	  literature	  to	  describe	  the	  set	  of	  states	  in	  this	  basin	  (also	  called	  a	  domain)	  of	  
attraction	  (Resilience	  Alliance,	  2007).	  This	  use	  of	  regime	  will	  be	  avoided	  to	  minimise	  confusion	  between	  regimes	  in	  
governance	  and	  regimes	  in	  ecosystems.	  
Figure	  1.	  Visual	  representation	  of	  stability	  
landscape	  and	  basins	  of	  attraction	  
Source:	  Walker	  et	  al.,	  2004,	  p.	  5	  (Figure	  1b)	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Figure	  2.	  Visual	  representation	  of	  the	  adaptive	  cycle	  	  
Source:	  Resilience	  Alliance,	  2007,	  p.	  25	  
	  
Dynamics	  of	  change	  and	  stability	  in	  SESs	  can	  be	  described	  by	  a	  four-­‐phase	  adaptive	  cycle	  (Figure	  2)	  
(Gunderson	  et	  al.,	  1995;	  Holling	  and	  Gunderson,	  2002).	  The	  cycle	  provides	  an	  alternative	  view	  to	  
more	   traditional	   notions	   of	   ecosystem	   dynamics,	   grounded	   in	   a	   static	   view	   that	   emphases	  
equilibrium	   states.	   The	   traditional	   view,	   Holling	   (1973)	   argues,	   is	   not	   useful	   for	   describing	  
ecosystems	   in	   transient	   states;	   however,	   both	   undisturbed	   ecosystems	   and	   those	   disturbed	   by	  
humans	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  in	  a	  continually	  transient	  state.	  The	  adaptive	  cycle	  is	  a	  metaphor	  that	  has	  
been	   developed	   based	   on	   study	   of	   ecosystems	   around	   the	   world,	   although	   it	   is	   not	   yet	   a	  
generalised	   theory	   (Holling	   and	  Gunderson,	   2002).	   The	   forward	   loop	  of	   the	   cycle	   consists	  of	   the	  
rapid	  growth	   (r)	  and	  conservation	   (K)	  phases.	  This	   loop	   is	   characterised	  by	   slow	  accumulation	  of	  
capital	  and	  relatively	  predictable	  dynamics.	  As	  the	  system	  moves	  through	  the	  K	  phase,	  it	  becomes	  
less	   flexible	   and	   responsive	   to	   external	   shocks	   as	   resources	   become	   increasingly	   locked	   up.	   This	  
phase	   is	   followed	  by	  the	  back	   loop,	  consisting	  of	  a	   release	  (Ω)	  and	  reorganisation	   (α)	  phase.	  The	  
back	   loop	   can	   be	   described	   as	   chaotic	   and	   unpredictable,	   but	   this	   phase	   provides	   new	  
opportunities	   and	   room	   for	   innovation	   (Walker	   et	   al.,	   2004).	   Systems	  may	  move	   through	   these	  
phases	   in	   order;	   however,	   it	   is	   also	   possible	   to	   move	   out	   of	   order	   between	   phases,	   with	   the	  
exception	  of	  a	  move	  from	  Ω	  phase	  directly	  to	  the	  K	  phase	  (Walker	  and	  Salt,	  2006).	  
	  
The	  dynamics	  of	  stability	  in	  SESs	  are	  said	  to	  arise	  from	  three	  complementary	  attributes:	  resilience,	  
adaptability	   and	   transformability	   (Walker	  et	   al.,	   2004).	  Originally	  described	   in	  a	  paper	  by	  Holling	  
(1973),	  ecological	  resilience	  refers	  to	  the	  buffer	  or	  absorptive	  capacity	  of	  a	  system,	  i.e.	  how	  much	  
disturbance	  can	  be	  absorbed	  before	  a	  system	  changes	  its	  structure	  by	  changing	  the	  variables	  and	  
processes	   that	   control	  behaviour	   (Gunderson	  et	  al.,	   1995).	  While	   there	   is	   some	  variation	   in	  how	  
the	   term	   is	   used,	   most	   definitions	   of	   resilience	   build	   on	   Holling’s	   earlier	   definitions.	   These	  
discussions	   generally	   emphasise	   both	   exposure	   to	   disturbance	   and	   the	   ability	   to	   absorb	   or	  
persevere.	  A	   resilient	   system	   is	   one	   that	   can	  be	   exposed	   to	   stress,	   disturbance	  or	   other	   outside	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influences	   whilst	   still	   retaining	   essentially	   the	   same	   function,	   structure,	   feedbacks,	   and	   identity	  
(Walker	   et	   al.,	   2006;	  Walker	   and	   Salt,	   2006).	   	   Although	   resilience	   is	   discussed	   as	   an	   attribute	   of	  
social	   and	   ecological	   systems	   when	   viewed	   as	   a	   single	   system	   (i.e.	   an	   SES),	   there	   are	   distinct	  
features	  of	  human	  systems	  that	  make	  the	  term	  an	  awkward	  fit	  in	  the	  social	  realm.	  
	  
5.2	   Institutions,	  Governance,	  and	  Resilience	  
Resilience	   thinking	  has	   its	   roots	   in	  ecology;	  but	   it	   is	   increasingly	  being	  applied	   to	   social	   systems,	  
including	  the	   institutional	  dimension.	  An	  attempt	  to	  foster	  SES	  resilience	  requires	  examination	  of	  
the	  role	  of	  governance	  and	  institutions.	  As	  the	  link	  between	  social	  and	  ecological	  systems	  (Adger,	  
2000;	   Sikor,	   2008),	   institutions,	   and	   the	   governance	   systems	   of	  which	   they	   are	   a	   part,	   can	   both	  
enable	  and	  constrain	  SES	  resilience.	  Researchers	  who	  adopt	  a	  resilience	  thinking	  perspective	  tend	  
to	   emphasise	   the	   need	   for	   change	   to	   cope	   with	   the	   complexity	   and	   uncertainty	   of	   social	   and	  
ecological	  systems.	  This	   includes	  an	  emphasis	  on	  political	  and	   institutional	   flexibility	  and	  ongoing	  
learning,	  evaluation	  and	  adaptation	   (Biggs	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Holling	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  These	  characteristics	  
suggest	  a	  particular	  meaning	  of	  institutional	  resilience	  that	  is	  distinct	  from	  ecosystem	  resilience.	  	  
	  
A	   resilient	   ecosystem	  as	   previously	   defined	   retains	   the	   same	   function,	   structure,	   feedbacks,	   and	  
identity	  in	  the	  face	  of	  stress	  or	  disturbance.	  Retention	  of	  function	  over	  the	  attributes	  of	  structure	  
and	   identity	   is	  emphasised	   in	  the	  definition	  of	   institutional	  resilience	  used	  here.	  Steinberg	  (2009)	  
uses	  institutional	  resilience	  to	  describe	  an	  institution	  that	  can	  maintain	  its	  effectiveness	  (e.g.	  fulfil	  
its	  core	  mission)	  over	  time,	  despite	  changing	  conditions.	  This	  does	  not	  suggest	  that	  the	  institutional	  
regime	  must	  retain	   its	   identity;	  rather,	   it	   implies	  that	  a	  shift	   in	   identity	  may	  be	  desirable	   if	   it	  will	  
lead	  to	  a	  better	  outcome.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  biodiversity,	  a	  resilient	  institutional	  regime	  should	  be	  able	  
to	  conserve	  biodiversity	  assets	  and	  processes.	  The	  regime	  should	  be	  robust	  enough	  to	  be	  sustained	  
over	   time,	   but	   flexible	   enough	   to	   change	   as	   required,	   for	   example,	   in	   response	   to	   threatening	  
processes	  such	  as	  climate	  change.	  	  	  
	  
This	   suggests	   that	   institutional	   resilience	   requires	   a	   careful	   balancing	   act	   between	   stability	   and	  
change.	  For	  instance,	  institutions	  must	  be	  stable	  enough	  to	  accommodate	  the	  long	  time	  scale	  of	  an	  
environmental	  problem,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  they	  cannot	  be	  so	  rigid	  that	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  bend	  
when	  pressures	  change.	  To	  enable	  resilience	   in	  the	  ecological	   realm,	   institutions	  and	  governance	  
regimes	  must	   have	   the	   capacity	   to	   cope	   with	   environmental	   change,	   societal	   dynamics,	   and	   to	  
reorganise	  after	  unforseen	  impacts	  (Galaz	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  This	  reorganisation	  may	  require	  only	  minor	  
changes,	   or	   it	   may	   leave	   institutions	   in	   an	   unrecognisable	   form	   to	   those	   who	   knew	   them	  
previously.	  “An	  institutional	  arrangement	  may	  perish	  if	  its	  mission	  is	  fundamentally	  altered,	  even	  if	  
its	  operational	  machinery	  (procedures,	  budget,	  staff,	   infrastructure)	  persists”	   (Steinberg,	  2009,	  p.	  
65).	   Institutional	  analysis	  and	  identification	  of	  needed	  reforms	  are	  thus	  important	  components	  in	  
efforts	  to	  generate	  more	  resilient	  SESs.	  Accordingly,	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  potential	  for	  institutional	  
change	  seems	  appropriate	   from	  resilience	  perspective,	  where	  change	   in	  ecosystems	   is	   inevitable	  
yet	  somewhat	  unpredictable.	  	  
	  
The	  ecological	  foundation	  of	  resilience	  has	  led	  to	  questions	  regarding	  the	  utility	  of	  the	  concept	  for	  
social	  scientists.	  At	  this	  stage,	  resilience	  thinking	  is	  more	  heuristic	  than	  theory,	  and	  it	  is	  based	  on	  a	  
relatively	  small	  number	  of	  empirical	  case	  studies	  (Griffith	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  Not	  surprisingly,	  the	  extent	  
to	   which	   these	   debated	   ecological	   concepts	   can	   be	   generalised	   to	   social	   systems	   has	   been	  
questioned.	   For	   example,	   the	   robustness	   of	   the	   adaptive	   cycle	   metaphor	   is	   contentious	   even	  
within	  ecology;	   thus	   it	   is	  questionable	  how	  robust	   it	   is	  once	  transferred	  to	  human	  systems.	  Both	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the	  concept	  of	  resilience	  and	  its	  measurement	  are	  still	  debated	  in	  ecology	  and	  the	  social	  sciences,	  
and	   the	   relationship	   between	   ecological	   and	   social	   resilience	   concepts	   is	   still	   being	   explored	  
(Adger,	   2000;	   Davidson,	   2010).	   Resilience	   in	   the	   social	   realm	   is	   still	   often	   viewed	   through	   an	  
ecological	  lens,	  but	  the	  two	  types	  of	  resilience	  could	  be	  conceived	  quite	  differently	  (Adger,	  2000).	  
Adger	  (2000,	  p.	  347)	  defines	  social	  resilience	  as	  “the	  ability	  of	  groups	  or	  communities	  to	  cope	  with	  
external	   stresses	   and	   disturbances	   as	   a	   result	   of	   social,	   political	   and	   environmental	   change.”	  
Ecological	   and	   social	   resilience	   can	   complement	   each	   other,	   with	   ecological	   resilience	   providing	  
social	  systems	  with	  opportunities	  to	  innovate,	  learn,	  and	  cope	  with	  change	  (Adger,	  2000).	  	  
	  
At	   the	   same	   time,	   there	   are	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   two	   concepts	   can	   conflict.	   Resilience	   as	   an	  
ecological	  concept	  is	  focused	  on	  the	  capacity	  of	  an	  SES	  to	  persist,	  independent	  of	  human	  values.	  It	  
does	   not	   guarantee	   that	   the	   system	   will	   persist	   in	   a	   desirable	   form.	   For	   example,	   a	   polluted	  
landscape	  or	  an	  economically	  depressed	  community	  could	  both	  meet	  the	  definition	  of	  resilient.	  On	  
the	  other	  hand,	  management	  to	  maximise	  production	  or	  aesthetic	  value	  may	  suppress	  the	  natural	  
variability	  of	  a	   forest,	  and	  such	  a	   system	  may	   lack	   resilience.	  What	   is	   resilient	   is	   thus	  not	  always	  
socially	  desirable,	  and	  what	  is	  socially	  desirable	  is	  not	  always	  resilient	  (Adger,	  2000;	  Chapin	  et	  al.,	  
2006).	   Defining	  what	   regime	   in	   is	   ‘desirable’	   in	   both	   ecological	   and	   social	   systems	   is	   laden	  with	  
value	   judgments.	   What	   is	   desirable	   and	   who	   decides	   are	   among	   the	   questions	   that	   should	   be	  
addressed	   if	   the	   concept	  of	   resilience	   is	   to	  make	   inroads	   in	   the	   social	   sciences.	  Answering	   these	  
questions	  will	   require	  an	  examination	  of	  power	  and	  values	  and	  consideration	  of	  the	  trade-­‐offs	   in	  
alternative	  courses	  of	  action.	  	  
	  
Resilience	   thinking	   is	  also	  underdeveloped	  when	  applied	   to	   social	   systems	  because	   its	  model	   for	  
ecological	   complexity	   imperfectly	   translates	   to	  a	  model	  of	   social	   complexity.	  Perhaps	  even	  more	  
importantly,	   it	  fails	  to	  account	  for	  human	  agency,	  which	  not	  only	  sets	  human	  systems	  apart	  from	  
ecological	   systems	   but	   can	   be	   one	   of	   society’s	   greatest	   assets	   in	   avoiding	   system	   collapse	  
(Davidson,	   2010).	   	   It	   is	   questionable	   whether	   social	   thresholds	   exist	   (Griffith	   et	   al.,	   2010),	   and	  
identifying	  such	  thresholds	  in	  the	  social	  realm	  is	  challenging.	  Although	  there	  have	  been	  attempts	  to	  
better	  integrate	  the	  concept	  of	  resilience	  in	  the	  social	  science	  literature,	  the	  social	  elements	  of	  the	  
perspective	  are	  not	  robust,	  and	  significantly	   lacking	   in	  the	  area	  of	   institutional	  dynamics,	  change,	  
and	  governance	  (Griffith	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  	  
	  
Although	   resilience	   thinking	   is	   an	   imperfect	   metaphor	   for	   social	   systems,	   it	   can	   still	   provide	   a	  
helpful	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  the	  role	  of	  institutions.	  In	  the	  social	  realm,	  resilience	  thinking	  is	  most	  
often	   associated	   with	   the	   adaptability	   component	   of	   the	   system.	  Walker	   et	   al.	   (2004)	   consider	  
resilience	  to	  be	  purely	  a	  function	  of	  the	  ecological	  realm.	  Adaptability,	  they	  argue,	  is	  a	  function	  of	  
the	  social	  realm,	  using	  the	  term	  to	  describe	  the	  capacity	  of	  actors	  in	  an	  SES	  to	  influence	  resilience	  
(Walker	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  Resilience	  can	  be	  built	  when	  there	  is	  capacity	  to	  learn	  and	  adapt	  in	  the	  front	  
loop	   and	   the	   ability	   to	   self-­‐organise	   in	   the	   back	   loop	   (Holling	   and	   Gunderson,	   2002).	   Adaptive	  
management	  (Section	  2.2)	  is	  one	  way	  to	  enhance	  resilience	  of	  an	  SES	  (Olsson	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  Walker	  
et	  al.,	  2004).	  The	  third	  characteristic	  of	  an	  SES	   is	  transformability,	  which	  refers	  to	  the	  capacity	  to	  
create	  a	  fundamentally	  new	  system	  when	  existing	  conditions	  make	  the	  existing	  system	  untenable	  
(Walker	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  	  
	  
Though	  they	  differ	  in	  degree,	  both	  adaptation	  and	  transformation	  are	  forms	  of	  change	  that	  can	  be	  
influenced	   by	   the	   designed	   components	   of	   an	   SES	   (i.e.	   institutions	   and	   governance).	   Given	   that	  
institutional	   and	   governance	   regimes	   have	   failed	   to	   address	   many	   challenging	   environmental	  
problems,	  many	  researchers	  and	  practitioners	  have	  noted	  that	  changes	  are	  required	  to	  foster	  SES	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resilience.	   Incremental	   changes	  may	  be	   sufficient,	  but	  a	  number	  of	   researchers	  have	   issued	  calls	  
for	  transformation	  of	  existing	  institutional	  arrangements	  (Biggs	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Boyd	  and	  Folke,	  2011;	  
Westley	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  The	  continued	  decline	  in	  biodiversity	  values,	  despite	  many	  international	  and	  
national	   attempts	   to	   halt	   these	   losses,	   suggest	   it	   may	   be	   that	   transformation	   –	   rather	   than	  
adaptation	  –	  of	  current	  regimes	  is	  required.	  	  
	  
The	  metaphor	  of	  resilience	  can	  also	  aid	  an	  understanding	  of	  innovation	  in	  social	  systems	  (Section	  
4).	   Although	   the	   two	   concepts	   are	   distinct,	   one	   way	   of	   thinking	   about	   adaptability	   and	  
transformation	   is	   as	   two	   degrees	   of	   innovation.	   In	   this	   way,	   transformation	   equates	   to	   a	  more	  
radical	   shift	   to	   a	  new	   system	  and	  adaptation	   is	   akin	   to	   incremental	   change.	  Moore	  and	  Westley	  
(2011b)	  distinguish	  the	  two	  based	  on	  the	  breadth	  and	   impact	  of	  change.	  Adaptive	  change	   is	   firs-­‐
order	  or	   incremental,	  and	   its	   impact	   is	  not	  widespread	  or	  disruptive.	  Transformative	   innovations	  
(also	   called	   ‘disruptive	   innovations’)	   change	   the	   rules	  of	   the	   system,	   leading	   to	   cascading	  effects	  
across	   adaptive	   cycles	   and	   altering	   relationships	   at	   different	   scales	   (Moore	   and	  Westley,	   2011).	  
Adaptive	  and	  transformative	  changes	  in	  the	  institutional	  realm	  thus	  roughly	  correspond	  to	  the	  two	  
types	  of	  change	  discussed	  earlier,	  i.e.	  incremental	  and	  radical	  change	  (Section	  4).	  
	  
Just	   as	   the	   ecological	   foundations	   of	   resilience	   present	   a	   challenge	   for	   integration	   for	   social	  
scientists,	  so	  do	  the	  foundations	  of	  institutional	  analysis	  itself.	  As	  previously	  discussed,	  the	  role	  of	  
institutions	  in	  explaining	  persistent	  patters	  has	  been	  a	  focal	  point	  for	  institutional	  analysis,	  rather	  
than	  on	   the	  attributes	  of	   institutions	   that	  allow	  change	  or	  enable	   resilience.	  Scholars	  have	  often	  
focused	   on	   understanding	   the	   complexity	   of	   institutions,	   but	   biophysical	   conditions	   have	   been	  
over-­‐simplified	   in	   the	   process.	   For	   example,	   in	   earlier	   versions	   of	   the	   Institutional	   Analysis	   and	  
Development	   Framework	   (IAD)	   (Section	   8),	   the	   complex	   ecological	   systems	   were	   reduced	   to	   a	  
single	  box,	   “the	  biophysical	  world”	   (Ostrom,	  1982;	  Ostrom,	  2011).	  Also,	   although	  Ostrom	   (1990)	  
outlines	   the	   processes	   by	   which	   rules	   can	   change,	   this	   was	   in	   the	   context	   of	   an	   unchanging	  
ecosystem,	  and	  how	  rules	  can	  change	  based	  on	  past	  experience	  (Anderies	  et	  al.,	  2004).	   In	  recent	  
years,	   researchers	   have	   sought	   to	   integrate	   a	   more	   complex	   understanding	   of	   how	   biophysical	  
conditions	  drive	  change	  and	  are	  impacted	  in	  SESs	  in	  the	  field	  of	  institutional	  analysis.	  	  
	  
The	   field	   of	   institutional	   analysis	   recognises	   the	   need	   to	   develop	   better	   theories	   of	   institutional	  
change.	   The	   recent	   attention	   to	   how	   institutions	   change	   over	   time	   and	   how	   they	   can	   facilitate	  
change	  (Dacin	  et	  al.,	  2002)	  may	  aid	  integration	  between	  the	  institutional	  and	  resilience	  literatures.	  
Recently,	   RC	   institutionalists	   have	   attempted	   to	   integrate	   the	   concept	   of	   SESs	   and	   resilience	  
thinking	   into	   institutional	  analysis	   (e.g.	  Anderies	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  Cox	  and	  Ross,	  2011;	  Ostrom,	  2009;	  
Schoon,	   2008).	   It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   this	   work	   focuses	   on	   robustness	   in	   the	   designed	  
components	  of	   SESs	   (i.e.	   institutions	  and	  governance).	   This	  work	  acknowledges	   change	   in	   that	   it	  
concedes	  persistence	  may	  not	  be	  a	  desirable	   feature	   in	  complex	  adaptive	  systems;	   rather,	  when	  
ecological	  systems	  inevitably	  change,	   institutions	  may	  need	  to	  change	  with	  them	  (Anderies	  et	  al.,	  
2004).	  However,	  there	  is	  an	  important	  caveat	  to	  that	  acknowledgement.	  
	  
An	   emphasis	   on	   robustness	   has	   implications	   for	   the	   power	   of	   this	   work	   to	   explain	   change.	  
Robustness	   can	   be	   defined	   here	   as	   an	   institution’s	   capacity	   to	   absorb	   stress	   without	   adaptive	  
change.	  When	  robustness	  is	  eroded,	  a	  system	  is	  vulnerable	  to	  stress	  (Young,	  2010).	  Young	  (2010)	  
contrasts	   this	  with	   institutional	   resilience,	  which	  he	  defines	  as	  an	   institution’s	  ability	   to	  adapt	   to	  
stress.	   Although	   this	   definition	   stops	   short	   of	   including	   transformative	   change,	   it	   highlights	   an	  
important	  difference	  between	  robustness	  and	  resilience.	  Both	  address	  the	  capacity	  of	  a	  system	  to	  
cope,	  but	  one	  incorporates	  change	  and	  the	  other	  does	  not.	  Anderies	  et	  al.	  (2004)	  note	  that	  they	  do	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not	  abandon	  the	  concept	  of	  resilience,	  but	  they	  only	  incorporate	  it	  into	  the	  ecological	  component	  
of	   an	   SES.	   Their	   view	   of	   the	   role	   of	   governance	   in	   resilience	   is	   to	   foster	   this	   attribute	   in	   the	  
ecological	  system	  (Anderies	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  Young	  (2010)	  notes	  the	  interdependency	  of	  robustness,	  
vulnerability,	   and	   resilience.	   For	   example,	   a	   regime	   may	   be	   very	   resilient,	   but	   it	   may	   have	   an	  
“Achilles	  heel”	  that	  leaves	  it	  vulnerable	  to	  one	  or	  more	  specific	  types	  of	  stress	  (e.g.	  introduction	  of	  
a	  new	  technology	  that	  increases	  harvest	  capacity)	  (Young,	  2010).	  This	  relationship	  is	  important,	  as	  
it	  highlights	  the	  idea	  that	  all	  three	  characteristics	  do	  not	  exist	  independently.	  
	  
In	  contrast	  to	  the	  literature	  that	  focuses	  on	  robustness	  in	  the	  institutional	  realm,	  my	  PhD	  will	  also	  
explore	  the	  concept	  of	  resilience	  in	  institutional	  systems.	  It	  also	  goes	  a	  step	  further	  to	  acknowledge	  
there	  is	  sometimes	  a	  need	  for	  transformative	  change,	  which	  may	  even	  result	  in	  existing	  institutions	  
dissolving	   completely	   and	  new	  ones	   emerging.	   This	   approach	   is	   favoured	  because	   it	   emphasises	  
the	   potential	   for	   change	   in	   the	   institutional	   arrangements	   themselves,	   rather	   than	   the	   role	   of	  
institutions	   in	   enabling	   resilience	   in	   ecological	   systems.	   Unlike	   the	   robustness	   approach,	   which	  
neglects	  radical	  change	  in	  the	  institutional	  realm,	  in	  this	  approach	  neither	  radical	  nor	  incremental	  
change	  is	  relegated	  to	  one	  area	  of	  the	  SES.	  	  
	  
5.3	   Related	  Frameworks	  
SES	   and	   resilience	   thinking	   are	   linked	   to	   the	   panarchy	   framework,	   a	   conceptual	   framework	   for	  
analysing	  adaptive	  capacity	  and	  resilience	  in	  an	  SES	  (Holling	  and	  Gunderson,	  2002).	  Key	  concepts	  in	  
the	   framework	   include	   the	   adaptive	   cycle	   and	  panarchy.	   The	   latter	   term	   is	   used	   to	  describe	   the	  
hierarchy	   of	   adaptive	   cycles	   in	   any	   SES	   that	   are	   linked	   across	   space	   and	   time	   (Walker	   and	   Salt,	  
2006).	  Panarchy	  thus	  emphasises	  the	  importance	  of	  cross-­‐scale	  interactions,	  asking	  researchers	  to	  
consider	  the	  scales	  both	  above	  and	  below	  the	  scale	  of	   interest,	  as	  these	  dynamics	  will	  affect	  the	  
scale	  of	  interest.	  Walker	  et	  al.	  (2004)	  refer	  to	  panarchy	  as	  one	  aspect	  of	  resilience	  and	  emphasise	  
that	  no	  SES	  can	  be	  understood	  through	  examination	  of	  a	  single	  scale,	  which	  is	  only	  one	  sub-­‐system	  
of	  the	  whole	  panarchy.	  In	  the	  social	  system,	  for	  instance,	  there	  will	  be	  multiple	  groups	  of	  people	  at	  
multiple	  scales,	  and	  their	  views	  of	  what	  is	  a	  ‘desirable’	  system	  state	  can	  differ	  (Walker	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  
The	  panarchy	  framework	  provides	  a	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  these	  cross-­‐scale	  dynamics.	  
	  
The	  panarchy	  framework	  is	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  attempt	  to	  develop	  a	  generalised	  theory	  of	  adaptive	  
change	   (Holling	   and	   Gunderson,	   2002),	   although	   at	   present	   the	   concepts	   are	   less	   theoretical	  
framework	   and	   more	   metaphor	   or	   heuristic	   (Griffith	   et	   al.,	   2010).	   While	   it	   would	   be	   useful	   to	  
employ	   a	   theoretical	   framework	   based	   on	   the	   adaptive	   cycle	   metaphor	   and	   the	   concept	   of	  
resilience	   in	   this	   research,	   it	   is	   too	   abstract	   to	   be	   fully	   operationalised	   and	   the	   institutional	  
components	  of	  SES	  are	  still	  underdeveloped	  (Ferguson	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  The	  theoretical	  framework	  for	  
my	  PhD	   thus	  will	  not	  be	  based	  on	   this	   framework,	  although	  some	  of	   its	   concepts	   (e.g.	   scale	  and	  
ecosystem	   dynamics)	   will	   be	   used	   to	   aid	   integration	   between	   the	   governance	   and	   resilience	  
literature.	  	  
	  
Although	   the	   framework	   itself	  will	   not	   be	   used,	   the	  metaphor	   of	   the	   adaptive	   cycle	   can	   still	   be	  
useful	   in	  thinking	  about	  some	  aspects	  of	  the	  research.	  For	  example,	  some	  researchers	  have	  used	  
the	  adaptive	  cycle	  to	  describe	  how	  shadow	  networks	  (Section	  3)	  can	  facilitate	  change.	  Olsson	  et	  al.	  
(2006)	  posit	  that	  shadow	  networks	  that	  form	  during	  the	  front	   loop	  of	  the	  adaptive	  cycle	  (r	  and	  K	  
phases)	  create	  reserves	  of	  experience	  (social	  memory)	  that	  can	  facilitate	  transition	  in	  the	  back	  loop	  
(Ω	   and	   α	   phases).	   This	   suggests	   that	   it	   may	   be	   useful	   to	   explore	   opportunities	   to	   foster	   these	  
networks	  in	  the	  front	  loop,	  banking	  experience	  that	  may	  generate	  adaptation	  when	  it	  is	  needed.	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Innovation	  can	  also	  be	  viewed	  through	  the	   lens	  of	   the	  adaptive	  cycle.	  Some	  researchers,	  such	  as	  
Westley	  and	  others	  at	   the	  Waterloo	   Institute	   for	  Social	   Innovation	  and	  Resilience,	  have	  used	  the	  
concepts	  of	  panarchy	  and	  resilience	  to	  describe	  the	  process	  of	   innovation	  using	  the	  metaphor	  of	  
the	  adaptive	  cycle.	  As	  outlined	  in	  Moore	  and	  Westley	  (2011):	  
• The	  front	  loop	  is	  characterised	  by	  the	  accumulation	  of	  knowledge	  and	  social	  memory.	  It	  is	  
here	  where	  skills	  are	  developed,	   resources	  are	  acquired,	  and	  norms	  are	   institutionalised.	  
This	  process	   increases	  efficiency,	  and	  the	  system	  matures	  during	  this	  phase.	  At	  the	  same	  
time,	  diversity	  is	  reduced	  and	  the	  system	  becomes	  vulnerable	  to	  major	  disturbances.	  	  
• During	   the	   back	   loop,	   creative	   destruction	   occurs	   in	   social	   systems	   in	   response	   to	  
disturbance.	  This	  might	  be	  a	  natural	  disaster,	  financial	  crises,	  or	  political	  change.	  
	  
Moore	   and	   Westley	   (2011b)	   also	   identify	   when	   barriers	   to	   innovation	   can	   occur	   during	   the	  
adaptive	  cycle.	  For	  example,	   there	  are	  two	  traps	  that	  can	  occur	   in	  SESs:	   the	  rigidity	   trap	  and	  the	  
poverty	  trap	   (Holling	  and	  Gunderson,	  2002).	  These	  traps	  can	  act	  as	  barriers	   to	   innovation.	  When	  
institutions	  become	  highly	  connected,	  inflexible,	  and	  self-­‐reinforcing,	  the	  system	  can	  become	  stuck	  
in	  a	  rigidity	  trap	  (Carpenter	  and	  Brock,	  2008).	  Here,	  the	  potential	  for	  change	  is	  low	  and	  resilience	  is	  
high	  (Allison	  and	  Hobbs,	  2004).	  A	  rigidity	  trap	  occurs	  in	  the	  front	  loop,	  when	  the	  system	  is	  maturing	  
and	  the	  need	  for	   innovation	   is	  stifled.	   In	  the	  front	   loop,	  social	  and	  ecological	  systems	  are	  said	  to	  
become	  more	  homogenous	  and	  resistant	  to	  change	  (Moore	  and	  Westley,	  2011).	  An	  example	  of	  a	  
rigidity	  trap	  in	  governance	  would	  be	  if	  management	  systems	  sought	  to	  reduce	  variation	  in	  resource	  
dynamics	   in	   a	   forest	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   maximising	   timber	   production.	   In	   such	   a	   situation,	   the	  
traditional	   command-­‐and-­‐control	   management	   styles	   discussed	   earlier	   can	   lead	   to	   decreased	  
diversity	  of	  the	  system	  and	  a	  reinforcing	  cycle	  of	  power	  and	  profit	  (Carpenter	  and	  Brock,	  2008).	  
	  
A	  poverty	  trap	  is	  essentially	  the	  opposite	  situation,	  in	  which	  resilience	  and	  connectivity	  is	  low.	  This	  
trap	  occurs	  in	  the	  back	  loop,	  but	  it	  can	  prevent	  a	  system	  from	  entering	  the	  front	  loop.	  Diversity	  and	  
competition	   are	   said	   to	   be	   high	   in	   a	   poverty	   trap,	   so	   there	   is	   no	   dominant	   set	   of	   ideas,	  
organisations,	   or	   initiatives	   (Moore	   and	  Westley,	   2011).	   	   Although	   there	   is	   potential	   for	   change,	  
that	   potential	   is	   not	   realised	   (Allison	   and	   Hobbs,	   2004;	   Carpenter	   and	   Brock,	   2008).	   From	   an	  
innovation	  perspective,	  ideas	  may	  be	  abundant,	  but	  innovation	  does	  not	  occur	  because	  the	  system	  
lacks	   capacity	   to	   move	   these	   ideas	   forward	   (Westley	   et	   al.,	   2006).	   This	   might	   mean	   a	   lack	   of	  
capacity	  to	  build	  political	  will	  and	  public	  support	  or	  a	  lack	  of	  energy	  and	  momentum.	  Even	  highly	  
interesting	   ideas	   and	   products	   require	   the	   right	   timing	   and	   awareness.	   They	   also	   need	  
entrepreneurs	   to	   frame	   them	   as	   legitimate,	   desirable,	   and	   needed	   (Moore	   and	  Westley,	   2011).	  
Although	  this	  work	  is	  based	  on	  a	  relatively	  small	  number	  of	  case	  studies,	  it	  suggests	  that	  identifying	  
and	  testing	  interventions	  that	  foster	  innovation	  may	  be	  a	  useful	  way	  to	  move	  social	  and	  ecological	  
systems	  out	  of	  these	  traps.	  	  
	  
Moore	   and	   Westley	   (2011a;	   2011b)	   have	   used	   the	   adaptive	   cycle	   as	   a	   metaphor	   to	   explain	  
innovation	   and	   identify	   leverage	   points	  where	   policy	   interventions	   can	   enable	   innovation.	  Using	  
case	   studies	   and	   examples,	   the	   authors	   applied	   a	   framework	   that	   illustrates	   how	   to	   facilitate	  
change	  through	  policy	   interventions	   (Hämäläinen,	  2007).12	  Moore	  and	  Westley	   (2011a)	  proposed	  
four	   phases	   of	   social	   innovation	   and	   recommend	   policy	   solutions	   that	   foster	   innovation	   in	   each	  
phase.	   For	   example,	   if	   a	   crisis	   or	   disturbance	   highlights	   a	   need	   to	   change	   the	   status	   quo,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  This	  framework	  is	  also	  based	  on	  the	  adaptive	  cycle	  metaphor.	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establishing	   processes	   that	   allow	   disconnected	   groups	   to	   interact	   and	   build	   trust	   can	   create	  
conditions	  that	  enable	  innovation.	  The	  policy	  interventions	  are	  intuitive	  and	  built	  upon	  case	  study	  
examples;	  however,	  they	  are	  hypotheses	  and	  have	  not	  been	  systematically	  tested.	  Their	  ability	  to	  
stimulate	  innovation,	  therefore,	  is	  not	  yet	  fully	  understood.	  In	  addition,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  say	  at	  this	  
stage	   if	   the	  adaptive	  cycle	   is	  a	  good	   fit	   for	  describing	   the	  process	  of	  social	   innovation.	  While	   the	  
metaphor	  has	  been	  applied	   to	   some	   case	   studies,	   the	   literature	   is	   largely	   self-­‐referencing	   and	   is	  
only	  a	  small	  subset	  of	  the	  larger	  body	  of	  social	  innovation	  literature.	  
	  
6	   Research	  Paradigm	  
The	   approach	   taken	   in	   my	   PhD	   is	   informed	   not	   only	   by	   the	   theoretical	   perspectives	   discussed	  
previously,	  but	  also	  by	  my	  research	  paradigm.	  A	  paradigm	  is	  a	  basic	  set	  of	  beliefs	  or	  worldview	  that	  
represents	  how	  the	  researcher	  views	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  world,	  and	  it	  guides	  research	  and	  practice	  
in	  a	  field	  (Guba	  and	  Lincoln,	  1994;	  Willis,	  2007).	  	  A	  paradigm	  can	  be	  characterised	  by	  its	  answers	  to	  
three	   fundamental	   questions:	   ontology	   (What	   is	   the	   nature	   and	   form	   of	   reality?),	   epistemology	  
(What	  we	   can	   know	   and	   how	  we	   can	   know	   it?)	   and	  methodology	   (How	   can	   the	   inquirer	   obtain	  
knowledge?)	  (Guba	  and	  Lincoln,	  1994).	  	  
	  
This	   research	   adopts	   an	   interpretive	   paradigm,	   although	   it	   draws	   from	   a	   significant	   body	   of	  
literature	   that	   sits	   within	   the	   neo-­‐positivist	   paradigm.	   Neo-­‐positivism	   holds	   that	   reality	   and	   the	  
researcher	  are	  separate,	  and	  that	  reality	  can	  be	  studied	  objectively.	  Interpretivism	  is	  predicated	  on	  
a	  belief	   that	   context	   and	   the	   subjective	  experience	  of	  humans	  matter,	   and	   that	   studying	  human	  
behaviour	   is	   fundamentally	   different	   from	   fields	   such	   as	   chemistry	   and	   physics.	   This	   paradigm	  
favours	  research	  methods	  that	  allow	  the	  researcher	  to	  understand	  how	  participants	  interpret	  the	  
world	  around	  them,	  such	  as	  case	  studies,	   interviews,	  and	  observation	   (Willis,	  2007).	  My	  PhD	  sits	  
mainly	  within	  the	  interpretive	  paradigm	  in	  that	  it	  seeks	  a	  nuanced	  appreciation	  of	  context	  and	  the	  
subjective	   experience	   of	   actors,	   rather	   than	   universal,	   law-­‐like	   truths.	   Neo-­‐positivism	   and	  
interpretivism	  are	  summarised	  in	  Table	  3.	  
	  
Table	  3.	  Summary	  of	  neo-­positivist	  and	  interpretivist	  paradigms	  
Meta-­‐theoretical	  
Assumptions	  
Neo-­‐positivism	   Interpretivism	  
Ontology	   Person	  (researcher)	  and	  reality	  
are	  separate.	  
Person	  (researcher)	  and	  reality	  are	  inseparable	  
(life-­‐world).	  
Epistemology	   Objective	  reality	  exists	  beyond	  
the	  human	  mind.	  
Knowledge	  of	  the	  world	  is	  
intentionally	  constituted	  through	  
a	  person’s	  lived	  experience.	  
Method	   Scientific	  methods	  (modified	  
experimental);	  may	  be	  qualitative	  
but	  often	  quantitative.	  
Subjective	  and	  objective	  research	  methods	  are	  
acceptable.	  Favours	  interviews,	  Hermeneutics,	  
phenomenology.	  
Sources:	  Guba	  and	  Lincoln,	  1994;	  Weber,	  2004;	  Willis,	  2007	  
	  
The	   discussion	   of	   paradigms	   is	   often	   polarised,	   but	   in	   practice	   the	   line	   between	   paradigms	   is	  
blurred.	   Earlier	  discussions	   about	  paradigms	  organised	   these	  perspective	   around	  methodological	  
approaches	   (i.e.	   quantitative	   versus	   qualitative),	   but	   this	   emphasis	   on	   data	   over	   foundational	  
beliefs	   is	   incomplete	   and	   overly	   simplified	   (Willis,	   2007).	   In	   fact,	   adopting	   a	   particular	   paradigm	  
does	  not	  necessarily	  preclude	  use	  of	  the	  methods	  or	  tools	  of	  researchers	  from	  another	  paradigm.	  
For	  example,	  an	  interpretive	  institutional	  analysis	  can	  incorporate	  aspects	  from	  the	  neo-­‐positivist	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literature	   (e.g.	   IAD	   framework,	   see	   section	  8)	   to	   identify	   factors	   to	  be	  explored,	  but	   supplement	  
this	  with	  interpretive	  elements	  (e.g.	  discourse)	  to	  access	  the	  subjective	  experiences	  of	  participants.	  
This	  is	  the	  approach	  I	  have	  adopted	  in	  my	  PhD.	  
	  
The	   interpretivist	   paradigm	  was	   selected	   for	   its	   suitability	   in	   accessing	   a	   thick	   understanding	   of	  
institutions.	   This	   perspective	   seeks	   to	   understand	   the	   behavioural	   significance	   of	   institutions,	   in	  
contrast	  to	  a	  thin	  perspective	  that	  focuses	  on	  institutions	  as	  articulated	  in	  constitutive	  documents.	  
The	   thick	   perspective	   incorporates	   discourse,	   informal	   understandings,	   and	   norms.	   This	  
perspective	  does	  not	  dismiss	  rules-­‐on-­‐paper;	  rather,	   it	  recognises	  that	   institutions	  may	  start	  with	  
such	   rules	   and	  evolve	  over	   time	   (Young,	   2002a).	  However,	   this	  understanding	   can	  be	  difficult	   to	  
obtain,	  given	  that	  institutions	  are	  often	  subtle,	  unstated,	  and	  highly	  embedded	  in	  social	  structures.	  
Institutions	   tend	   to	   be	   replicated	   without	   much	   reflection,	   taken	   for	   granted,	   and	   create	   path	  
dependencies	   (Garud	   et	   al.	   2007).	   This	   means	   the	   researcher	   must	   go	   beyond	   a	   review	   of	   the	  
content	  of	  written	  documents	   to	  understand	  how	  actors	   interpret	   roles	  and	  responsibilities.	  This	  
can	   be	   aided	   by	   examining	   the	   subjective	   experience	   of	   the	   actors	   involved	   in	   biodiversity	  
governance.	   This	   approach	   to	   institutional	   analysis	   suits	   the	   relativist	   ontology	  of	   interpretivism,	  
which	   acknowledges	   multiple	   mental	   constructions	   and	   experiences	   of	   institutions,	   rather	   than	  
one	  objective	  truth	  that	  the	  researcher	  can	  access	  (Willis,	  2007).	  	  
	  
The	   craft	   perspective	   of	   policy	   analysis	   informs	   my	   PhD.	   This	   approach	   shifts	   focus	   away	   from	  
dichotomous	  ways	  of	  thinking	  to	  balance	  empirical	  knowledge	  with	  useable	  knowledge	  in	  an	  often	  
messy	   political	   reality.	   Adopting	   a	   craft	   perspective	   “usefully	   and	   appropriately	   informs	   the	  
consideration	  of	  collective	  choices…policy	  analysis	  craft	  consists	  of	  more	  than	  a	  rational/empiricist	  
methodology.	   Specifically,	   it	   incorporates	   discursive	   and	   interpretive	   elements	   that	   arise	   in	   the	  
discovery	  of	  relevant	  values	  and	  goals	  in	  the	  formulation	  of	  policy	  alternatives”	  (Weimer,	  1998;	  p.	  
114).	   This	   perspective	   is	   consistent	   with	   the	   deliberative	   policy	   analysis	   approach,	   which	   uses	  
discourse	   theory	   to	   explore	   not	   only	   how	   institutions	   shape	   action,	   but	   the	   way	   actors	   shape	  
institutions	   through	   language	   and	  politics	   (Fischer,	   2003b;	  Hajer	   and	  Wagenaar,	   2003).	   This	   PhD	  
will	  thus	  examine	  the	  way	  institutions	  are	  expressed	  formally	  on	  paper	  and	  formally	  and	  informally	  
by	  individuals	  and	  organisations	  to	  better	  understand	  how	  collective	  choices	  are	  made	  within	  the	  
biodiversity	  governance	  regime.	  	  
	  
7	   Analytical	  Themes	  in	  Institutional	  Analysis	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  theories	  and	  perspectives	  discussed	  in	  Sections	  1	  through	  6,	  my	  PhD	  is	  focused	  
on	  using	  the	  analytical	  theme	  of	  fit	  to	  improve	  institutional	  performance.	  This	  section	  outlines	  the	  
basics	  of	  these	  concepts	  and	  their	  relationship	  to	  other	  prominent	  themes	  in	  institutional	  analysis.	  
	  
7.1	   Causality,	  Performance,	  and	  Design	  	  
Institutional	   analysis	   can	   take	  many	   forms,	   but	   a	   pattern	   emerges	   across	   studies.	   Young	   (2002)	  
organises	   the	   field	   by	   its	   “principle	   science	   questions”.	   These	   questions	   confronting	   institutional	  
analysts	  can	  be	  said	  to	  fall	  into	  three	  broad	  categories:	  causality,	  performance	  and	  design.	  	  
• Causality:	  How	  much	  variance	  in	  the	  condition	  of	  ecosystems	  is	  attributable	  to	  institutions?	  	  
• Performance:	  Why	  do	  some	  institutional	  responses	  to	  environmental	  problems	  prove	  more	  
successful	  than	  others	  in	  terms	  of	  criteria	  such	  as	  sustainability,	  efficiency	  and	  equity?	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• Design:	  How	  can	  we	  structure	  institutions	  to	  maximise	  their	  performance?	  
	  
Causality	  
Studies	  of	  cause-­‐and-­‐effect	  are	  challenging	  in	  the	  social	  sciences.	  Complex	  causality	  is	  pervasive	  in	  
SESs,	  making	  the	  use	  of	  traditional	  scientific	  methods	  to	  determine	  causality	  difficult	  (Young	  et	  al.,	  
2006).	  There	  are	  multiple	  social,	  economic,	  and	  biophysical	  drivers	  that	  affect	  these	  systems,	  and	  
these	  effects	   are	  not	   always	  direct.	   They	  also	   interact	  with	  one	  another	   and	   cannot	  be	   isolated.	  
Institutional	   analysts	  must	   cope	  with	   the	  problem	  of	   endogeneity.	   “An	  endogenous	   variable	   is	   a	  
factor	   in	   a	   causal	   model	   or	   a	   causal	   system	   whose	   value	   is	   determined	   by	   the	   states	   of	   other	  
variables	   in	   the	   system”	   (Lewis-­‐Beck	   et	   al.,	   2004;	   p.	   309).	   Ideally,	   a	   pure	   endogenous	   variable	   is	  
determined	  entirely	  by	  the	  states	  of	  other	  variables	  in	  a	  system,	  but	  in	  reality	  causal	  systems	  have	  
a	   range	   of	   endogeneity	   (Lewis-­‐Beck	   et	   al.,	   2004).	   Problems	   of	   endogeneity	   occur	   when	   all	   the	  
variables	  are	  not	   included	   in	  a	  model	   (e.g.	  because	  of	   insufficient	  data	  or	   ignorance),	   and	   this	   is	  
often	   the	   case	   in	   studies	   of	   SESs.	   Statistical	   models	   to	   determine	   causality	   thus	   must	   be	  
supplemented	   or	   even	   replaced	   with	   a	   suite	   of	   methods	   to	   begin	   to	   tease	   out	   questions	   of	  
causality	   (Young	   et	   al.,	   2006).	   In	   addition,	   specifying	   independent	   and	   dependent	   variables	   is	  
complicated	   in	   institutional	   analysis.	  Dependent	   variables	   can	   also	   act	   as	   independent	   variables.	  
For	   example,	   roads	   can	   cause	   deforestation,	   and	   deforestation	   can	   lead	   to	   the	   construction	   of	  
roads.	   Institutions	   can	   introduce	   conservation	   measures,	   but	   damage	   to	   resources	   leads	   to	  
formation	  of	  institutions	  (Young	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  Methods	  to	  solve	  this	  “chicken	  or	  the	  egg”	  problem	  
are	  still	  in	  their	  infancy.	  
	  
There	  are	  other	  problems	  associated	  with	   the	  question	  of	  causality.	  Although	   institutions	  have	  a	  
role	   to	   play	   in	   both	   causing	   and	   solving	   environmental	   problems,	   the	   strength	   of	   influence	   of	  
institutions	  on	  ecosystem	  condition	  is	  not	  always	  straightforward.	  Forces	  outside	  the	  institutional	  
realm	  also	  impact	  biodiversity	  values,	  such	  as	  climate	  change	  and	  the	  ability	  of	  species	  to	  adapt	  to	  
environmental	   change.	   Institutional	   forces	   from	   outside	   the	   domestic	   biodiversity	   governance	  
framework,	  such	  as	  global	  financial	  markets,	  are	  also	  at	  play.	  It	  is	  a	  challenge	  to	  determine	  whether	  
–	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  –	  institutional	  forces	  affect	  biodiversity	  conservation,	  and	  the	  task	  becomes	  
even	  more	  complex	   if	   the	   researcher	   seeks	   to	  determine	   the	   relative	  contribution	  of	   institutions	  
and	   other	   (e.g.	   biogeophysical)	   forces.	   Synergistic	   impacts	   between	   these	   forces	   also	   have	   an	  
effect	  on	  outcomes,	  but	  understanding	  and	  predicting	  how	  factors	   interact	   in	  complex	  systems	  is	  
not	  easy.	  	  
	  
As	  yet,	   there	   is	  no	  cohesive	   theory	   to	  guide	  research	   in	   this	  area,	  and	  researchers	   typically	  must	  
employ	   a	   suite	   of	   methods	   to	   contribute	   incrementally	   to	   our	   understanding	   of	   causality.	  
Identifying	   the	   mechanisms	   and	   the	   effect	   of	   institutions	   on	   biodiversity	   conservation	   is	   thus	  
crucial	   to	   institutional	   analysis,	   yet	   Young	   (2002)	   contends	   it	   remains	   “the	   most	   fundamental	  
challenge”	   in	   the	   field	   of	   institutional	   analysis.	  My	   PhD	  does	   not	   attempt	   to	   quantify	   the	   causal	  
impact	   of	   institutions	   relative	   to	   other	   forces	   on	   biodiversity	   outcomes.	   Although	   definitive	  
evidence	  of	   causality	  may	  not	  be	  available,	  qualitative	  date	   (e.g.	  expert	  opinion)	  and	  monitoring	  
data	  suggest	  that	  institutions	  are	  a	  part	  of	  the	  problem;	  and	  this	  study	  will	  explore	  how	  changes	  to	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Performance	  
In	   situations	   where	   institutions	   are	   found	   (or	   assumed)	   to	   be	   significant	   causal	   forces,	   then	  
research	   may	   focus	   on	   the	   question	   of	   performance.	   Evaluation	   of	   performance	   requires	   the	  
specification	  of	  criteria	  for	  evaluation	  of	  the	   institutional	   framework	  or	  regime.	  These	  criteria	  for	  
environmental	   regimes	   often	   include	   sustainability,	   efficiency,	   and	   equity.	   Performance	   can	   be	  
assessed	   at	   two	   basic	   levels,	   i.e.	   simple	   or	   complex.	   Simple	   performance	   focuses	   on	   internal	  
outcomes	   relevant	   to	   the	   problem	   the	   institution	   is	   meant	   to	   address,	   whereas	   complex	  
performance	  considers	  broader	  outcomes	  flowing	  from	  institutional	  regimes	  (Young,	  2002a).	  This	  
might	  mean,	   for	  example,	   considering	  not	  only	   the	  biodiversity	  values	  protected	  by	  a	  policy	   that	  
conserves	  biodiversity	  on	  private	  property,	  but	  also	  the	  effects	  on	  farm	  income	  and	  social	  welfare.	  
Efforts	  to	  assess	  complex	  performance	  are	  much	  more	  difficult,	  as	  they	  require	  examination	  of	  a	  
much	  longer	  causal	  chain	  and	  are	  much	  less	  advanced	  (Young,	  2002a).	  	  
	  
Performance	   of	   an	   institutional	   regime	   can	   also	   be	   framed	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   effectiveness	   in	  
addressing	   the	   problem	   at	   hand.	   An	   environmental	   regime	   can	   be	   considered	   effective	  when	   it	  
solves	   the	   problem	   it	   was	   created	   to	   address	   (Underdal,	   2002).	   In	   biodiversity	   conservation	  
governance,	  this	  would	  mean	  an	  effective	  regime	  would	  change	  human	  behaviours,	  resulting	  in	  a	  
biophysical	   change	   in	   the	   environment	   and	   a	   net	   improvement	   in	   biodiversity.	   There	   are	  many	  
ways	   to	   assess	   effectiveness,	   and	   a	   number	   of	   methodological	   challenges.	   This	   includes	  
establishing	   a	   point	   of	   reference	   to	   compare	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   regime	   and	   a	   metric	   of	  
measurement	   that	   allows	   the	   regime	   to	   be	   measured	   (Underdal,	   2002).	   	   All	   of	   this,	   of	   course,	  
assumes	   that	   data	   on	   how	   the	   regime	   changed	   behaviour	   and	   how	   the	   state	   of	   the	   biophysical	  
world	   also	   changed	   is	   available.	   In	   practice	   this	   data	   is	   not	   always	   available,	   and	   the	  matter	   is	  
complicated	  when	  the	  variable	  to	  be	  measured	  is	  complex.	  Measuring	  the	  population	  or	  stock	  of	  a	  
certain	   species,	   for	   instance,	   is	   simpler	   than	   measuring	   an	   underlying	   functional	   process.	   In	  
monitoring	   programs,	   this	   is	   usually	   addressed	   by	   the	   measurement	   of	   indicators	   and	  
establishment	   of	   thresholds	   of	   potential	   concern.	   These	   measures,	   however,	   are	   decision	  
thresholds	  based	  on	  ecological	  or	  social	  values	  (Biggs	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  Regime	  performance	  could	  be	  
gauged	  by	  how	  quickly	  they	  respond	  to	  these	  variables,	  but	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  say	  whether	  it	  was	  the	  
fault	  of	  the	  regime,	  a	  flaw	  in	  setting	  the	  threshold,	  or	  the	  speed	  of	  the	  driver	  that	  resulted	  in	  the	  
condition	  of	  the	  environment	  (Biggs,	  2008).	  This	  suggests	  that	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  effectiveness,	  one	  




The	   question	   of	   designing	   institutions	   to	   maximise	   performance	   has	   been	   a	   major	   focus	   in	  
institutional	  analysis.	  If	  institutions	  are	  the	  major	  causal	  force,	  then	  institutional	  design	  may	  focus	  
on	  modifying	   or	   replacing	   institutions	   to	  modify	   the	   behaviour	   of	   relevant	   actors.	   On	   the	   other	  
hand,	   if	   biophysical	   drivers	   are	  major	   causal	   forces,	   then	   efforts	   in	   institutional	   design	   is	   better	  
focused	   on	   giving	   actors	   the	   tools	   and	   incentives	   required	   to	   cope	  with	   these	   drivers.	   In	   either	  
case,	  the	  impact	  of	  institutional	  design	  on	  behaviour	  of	  the	  relevant	  actors	  should	  remain	  central	  
at	  all	  times	  in	  endeavours	  to	  redesign	  institutions.	  Hence,	  design	  is	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  the	  model	  
of	   the	   actor	   a	   researcher	   adopts.	   That	   is,	   whether	   the	   analyst	   views	   the	   actors	   as	   utilitarians	  
reacting	  to	  changes	  in	  costs	  and	  benefits	  (logic	  of	  consequences)	  or	  as	  behaving	  in	  ways	  they	  view	  
as	   right	   or	   proper	   (logic	   of	   appropriateness)	   (Young,	   2002a).	   The	   implications	   of	   each	   of	   these	  
positions	  for	  institutional	  design	  were	  outlined	  in	  Section	  1.1	  (Table	  2).	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Institutional	   design	   can	  be	   a	  product	   of	   social	   learning	  within	   a	   particular	   policy	   domain.	   Single-­‐
loop	   learning	   might	   lead	   to	   minor	   changes,	   but	   double-­‐	   and	   triple-­‐loop	   learning	   can	   lead	   to	  
changes	  in	  policy	  instruments,	  institutional	  arrangement,	  and	  even	  underlying	  paradigms	  (Grin	  and	  
Loeber,	  2007).	  This	  view	  of	  institutional	  design	  as	  a	  process	  of	  social	  learning	  highlights	  that	  there	  
is	   no	   single	   ‘institutional	   designer’.	   In	   outlining	   the	   theory	   of	   institutional	   design,	  Goodin	   (1996)	  
contends	   that	   the	   process	   of	   institutional	   design	   is	   actually	   just	   the	   result	   of	   multiple	   local	  
attempts	   at	   changing	   institutional	   designs	   that	   cut	   across	   one	   another.	   Attempts	   at	   institutional	  
design,	  he	  argues,	  should	  not	  seek	  to	  design	   institutions	  directly,	   rather	  they	  should	  be	  aimed	  at	  
“designing	   schemes	   for	   designing	   institutions	   –	   schemes	   which	   will	   pay	   due	   regard	   to	   the	  
multiplicity	  of	  designers	  and	  to	  the	  inevitably	  cross-­‐cutting	  nature	  of	  their	  intentional	  interventions	  
in	   the	   design	   process”	   (Goodin,	   1996;	   p.	   28).	   This	   view	   is	   consistent	  with	   the	   idea	   of	   discursive	  
design	  (Dryzek,	  1990),	  and	  thus	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  discursive	  institutionalist	  perspective	  adopted	  
in	  this	  PhD.	  
	  
Institutions	   are	   not	   stagnate,	   particularly	   when	   they	   are	   part	   of	   an	   environmental	   governance	  
regime	   that	   must	   respond	   to	   changing	   conditions.	   Institutional	   design	   can	   be	   accidental,	  
intentional,	  or	  evolve	  from	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  institutions	  themselves	  (Dryzek,	  1990).	  This	  means	  that	  
although	   institutional	   design	   can	   be	   part	   of	   a	   deliberate	   attempt	   to	   improve	   institutional	  
performance,	   it	   can	   also	   be	   the	   product	   of	   every	   day	   decision-­‐making.	   Institutional	   designs	   can	  
change	  in	  response	  to	  drivers	  and	  disturbances.	  For	  example,	  changes	  to	  the	  design	  of	  institutional	  
arrangements	   may	   be	   the	   result	   of	   scientific	   research	   and	   conscious	   attempts	   to	   re-­‐design	  
institutions	  when	  the	  current	  institutions	  are	  underperforming.	  It	   is	  often,	  however,	  made	  on	  the	  
fly	   by	   decision-­‐makers	   and	   practitioners,	   based	   on	   practical	   considerations	   such	   as	   previous	  
experience,	  a	  need	   to	   respond	   to	  crises,	  or	  as	  a	  means	  of	   coping	  with	  organisational	   constraints	  
and	  capacities	  (Schoon,	  2008).	  Schoon	  (2008)	  suggests	  that	  institutional	  robustness	  may	  also	  lead	  
improved	  institutional	  design.	  This	  is	  because	  robust	  institutional	  arrangements	  should	  respond	  to	  
drivers	   and	   disturbances	   and	   adjust	   as	   needed.	   Institutional	   design	   is	   thus	   to	   a	   certain	   extent	  
context-­‐specific,	   as	   institutional	   and	   governance	   arrangements	   must	   be	   designed	   in	   a	   way	   that	  
allow	  them	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  specific	  problems	  at	  hand	  (Schoon,	  2008).	  Institutional	  design	  efforts	  
should	  thus	  take	  the	  need	  for	  dynamic	  arrangements	  into	  account.	  
	  
7.2	   The	  Problem	  of	  Fit	  
Underneath	   the	   questions	   of	   causality,	   performance,	   and	   design	   lie	   three	   analytic	   themes	   of	  
inquiry	   that	   Young	   highlights	   on	   the	   frontier	   of	   institutional	   analysis,	   i.e.	   fit,	   interplay	   and	   scale.	  
Young	   (2002)	   uses	   fit	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   compatibility	   between	   ecosystems	   and	   management	  
institutions.	  When	  the	  two	  do	  not	  fit,	  then	  there	  is	  an	   institutional	  misfit.	   Interplay	  occurs	   in	  two	  
directions	   –	   horizontally	   and	   vertically.	   Horizontal	   interplay	   occurs	   at	   the	   same	   level	   of	   social	  
organisation,	   whereas	   vertical	   interplay	   refers	   to	   cross-­‐scale	   interactions	   across	   levels	   of	   social	  
organisation.	   Interplay	   can	   occur	   as	   the	   result	   of	   functional	   interdependencies	   or	   the	   politics	   of	  
design	  and	  management.	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  other	   terms	  used	  for	   interplay	   in	   the	   literature,	  
including	   cross-­‐scale	   linkages	   (Heikkila	  et	   al.,	   2011)	   and	  boundary	  organisations	   (Termeer	   	   et	   al.,	  
2010).	  Finally,	  scale	  is	  important	  not	  just	  for	  the	  environmental	  problems	  themselves,	  which	  vary	  in	  
time	  and	  space,	  but	  also	  for	  the	  institutional	  systems	  (Young,	  2002a).	  	  
	  
There	   is	   also	   overlap	   between	   fit,	   scale,	   and	   interplay	   in	   the	   literature,	   with	   many	   authors	  
discussing	   them	  under	   the	  umbrella	  of	   the	  problem	  of	   fit.	  Through	  the	   lens	  of	  SES	  and	  resilience	  
thinking,	  fit	  should	  be	  conceived	  in	  this	  broader	  sense.	  A	  narrow	  focus	  only	  on	  the	  match	  between	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the	  properties	  of	  the	  biophysical	  system	  and	  the	  properties	  of	  the	  institutions	  that	  manage	  them	  is	  
inadequate	   in	   addressing	   institutional	   design,	   as	   it	   requires	   an	   arbitrary	   separation	  of	   social	   and	  
ecological	   systems	   (Galaz	   et	   al.,	   2008).	   Folke	   et	   al.	   (2007)	   incorporate	   temporal,	   spatial	   and	  
functional	   scale	   of	   institutions	   in	   examining	   how	   institutions	   fit	   the	   ecosystem	   being	   managed.	  
Central	   to	   their	   examination	   of	   fit	   are	   the	   linkages	   from	   institutions	   to	   functional	   diversity,	   key	  
structuring	  processes,	  and	  resilience	  (capacity	  to	  survive	  disturbance)	   in	  ecosystems	  (Folke	  et	  al.,	  
2007).	   Berkes	   (2002)	   discusses	   cross-­‐scale	   institutional	   linkages	   and	   horizontal	   and	   vertical	  
interplay	  under	  the	  wider	  umbrella	  of	  fit.	  	  
	  
Misfits	  come	  in	  many	  forms	  and	  have	  varied	  causes.	  Young	  (2002)	  identifies	  imperfect	  information,	  
rent-­‐seeking	   behaviour,13	   and	   institutional	   constraints	   as	   sources	   of	   misfits.	   Misfits	   are	   also	  
discussed	   as	   a	   failure	   of	   knowledge	   transfer.	   This	   may	   be	   a	   problem	   of	   large-­‐scale	   scientific	  
knowledge	   that	   is	   or	   is	   perceived	   to	  be	   irrelevant	   to	   local	   decision	  makers	   (e.g.	   climate	  models)	  
(Cash,	   2006).	   Failure	   to	   account	   for	   or	   transfer	   local	   or	   indigenous	   knowledge	   has	   also	   been	  
highlighted	   as	   a	   problem	   of	   fit	   (Berkes,	   2002;	   Frantzeskaki	   and	   Thissen,	   2009;	   Robards	   and	  
Lovecraft,	   2010).	   Berkes	   (2002)	   highlights	   the	   importance	   of	   accounting	   for	   different	   systems	   of	  
knowledge,	  as	  they	  can	  lead	  to	  significantly	  different	  views	  of	  the	  resources	  being	  managed.	  	  
 
According	  to	  Galaz	  et	  al.	  (2008,	  Table	  5.1)	  misfits	  fall	  into	  four	  broad	  categories:	  
• Spatial	  misfits	  can	  occur	  where	  the	   institutional	   jurisdiction	   is	  too	  small/large	  to	  cover	  or	  
affect	  the	  ecosystem	  being	  managed.	  Such	  misfits	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  actors	  
or	  drivers	  relevant	  to	  the	  ecosystem.	  	  
• Temporal	  misfits	  occur	  when	  1)	   institutions	  are	   formed	   too	  early	  or	   late	   to	  produce	  and	  
effect,	  or	  2)	   institutional	  decisions	  assume	  a	  shorter	  or	   longer	  time	  span	  than	   is	  required	  
for	   the	   affected	   ecosystems	   and/or	   the	   social	   response	   is	   too	   slow,	   fast,	   short	   or	   long	  
relative	  to	  biophysical	  conditions.	  	  
• Misfits	   can	   occur	   when	   institutions	   lead	   to	   ecological	   systems	   to	   cross	   a	   threshold.	  
Institutions	   that	   do	   not	   recognise,	   cause,	   or	   are	   unable	   avoid	   abrupt	   shifts	   can	   lead	   to	  
almost	   irreversible	   shifts	   in	   biophysical	   systems.	   When	   institutions	   fail	   to	   respond	   or	  
respond	   inadequately	   to	   disturbances	   that	   could	   have	   been	   buffered,	   this	   also	   can	   lead	  
systems	  to	  cross	  a	  threshold.	  	  
• Cascading	   effects	   occur	   when	   institutions	   cannot	   buffer	   effects	   between	   biophysical,	  
social,	  and	  economic	  systems.	  This	   type	  of	  misfit	  can	  also	  trigger	   further	  effects,	  and	  can	  
occur	  when	  institutional	  response	  is	  misdirected,	  nonexistent,	  or	  timed	  incorrectly,	  causing	  
further	  changes	  along	  temporal	  or	  spatial	  scales.	  	  
	  
An	   institutional	  misfit	   in	  a	  biodiversity	  governance	  regime	  can	  occur	   for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  As	  
Brown	  (2003)	  discusses,	  institutions	  often	  fail	  to	  protect	  biodiversity	  by	  suppressing	  variability	  and	  
blocking	   out	   large-­‐scale	   disturbance	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   create	   a	   static	   system.	   However,	   this	   can	  
actually	  increase	  the	  chance	  of	  large-­‐scale	  disturbances	  and	  works	  against	  maximising	  biodiversity	  
and	  resilience	  in	  ecosystems	  (Brown,	  2003).	  Biodiversity	  institutions	  are	  also	  a	  part	  of	  politics,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	   Rent	   seeking	   behaviour	   is	   when	   an	   actor	   seeks	   wealth	   by	   manipulating	   the	   environment	   (e.g.	   through	   political	  
lobbying),	  rather	  than	  generating	  new	  wealth.	  This	  maximises	  individual	  benefit,	  but	  has	  a	  net	  negative	  impact	  on	  social	  
welfare.	  This	  might	  mean	  an	  individual	  manipulates	  legislation	  to	  maximise	  resource	  extraction,	  without	  consideration	  of	  
the	  long-­‐term	  consequences	  to	  society	  (Young,	  2002a).	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the	  nature	  of	  politics	   can	  be	  maligned	  with	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  biodiversity	   conservation	  problem.	  
For	  example,	  a	  focus	  on	  short-­‐term	  rather	  than	  long-­‐term	  goals	  is	  a	  political	  reality	  for	  politicians	  
and	  government	  agencies	  as	  well	  as	  non-­‐governmental	  actors	  and	  organisations	  that	  rely	  on	  short-­‐
term	   funding	   cycles	   (Brown,	   2003).	   Efficiency	   is	   also	   a	   frequent	   focus	   of	   assessments	   of	  
institutional	   performance	   and	   design,	   and	   governments	   often	   pride	   themselves	   on	  measures	   to	  
improve	   efficiency.	   Unfortunately,	   measures	   to	   maximise	   efficiency	   and	   production	   (e.g.	   by	  
removing	   ‘redundancies’)	   can	   create	   rigid,	   vulnerable	   systems	   that	   lack	   resilience	   (Galaz	   et	   al.,	  
2008;	  Griffith	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Walker	  and	  Salt,	  2006).	  	  
	  
It	  is	  notable	  that	  both	  institutions	  and	  other	  sources	  of	  misfits	  in	  governance	  regimes	  can	  be	  highly	  
resistant	  to	  change	  (Galaz	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Young,	  2002a).	  Even	  if	  a	  change	  occurs	   in	  one	  area	  of	  the	  
regime,	   this	   also	   does	   not	   mean	   the	   sources	   of	   misfit	   have	   been	   addressed	   in	   practice.	   For	  
example,	  language	  can	  shift	  to	  make	  institutions	  ‘fit’	  but	  actual	  practices	  may	  not	  reflect	  this	  shift	  
in	   language	  (Fischer,	  2007;	  Frantzeskaki	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Winkel	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  This	  might	  mean	  that	  a	  
particular	  coalition	  adopts	  the	  language	  of	  landscape	  scale	  and	  SES	  resilience,	  without	  shifting	  from	  
previous	   practices.	   Language	  will	   be	   an	   important	   focus	   in	   this	   PhD,	   both	   in	   the	   institutions	   on	  
paper	  and	  those	  in	  use.	  	  
	  
8	   Approach	  to	  Institutional	  Analysis	  
The	   following	   sections	   outline	   the	   approach	   that	   will	   guide	   the	   institutional	   analysis,	   and	   the	  
rationale	  for	  adopting	  this	  approach	  over	  several	  others	  that	  are	  prominent	  in	  the	  literature.	  Some	  
selected	  methods	  are	  also	  discussed	  here	  where	  relevant.	  For	  a	  full	  description	  of	  methods,	  refer	  
to	  the	  Programme	  of	  Study.	  
	  
8.1	   Case	  Studies	  
My	  PhD	  will	  employ	  the	  case	  study	  method.	  A	  case	  study	  is	  a	  form	  of	  empirical	  inquiry	  that	  allows	  
the	   researcher	   to	   investigate	   a	   contemporary	   phenomenon	   in	   depth	   whilst	   incorporating	  
important	  contextual	  conditions	   (Yin,	  2009).	  Case	  studies	  can	  be	  used	   to	  shed	   light	  on	  situations	  
where	   there	   are	   multiple	   outcomes	   and	   variables	   (Yin,	   2009),	   which	   describes	   most	   studies	   of	  
institutions	  and	  governance.	  They	  are	  a	  useful	  way	  to	  understand	  SESs,	  where	  they	  can	  contribute	  
to	   theory	   building	   and	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   complex	   relationships	   between	   social	   and	  
ecological	  systems	  (Poteete	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  Case	  studies	  are	  particularly	  useful	  for	  investigating	  ‘how’	  
and	  ‘why’	  research	  questions	  and	  for	  exploration,	  evaluation,	  and	  investigation	  of	  social	  complexity	  
(Yin,	  2009).	  These	  characteristics	  mean	  the	  method	  requires	  relatively	  few	  assumptions	  about	  the	  
cases	   in	   question,	   and	   researchers	   are	   encouraged	   to	   adopt	   an	   open-­‐ended	   approach	   to	  
investigation.	  The	  methodology	  enables	  examination	  of	  the	  fine-­‐grained	  details	  of	  cases,	  allowing	  
researchers	   to	  untangle	   complex	   relationships	   and	  discriminate	  between	   conceptually	   important	  
factors.	   These	   attributes	   make	   case	   studies	   useful	   in	   the	   areas	   of	   conceptual	   refinement	   and	  
theory	   development	   and	   testing,	   as	   well	   as	   enhancing	   data	   quality	   and	   construct	   and	   internal	  
validity	  (Poteete	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  	  
	  
Case	  studies	  are	  frequently	  employed	  in	  institutional	  analysis	  because	  they	  allow	  access	  to	  a	  depth	  
of	  understanding	  that	  can	  be	  more	  difficult	  to	  access	  through	  other	  methods.	  Although	  document	  
analysis	  will	  provide	  an	  important	  source	  of	  data,	  institutional	  research	  requires	  intense	  periods	  of	  
field	  research	  to	  uncover	  informal	  and	  undocumented	  arrangements.	  This	  is	  a	  common	  feature	  in	  
case	   studies	   investigating	  governance	  of	  natural	   resources	   (Poteete	  et	  al.,	   2010).	   The	   case	   study	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method	   is	   a	  useful	   tool	   to	  move	   research	  beyond	   institutions	   as	  mere	   statements	  on	  paper	   and	  
uncover	  the	  rules-­‐in-­‐use,	  norms,	  and	  strategies	  that	  form	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  institution	  (Ostrom,	  
1990,	   2005),	   as	   well	   as	   the	   patterns	   of	   interaction	   between	   actors	   and	   the	   institutional	   setting	  
(Giddens,	  1984;	  Young	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  	  
	  
Several	   limitations	  of	  case	  studies	  are	  worth	  noting.	  Although	  case	  studies	  are	  frequently	  used	  to	  
study	   natural	   resource	   governance,	   they	   have	   drawbacks	   for	   advancement	   of	   the	   field.	   For	  
example,	   most	   case	   studies	   are	   generally	   selected	   via	   purposive	   sampling	   in	   which	   cases	   are	  
selected	  for	  their	  theoretical	  relevance	  and	  variation	  in	  significant	  variables.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  practical	  
challenges	  that	  generally	  prevent	  researchers	  in	  this	  field	  satisfying	  the	  requirements	  of	  random	  or	  
representative	   case	   selection.	   A	   purposive	   sampling	   strategy	   has	   the	   advantage	   of	   requiring	   the	  
researcher	  to	  explicitly	  consider	  theoretically	  relevant	  variables;	  however,	  it	  requires	  knowledge	  of	  
what	   those	   variables	   are	   as	   well	   as	   knowledge	   of	   the	   case(s)	   to	   be	   studied	   (Agrawal,	   2001).	  
Examples	   of	   successful	   institutional	   and	   governance	   arrangements	   are	   also	   likely	   to	   be	   over-­‐
represented	   in	   the	   case	   study	   literature.	   This	   is	   a	   common	  problem	  across	   the	   sciences	  because	  
there	  is	  a	  tendency	  to	  prefer	  reporting	  (and	  publishing)	  successful	  cases.	  Failures	  may	  also	  be	  more	  
difficult	  to	   locate	   in	  the	  case	  of	  natural	  resource	  governance,	  since	  failure	   in	  this	  context	   is	  quite	  
frequently	  defined	  by	  inaction,	  rather	  than	  an	  overt	  failure	  (Poteete	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  
	  
Many	  criticisms	  of	  case	  studies	  can	  be	  addressed	  through	  robust	  research	  design.	  For	  example,	  a	  
common	  criticism	  of	  case	  studies	  is	  that	  they	  lack	  external	  validity	  (Poteete	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Yin,	  2009).	  
The	  intention	  of	  case	  study	  designs	  is	  replication,	  in	  which	  the	  case	  studies	  will	  examine	  the	  same	  
factors,	   rather	   than	   selection	   of	   a	   statistically	   representative	   sample.	   This	   distinction	   between	  
replication	   and	   sampling	   logic	   is	   important,	   as	   it	   emphasises	   that	   the	  multiple	   case	   studies	   are	  
more	  akin	  to	  multiple	  experiments	  than	  a	  survey	  of	  the	  population.	  Use	  of	  replication	  logic	  is	  one	  
way	   to	  address	  external	  validity	   in	  multiple-­‐case	  studies,	  and	  use	  of	   theory	   in	  each	  case	  study	   is	  
also	  another	  important	  tactic	  (Yin	  2009).	  Lessons	  from	  case	  studies	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  other	  areas,	  
but	  there	  are	  limits	  to	  cross-­‐case	  generalities	  and	  such	  extrapolation	  should	  be	  done	  with	  caution.	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  fact	  that	  case	  studies	  call	  generalities	   into	  question	  is	  also	  a	  strength,	  as	   it	  
can	   call	   into	   question	   simple	   relationships	   and	   advance	   theory	   by	   elaborating	   the	   limits	   of	   a	  
theory’s	  generality	  (Poteete	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  	  
	  
Case	  studies	  are	  also	  criticised	   for	   favouring	   induction	  over	  deduction14.	  This	   research	  will	  utilise	  
both	  forms	  of	  reasoning	  by	  using	  theory	  to	  inform	  data	  collection,	  and	  then	  using	  data	  to	  generate	  
additional	   questions.	   	   Finally,	   indeterminacy	   can	   be	   an	   issue	   in	   case	   study	   research.	   Given	   the	  
complexity	  of	  social	  interaction	  and	  causality,	  it	  is	  not	  uncommon	  for	  observations	  to	  be	  consistent	  
with	  more	   than	  one	  hypothesis.	   This	   is	  not	  due	   to	  a	   lack	  of	  data,	  but	   from	   the	   close	   correlation	  
between	   the	   variables	   of	   interest	   (Poteete	  et	   al.,	   2010).	   Case	   studies	   are	   thus	   not	   strong	   in	   the	  
areas	  of	  theory	  confirmation	  or	  disconfirmation,	  particularly	  if	  a	  case	  study	  suggests	  a	  hypothesis	  
supported	  by	  a	   large	  body	  of	  scholarly	  work	  should	  be	  rejected	  (Gerring,	  2004).	  This	  challenge	   is	  
true	   for	  most	   small-­‐n	   research,	   but	   case	   studies	   still	   make	   a	   strong	   contribution	   to	   exploratory	  
research.	  This	  strength	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  my	  PhD	  and	  the	  larger	  research	  hub	  in	  which	  it	  
is	  a	  part,	  which	  is	  exploring	  tools	  to	  improve	  regional	  biodiversity	  planning.	  	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  An	   inductive	  approach	  moves	   from	  detailed	  observations	   to	  general	  abstractions,	  whereas	  deduction	  starts	  with	  an	  
abstract	  relationship	  and	  moves	  toward	  a	  logical	  conclusion	  by	  collection	  of	  empirical	  data	  (Neuman,	  1994)	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8.2	   Diagnostic	  Framework	  
One	  of	  the	  challenging	  aspects	  of	  the	  case	  study	  method	  is	  striking	  the	  balance	  between	  sufficient	  
detail	   and	   an	   endless	   catalogue	   of	   information	   about	   the	   cases	   (Yin,	   2011).	   I	   will	   develop	   a	  
framework	  that	  will	  provide	  guidance	  on	  the	  data	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  collected	  for	  my	  PhD	  research.	  
This	  framework	  will	  be	  fit-­‐for-­‐purpose,	  but	  it	  will	  draw	  upon	  existing	  concepts	  and	  frameworks	  in	  
institutional	  and	  policy	  analysis.	  	  In	  doing	  this,	  it	  will	  draw	  on	  the	  work	  of	  RC	  institutionalists,	  but	  I	  
will	   supplement	   this	   with	   a	   politicised,	   discursive	   approach.	   One	   drawback	   of	   the	   discursive	  
institutionalist	  approach	   is	   that	   it	   is	  not	  associated	  with	  one	  of	   the	  popularised	   frameworks	   that	  
provide	   the	   researcher	   with	   a	   specified	   set	   of	   factors	   and	   (in	   some	   cases)	   hypotheses,	   as	   is	  
provided	  in	  the	  frameworks	  developed	  by	  RC	  institutionalists	  such	  as	  the	  IAD	  framework	  and	  the	  
ACF.	   The	   alternative	   frameworks	   provided	   by	   discursive	   institutionalists	   that	   operate	   from	  
constructivist	   and	   interpretivist	   paradigms	   have	   been	   accused	   of	   being	   unclear	   (Dudley	   et	   al.,	  
2000).	   Discursive	   institutionalism	   does	   provide	   an	   alternative	   analytical	   framework	   in	   which	   to	  
theorise	   about	   institutional	   change	   (Schmidt,	   2010),	   but	   it	   does	   not	   necessarily	   fit	   the	   strict	  
definition	   of	   framework	   employed	   by	   neo-­‐positivist	   researchers.	   This	   section	   describes	   their	  
distinction	   between	   frameworks,	   theories,	   and	   models,	   followed	   by	   a	   description	   of	   the	   key	  
concepts	   and	   the	   primary	   RC	   and	   discursive	   institutionalist	   frameworks	   that	   will	   be	   used	   in	  my	  
PhD.	  
	  
8.2.1	   Frameworks,	  Theories,	  and	  Models	  
The	   study	   of	   institutions	   falls	   under	   the	   purview	   of	   researchers	   from	   diverse	   social	   science	  
disciplines,	   including	   economics,	   political	   science,	   environmental	   science,	   sociology	   and	  
psychology.	   Social	   science	   has	   long	   struggled	   with	   becoming	   a	   “true	   science”,	   underpinned	   by	  
theories	   that	   explain	   human	   behaviour	   and	   stand	   the	   test	   of	   systematic	   empirical	   testing	  
(Coleman,	  1964).	  Faced	  with	  the	  daunting	  task	  of	  generalising	  highly	  diverse	  phenomena	  without	  
the	  controlled	  conditions	  of	  a	  laboratory,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  the	  pursuit	  of	  theories	  that	  meet	  
the	  scientific	  standards	  of	  empirical	  law	  has	  been	  an	  uphill	  struggle	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  (Ostrom,	  
1982).	  The	  study	  of	  institutions	  has	  followed	  a	  similar	  path,	  no	  matter	  the	  disciplinary	  perspective	  
from	  which	   they	   are	   viewed.	   Institutions	   come	   in	  many	   forms	   and	   permutations	   and	   vary	   from	  
highly	  formal	  and	  written	  to	  highly	  informal	  and	  unspoken	  (Section	  1).	  	  
	  
This	  diversity	  of	  institutions	  is	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  challenge	  for	  the	  field.	  For	  an	  explanation	  to	  meet	  
the	  criteria	  of	  a	  theory	  in	  science	  it	  should	  be	  highly	  specific,	  have	  a	   limited	  number	  of	  variables,	  
and	  operate	  under	   stated	   conditions	   (Boynton,	   1982).	  However,	   the	  diversity	   of	   institutions	   and	  
social	  complexity	  involved	  in	  institutional	  settings	  suggests	  that	  such	  a	  narrow	  type	  of	  theory	  is	  not	  
possible.	   Research	   has	   revealed	   that	   effective	   institutional	   arrangements	   come	   in	   a	   variety	   of	  
forms,	  and	  what	  works	  in	  one	  context	  may	  fail	  in	  another.	  This	  suggests	  that	  rigorous	  institutional	  
analysis	   requires	  examination	  of	  a	   large	  number	  of	   variables	   (Ostrom,	  2005),	   and	  with	   this	   large	  
number	  of	  variables	  comes	  many	  research	  challenges,	  both	  practical	  and	  intellectual.	  
	  
Fortunately,	  political	  scientists	  and	  other	  researchers	  have	  developed	  a	  number	  of	  frameworks	  to	  
guide	  institutional	  and	  policy	  analysis.	  The	  concept	  of	  framework	  employed	  here	  is	  that	  of	  a	  meta-­‐
theoretical	   conceptual	   map	   that	   organises	   diagnostic	   and	   prescriptive	   inquiry	   (Ostrom,	   1999;	  
Ostrom,	  2005).	  	  While	  frameworks	  provide	  structure;	  specify	  variables	  and	  classes	  of	  variables;	  and	  
general	  relationships	  among	  variables;	  they	  are	  not	  predictive	  of	  behaviour	  or	  outcomes	  (Schlager,	  
1999).	   This	   means	   that	   many	   theories	   can	   be	   compatible	   with	   a	   single	   framework,	   providing	   a	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degree	   of	   flexibility	   and	   intellectual	   freedom	   to	   the	   researcher.	   Frameworks	   are	   distinct	   from	  
theories	  and	  models.	  Theories	  provide	  focus	  to	  the	  analysis,	  by	  assisting	  the	  researcher	  in	  selecting	  
among	  the	  variables	  in	  a	  framework.	  They	  direct	  attention	  to	  the	  variables	  that	  are	  most	  relevant	  
and	   provide	   assumptions	   about	   these	   elements	   (Ostrom,	   2005).	   In	   contrast	   to	   frameworks,	  
theories	   are	   predictive	   (Schlager,	   1999).	  Models	   provide	   the	   highest	   level	   of	   specificity,	   as	   they	  
make	  precise	  assumptions	  and	  explore	   the	  consequences	  on	  a	   limited	   set	  of	  outcomes	   (Ostrom,	  
2005).	  Although	  distinct	  concepts,	  the	  challenge	  in	  drawing	  from	  a	  number	  of	  disciplines	  is	  that	  the	  
terms	  are	  often	  used	  interchangeably	  in	  the	  literature,	  so	  theory	  can	  be	  used	  to	  describe	  anything	  
from	  a	  empirically	  tested,	  generalised	  theory	  to	  philosophies,	  worldviews,	  and	  metaphors.	  	  
	  
General	   frameworks	   exist	   for	   institutional	   and	   policy	   analysis;	   however,	   these	   frameworks	   are	  
often	   modified	   to	   suit	   a	   particular	   setting	   and	   to	   conform	   to	   the	   researcher’s	   theoretical	  
perspectives.	  My	  PhD	  will	  adopt	  the	  latter	  approach,	  modifying	  existing	  frameworks	  to	  develop	  a	  
diagnostic	  tool.	  Before	  describing	  the	  basic	  tenets	  of	  the	  diagnostic	  approach,	  however,	  a	  rationale	  
for	  selecting	  this	  approach	  over	  the	  use	  of	  design	  principles	  is	  provided.	  
	  
8.2.2	   Design	  Principles	  	  
Institutions	   cannot	   be	   studied	   in	   the	   laboratory,	   and	   it	   can	   be	   difficult	   to	   predict	   how	   different	  
institutional	  arrangements	  will	  perform	  in	  context.	  Even	  though	  there	  is	  a	  large	  body	  of	  case	  study	  
data	  that	  can	  be	  synthesised	  to	  arrive	  at	  generalisations,	  attempts	  to	  provide	  a	  unifying	  theory	  that	  
describes	   the	   causal	   relationships	   between	   the	   characteristics	   of	   environmental	   governance	  
regimes	  and	  their	  performance	  have	  been	  challenging.	  This	  is	  true	  even	  in	  the	  well-­‐researched	  area	  
of	   CPR	   governance,	   where	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   attention	   has	   been	   directed	   to	   theory-­‐building	   and	  
principle	  development.	  
	  
Perhaps	  the	  most	  recognised	  attempt	  in	  this	  area	  is	  the	  set	  of	  CPR	  design	  principles	  developed	  by	  
Ostrom	   (1990).	   These	   principles	   are	   derived	   from	   empirical	   studies	   of	   management	   of	   the	  
commons,	  such	  as	  smaller	  grazing	  areas,	  irrigation	  systems,	  and	  communal	  fisheries.	  The	  principles	  
focus	   on	   the	   characteristics	   that	   are	   conducive	   to	   establishing	   and	   sustaining	   institutions	   that	  
prevent	   overuse	   and	   deterioration	   of	   CPRs	   (e.g.	   small	   size,	   stable	   and	   well-­‐delineated	   resource	  
boundaries,	   relatively	  small	  negative	  externalities	   resulting	   from	  resource	  use,	  ability	  of	   resource	  
users	   to	   monitor	   resource	   stocks	   and	   ﬂows)	   (Ostrom,	   1990).	   Later	   iterations	   of	   the	   principles	  
include	   a	   number	   of	   additional	   variables	   believed	   to	   affect	   the	   success	   of	   self-­‐organized	  
governance	   systems,	   including	   effective	   communication,	   internal	   trust	   and	   reciprocity,	   and	   the	  
nature	  of	  the	  resource	  system	  as	  a	  whole	  (Young,	  2002a).	  	  
	  
These	  design	  principles	  are	  but	  one	  attempt	  to	  synthesise	  the	  findings	  in	  the	  CPR	  literature.	  There	  
have	  been	  many	  other	  attempts.	  Another	  notable	  attempt	  is	  that	  by	  Agrawal	  (2001).	  Starting	  with	  
the	  principles	  developed	  by	  Ostrom	  (1990)	  and	  two	  other	  sets	  of	  principles	  (Baland	  and	  Platteau,	  
1996;	   Wade,	   1988),	   Agrawal	   compares	   these	   results	   to	   many	   other	   existing	   case	   studies	   to	  
determine	   if	   there	   is	   agreement	  on	   the	   causal	   variables	   relevant	   to	   institutional	   sustainability	   in	  
the	  commons.	  He	  finds	  some	  agreement	  and	  lists	  36	  conditions	  from	  the	  CPR	  case	  study	  literature	  
in	   the	   categories	   of	   resource	   system	   characteristics,	   group	   characteristics,	   institutional	  
arrangements,	  and	  the	  external	  environment	  (Agrawal,	  2001).	  	  
	  
Use	   of	   this	   list	   of	   enabling	   conditions	   has	   a	   number	   of	   challenges	   and	   limitations,	   even	   when	  
applied	  to	  a	  CPR	  situation.	  The	  sheer	  number	  of	  conditions	  presents	  a	  methodological	  challenge,	  
and	  even	  though	  Agrawal	  (2001)	  attempts	  to	  narrow	  down	  this	  list	  to	  two	  dozen,	  he	  concludes	  that	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there	  are	  likely	  between	  30	  and	  40	  important	  conditions	  or	  factors.	  The	  methodological	  challenges	  
of	  studying	  several	  dozen	  conditions	  may	  be	  part	  of	   the	  reason	  that	  no	  CPR	  study	  at	  the	  time	  of	  
this	  paper	  had	  applied	  every	  condition	  in	  a	  single	  study.	  Although	  Moore	  and	  Rodger	  (2010)	  have	  
since	  applied	  these	  enabling	  conditions	  to	  understand	  whale	  shark	  tourism	  as	  a	  CPR	  issue,	  Agrawal	  
(2001)	  notes	  that	  the	  CPR	  literature	  on	  which	  these	  conditions	  are	  based	  has	  significant	  problems	  
of	   method	   (e.g.	   no	   explanation	   the	   causal	   model	   to	   be	   tested,	   omitted	   variables,	   emphasis	   on	  
irrelevant	  variables,	  and	  spurious	  correlations).	  He	  also	  discusses	  challenges	  with	  data	  analysis	  with	  
this	   extensive	   list,	   and	   suggests	   grouping	   the	   factors	   into	   an	   index	   that	   groups	   closely	   related	  
variables.	   In	   addition	   to	  practical	   and	  methodological	   challenges,	   the	   conditions	   are	   general	   and	  
pertain	   to	   all	   CPRs	   and	   institutions	   and	   are	   not	   linked	   to	   the	   particular	   context,	   e.g.	   resource	  
characteristics	   (Agrawal	   2001).	   Ostrom	   and	   Cox	   (2010)	   also	   acknowledge	   the	   validity	   of	   similar	  
criticisms	   that	   have	   been	   levelled	   at	   the	   design	   principles,	   noting	   the	   significant	  methodological	  
challenges	   that	   prevent	   specific	   contextual	   variables	   from	   being	   fully	   incorporated	   into	   design	  
principles.	  
	  
Context	  is	  important	  not	  only	  in	  determining	  which	  conditions	  matter,	  but	  it	  influences	  the	  state	  of	  
these	   conditions	   and	   the	   contingent	   relationships	   between	   them	   (Agrawal,	   2001).	   For	   example,	  
one	   condition	   is	   that	   resource	   systems	   should	   be	   small	   in	   size	   with	   well-­‐defined	   boundaries.	  
However,	  Agrawal	  (2001)	  notes	  it	  could	  be	  that	  size	  of	  the	  resource	  can	  or	  should	  vary	  with	  group	  
size,	  and	  that	  the	  boundaries	  could	  be	  fuzzy	  in	  cases	  where	  there	  is	  variation	  in	  group	  needs	  and	  
resource	   flows.	   The	   degree	   of	   correlation	   between	   the	   enabling	   conditions,	   as	  well	   as	   between	  
these	  conditions	  and	  other	  variables,	  is	  as	  yet	  unknown	  (Agrawal,	  2001).	  Another	  issue	  is	  the	  small	  
scale	  of	  the	  studies	  that	  have	  been	  conducted	  in	  this	  area,	  as	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  this	  knowledge	  
can	  be	   applied	  on	   a	   larger	   scale	   is	   contentious	   (Young,	   2002a).	   Although	   applying	   such	   enabling	  
conditions	   or	   the	  design	   principles	   can	  provide	  useful	   tool	   for	   overcoming	   some	  methodological	  
issues,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  they	  do	  not	  resolve	  all	  challenges.	  	  
	  
There	  are	  also	  a	  number	  of	  considerations	  specific	  to	  this	  research	  that	  limit	  the	  utility	  of	  both	  the	  
design	   principles	   (Ostrom,	   1990)	   and	   enabling	   conditions	   (Agrawal,	   2001).	   These	   principles	   and	  
conditions	  may	   provide	   a	   useful	   tool	   in	   certain	   situations,	   particularly	   in	   cases	   of	   governance	   in	  
small-­‐scale	  CPRs	  such	  as	  a	  small	  community	  irrigation	  system	  or	  common	  forest.	  While	  analysis	  of	  
91	   case	   studies	   showed	   these	   principles	   to	   be	  moderately	   well-­‐supported,	   this	   was	   across	   four	  
dominant	  sectors:	   forests,	   fisheries,	  common	  pastures,	  and	   irrigation	  (Cox,	  2010).	  This	   is	  because	  
the	   principles	   are	   derived	   from	   CPR	   literature	   that	   focuses	   on	   collective	   action	   of	   local	  
communities	   (Clement,	   2010),	   and	   it	   emphasises	   situations	   where	   communal	   institutional	  
arrangements	  are	  favoured	  over	  private	  or	  state	  ownership.	  Even	  though	  biodiversity	  conservation	  
could	  meet	   some	  of	   the	  criteria	  of	  a	  CPR	  problem,	   the	  design	  principles	  and	  enabling	  conditions	  
are	  based	  on	  case	  studies	  in	  which	  the	  problem	  characteristics	  are	  significantly	  different	  from	  the	  
problem	  of	  biodiversity	  conservation	  and	  this	  particular	  context.	  	  	  
	  
In	  addition,	  the	  principles	  are	  based	  on	  case	  studies	  where	  success	  is	  defined	  quite	  differently	  than	  
it	   is	   in	  the	  resilience	  thinking	  and	  SES	  literature.	  Most	  researchers	  in	  this	  domain	  stress	  durability	  
and	  efficiency	  of	  governance	  arrangements,	  conceiving	  of	  “successful	  institutions	  as	  those	  that	  last	  
over	  time,	  constrain	  users	  to	  safeguard	  the	  resource,	  and	  produce	  fair	  outcomes”	  (Agrawal,	  2001,	  
p.	  1650).	  While	  noble	  and	  sensible	  goals	   in	  a	  conventional	  management	  approach,	   these	  are	  not	  
necessarily	   the	   criteria	   by	   which	   a	   regime	   should	   be	   judged	   in	   the	   context	   of	   biodiversity	   or	  
through	   the	   lens	   of	   resilience.	   For	   example,	   in	   critiquing	   the	   principles	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	  
biodiversity	  governance,	  Steinberg	  (2009,	  p.	  65)	  notes:	  “A	  serious	  limitation	  of	  [the	  CPR	  principles]	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approach,	  however,	  is	  that	  it	  focuses	  entirely	  on	  the	  machinery	  of	  longevity	  but	  not	  the	  principle	  to	  
be	  sustained.”	  This	  is	  related	  to	  the	  problems	  discussed	  earlier	  with	  applying	  general	  CPR	  principles	  
or	  conditions,	  particularly	   the	  generic	  approach	  and	   insufficient	  connection	   to	  context.	  Efficiency	  
may	  be	  a	  frequent	  focus	  of	  institutional	  design	  because	  of	  its	  appeal	  for	  governments,	  but	  it	  comes	  
at	   a	   cost.	   As	   previously	   noted,	   measures	   to	   maximise	   efficiency	   can	   create	   inflexible	   regimes,	  
reduce	   resilience,	   and	   increase	   vulnerability	   (Galaz	   et	   al.,	   2008;	  Griffith	   et	   al.,	   2010;	  Walker	   and	  
Salt,	  2006).	  Thus	  while	  using	  CPR	  design	  principles	  can	  be	  useful	  when	  the	  goal	  is	  governance	  that	  
is	   efficient	   and	   can	   be	   sustained	   over	   time,	   it	   is	   a	   less	   than	   ideal	   fit	   when	   the	   emphasis	   is	   on	  
adaptive	  capacity,	  as	  it	  is	  in	  much	  of	  the	  resilience	  literature.	  
	  
These	  problems	  are	  linked	  to	  perhaps	  the	  most	  prominent	  criticism	  of	  institutional	  design	  based	  on	  
generic	   principles:	   that	   their	   use	   represents	   a	   “panacea	   approach”	   to	   solving	   environmental	  
problems	   (Ostrom	   and	   Cox,	   2010;	   Young,	   2002b).	   A	   number	   of	   researchers	   have	  warned	   of	   the	  
danger	  of	  applying	  blueprint	  approaches	   to	  governance	  and	  have	  called	  on	   researchers	   to	  move	  
beyond	   panaceas	   in	   designing	   solutions	   to	   institutional	   problems	   in	   SESs	   (Brock	   and	   Carpenter,	  
2007;	  Huntjens	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Korten,	  1980;	  Ostrom,	  2007;	  Ostrom	  and	  Cox,	  2010;	  Pahl-­‐Wostl	  et	  al.,	  
2010).	   Blueprint	   or	   panacea	   approaches	   impose	   simple	   solutions	   to	   complex	   social-­‐ecological	  
problems,	   for	   example,	   often	   advocating	   for	   particular	   governance	   arrangements	   or	   policy	  
instruments	   and	   excluding	   other	   options.	   Although	   the	   design	   principles	   (Ostrom,	   1990)	   and	  
enabling	  conditions	  (Agrawal,	  2001)	  are	  more	  useful	  than	  applying	  a	  single	  policy	  to	  all	  problems,	  
in	  many	  ways	  they	  still	  meet	  the	  criteria	  of	  a	  panacea.	  For	  example,	  all	  problems	  are	  treated	  as	  a	  
generic	  problem	  type,	  rather	  than	  linked	  to	  the	  particular	  problem	  context	  (Agrawal,	  2001;	  Young,	  
2002a).	  In	  addition,	  they	  fail	  to	  consider	  the	  interrelationships	  between	  conditions	  (Agrawal,	  2001)	  
and	   neglect	  many	   of	   the	   important	   factors	   influencing	   sustainability	   (Ostrom	   and	   Cox,	   2010).	   In	  
reality	  many	  governance	  regimes	  and	   institutional	  arrangements	  can	  be	  successful,	  and	   it	  cannot	  
be	  assume	  that	  a	  particular	  blueprint	  is	  optimal.	  This	  makes	  institutional	  design	  to	  address	  complex	  
SES	  problems	  such	  as	  biodiversity	  conservation	  a	  poor	  candidate	  for	  generic	  design	  principles.	  This	  
underpins	  the	  motivation	  to	  adopt	  a	  diagnostic	  approach	  in	  my	  PhD.	  
	  
8.2.3	   Institutional	  Diagnostics	  
Another	  approach	  is	  to	  conduct	  a	  diagnostic	  that	  can	  identify	  the	  areas	  in	  need	  of	  reform.	  Young	  
(2002)	   contends	   that	   the	   diagnostic	   approach	   guards	   against	   the	   panacea	   problem	   by	   moving	  
beyond	  a	  view	  that	  environmental	  problems	  can	  be	  characterised	  as	  a	  generic	  type,	  to	  an	  approach	  
focused	  on	  identifying	  the	  significant	  elements	  of	  the	  challenge	  at	  hand.	  “The	  defining	  feature	  of	  
the	   [diagnostic	   approach]	   is	   an	   effort	   to	   identify	   important	   features	   of	   issues	   arising	   from	  
environmental	  changes	  that	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  diagnostic	  conditions.”	  (Young,	  2002a;	  p.	  176).	  
In	  contrast	  to	  the	  principles	  discussed	  previously,	  this	  approach	  emphasises	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  
problem	  attributes.	  It	  is	  flexible	  and	  allows	  the	  analyst	  to	  generate	  a	  framework	  that	  is	  tailored	  to	  
the	  specific	  problem	  type.	  Like	  a	  doctor	  diagnosing	  a	  patient,	  the	  institutional	  analyst	  can	  diagnose	  
the	  institutional	  problem	  and	  recommend	  potential	  courses	  of	  appropriate	  treatment	  (e.g.	  reforms	  
or	  additional	  governance	  tools)	  (Young,	  2002a).	  The	  approach	  is	  similar	  to	  that	  employed	  in	  theory-­‐
based	  program	  and	  policy	  evaluation,	  in	  which	  a	  practitioner	  seeks	  to	  understand	  how	  a	  program	  
works	   or	   fails	   to	  work	   based	   on	   a	   set	   of	   logical	   assumptions	   about	   how	   the	   intervention	  works	  
(Weiss,	  1997).	   In	  this	  case,	  the	   intervention	   is	  the	  biodiversity	  governance	  regime,	  and	  the	  set	  of	  
logical	  assumptions	  will	  be	  built	  from	  the	  research	  literature.	  	  
	  
The	   diagnostic	   framework	   developed	   for	   this	   research	   will	   incorporate	   both	   general	   diagnostic	  
conditions	   associated	   with	   governance	   and	   those	   that	   are	   specific	   problems	   of	   biodiversity	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conservation	  and	   the	  most	   important	  drivers	   in	   the	   study	   regions.	   To	  aid	   researchers	   seeking	   to	  
design	   institutional	   arrangements	   that	   will	   solve	   environmental	   problems,	   Young	   (2008)	   also	  
provides	  a	   set	  of	  queries	  grouped	   into	   four	  categories:	  problems,	  politics,	  players,	  and	  practices.	  
The	  basics	  of	  these	  categories	  are	  described	  below	  (Young	  2008):	  
• Problems:	   An	   institutional	   diagnostic	   should	   begin	   with	   an	   assessment	   of	   the	   major	  
characteristics	  of	  the	  problem.	  For	  example,	  is	  a	  one-­‐off	  solution	  possible	  or	  is	  an	  ongoing	  
or	  long-­‐term	  solution	  required?	  	  
• Politics:	   Institutional	   design	   is	   a	   decidedly	   political	   process,	   and	  many	   actors	   involved	   in	  
the	   process	   will	   have	   a	   stake	   in	   promoting	   their	   causes	   in	   the	   design	   process.	   In	   an	  
institutional	   diagnostic,	   the	   focus	   is	   on	   surveying	   the	   political	   landscape,	   rather	   than	  
fixating	   on	   the	   minutia	   of	   the	   bargaining	   process	   with	   specific	   stakeholders.	   Example	  
questions	   here	   include:	  How	   is	   power	   dispersed	  or	   concentrated	   amongst	   stakeholders?	  
Can	  the	  problem	  be	  readily	  addressed	  using	  tried	  and	  tested	  policy	  instruments?	  
• Players:	   The	   diagnostic	   method	   directs	   attention	   to	   the	   key	   actors	   or	   players	   who	   are	  
causing	   the	   problem,	   likely	   to	   be	   affected	   by	   the	   problem,	   or	   in	   a	   position	   to	   solve	   it.	  
Questions	   to	   be	   asked	   about	   the	   players	   include,	   for	   example,	   whether	   the	   actors	   are	  
homogeneous	   or	   heterogeneous.	   This	   also	   includes	   the	  model	   of	   the	   actor	   that	   will	   be	  
adopted,	  which	  in	  my	  PhD	  is	  the	  social-­‐practice	  model	  (Table	  1,	  Section	  1.1).	  
• Practices:	   This	   category	   of	   questions	   is	   related	   to	   the	   institutional	   setting,	   such	   as	   the	  
formal	   institutional	   frameworks,	   in	   which	   the	   problem	   takes	   place.	   Here	   the	   researcher	  
should	   ask	   questions,	   for	   example,	   about	  who	   is	   permitted	   to	   participate	   and	  what	   the	  
roles	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  relevant	  actors	  are.	  
Guided	   by	   these	   questions,	   my	   PhD	   will	   seek	   answers	   from	   existing	   literature	   on	   biodiversity	  
conservation	   governance,	   the	   relevant	   policy	   instruments,	   and	   interviews	  with	   actors	   in	   each	   of	  
the	   study	   regions.	   An	   institutional	   diagnostic	   can	   begin	   with	   three	   categories	   of	   conditions:	  
ecosystem	  properties,	   actor	   attributes,	   and	   implementation	   issues.	   These	   simple	  diagnostics	   can	  
provide	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  developing	  complex	  diagnostics,	  which	  are	  necessary	  where	  individual	  
diagnostic	   conditions	   interact	   in	   significant	   ways	   (Young,	   2002a;	   Young,	   2008).	   Other	   diagnostic	  
conditions	  will	  be	  developed	  from	  the	  literature	  and	  information	  generated	  by	  other	  researchers	  in	  
the	  LaP	  Hub	  (e.g.	  drivers	  and	  disturbances).	  	  
	  
Although	   it	  offers	  many	  advantages,	  development	  of	  an	  original	  diagnostic	   framework	  also	  has	  a	  
number	  of	  weaknesses.	  Although	  a	  useful	  approach	  for	  addressing	  design	  issues,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  
note	  that	  a	  diagnostic	  tool	   is	  not	  meant	  to	  address	  the	  question	  of	  causality,	  which	   is	  one	  of	  the	  
chief	  challenges	  in	  institutional	  analysis.	  As	  noted	  previously,	  institutions	  have	  a	  role	  to	  play	  in	  both	  
causing	  and	  solving	  environmental	  problems,	  but	  the	  relative	  strength	  of	   influence	  of	   institutions	  
as	  compared	  to	  other	  drivers	  and	  disturbances	  is	  difficult	  to	  measure	  (Young,	  2002a).	  A	  diagnostic	  
approach	   is	   not	   intended	   to	   answer	   the	   question	   of	   causality.	   Again	   theory-­‐based	   evaluation	  
provides	  an	  apt	  comparison,	  as	  this	  method	  strives	  to	  examine	  mechanisms	  of	  causality	  (Davidson,	  
2005;	  Rogers,	  2007;	  Weiss,	  1997).	  Weiss	  (1997)	  advised	  that	  most	  evaluation	  should	  examine	  both	  
how	   the	   program	   is	   carried	   out	   (implementation	   theory)	   and	   the	   mechanisms	   that	   intervene	  
between	   inputs	   and	  outcomes	   (programmatic	   theory).	  One	  of	   the	   ongoing	   challenges	   in	   theory-­‐
based	   evaluation	   is	   developing	   programmatic	   theories,	   which	   are	   central	   to	   understanding	   the	  
mechanisms	   of	   causality	   (Rogers,	   2007).	   Although	   the	   diagnostic	   conditions	   will	   be	   developed	  
based	  on	  theories	   in	  the	  literature	  and	  the	  input	  of	  experts,	  the	  ability	  of	   institutional	  analysis	  to	  
determine	  causality	   is	   similarly	   limited	   (Section	  7.1).	  As	  yet,	   there	   is	  no	  cohesive	   theory	   to	  guide	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research	   in	   the	   area	   of	   causality,	   and	   researchers	   typically	   must	   employ	   a	   suite	   of	   methods	   to	  
contribute	  incrementally	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  causality	  (Young,	  2002a).	  Given	  these	  challenges,	  
this	   research	   is	   based	   on	   an	   assumption	   that	   the	   regime	   is	   one	   source	   of	   biodiversity	   loss	   or	  
decline,	  although	  the	  degree	  of	  causality	  will	  remain	  unknown.	  	  
	  
The	  other	  weakness	  of	  the	  diagnostic	  approach	  is	  that	  the	  generality	  of	  the	  framework	  developed	  
for	   this	   study	   will	   remain	   untested.	   For	   the	   same	   reasons	   that	   case	   studies	   are	   better	   for	  
exploration	   than	   confirmation	   –	   and	   seek	   replication	   rather	   than	   statistical	   sampling	   –	   the	  
generality	  of	  the	  framework	  cannot	  be	  evaluated	  in	  this	  research	  (Poteete	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  To	  address	  
this	   issue,	   the	   study	  will	   draw	  upon	  an	  existing	  meta-­‐theoretical	   framework,	   the	   IAD	   framework	  
(Ostrom,	  2005;	  Ostrom	  and	  Kiser,	  1982),	  to	  inform	  development	  of	  the	  diagnostic	  tool.	  	  
	  
8.2.4	   The	  Institutional	  Analysis	  and	  Development	  (IAD)	  Framework	  
The	  use	  of	  a	  diagnostic	  approach	  does	  not	  necessarily	  preclude	  a	  researcher	  from	  starting	  with	  an	  
existing	  framework.	  The	  IAD	  framework	  represents	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  attempt	  to	  synthesise	  
case	  studies	  about	  natural	  resource	  governance	  of	  the	  commons.	  This	  has	  been	  a	  challenging	  task,	  
as	   the	   case	   studies	   occur	   around	   the	   world	   and	   are	   uncoordinated,	   complex,	   approached	   from	  
different	   theoretical	   and	   disciplinary	   perspectives,	   and	   focused	   on	   many	   different	   research	  
questions	  and	  variables	  (Poteete	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  The	  IAD	  framework	  was	  chosen	  in	  part	  for	  its	  explicit	  
emphasis	   on	   institutions.	   Although	   a	   number	   of	   frameworks	   exist	   to	   analyse	   policy,	   the	   IAD	  
framework	  is	  currently	  the	  only	  framework	  based	  on	  institutions	  (Nowlin,	  2011).	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  3.	  IAD	  Framework	  
Source:	  Ostrom,	  2011,	  p.	  10	  
	  
The	  IAD	  framework	  (Figure	  3)	  was	  originally	  developed	  by	  Kiser	  and	  Ostrom	  (1982)	  although	  it	  has	  
been	  evolving	  ever	  since.	  It	  identifies	  the	  elements	  and	  relationships	  that	  should	  be	  considered	  in	  
an	   institutional	   analysis	   (Ostrom,	   2005).	   The	   IAD	   framework	   is	   essentially	   a	   “meta-­‐theoretical,	  
conceptual	   map	   that	   identifies	   an	   action	   situation,	   patterns	   of	   interaction	   and	   outcomes	   and	  
evaluative	  criteria”	  (Poteete	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  The	  IAD	  framework	  has	  origins	  in	  RC	  institutionalism	  and	  
the	  CPR	  literature	  (Ostrom,	  1999).	  The	  framework	  is	  built	  on	  behavioural	  rational	  choice,	  a	  second	  
generation	  of	  rational	  choice	  theory	  that	   incorporates	  effects	  of	  visual	  and	  verbal	  cues,	  norms	  of	  
reciprocity	  and	  fairness,	  and	  willingness	  to	  sanction	  rule	  violators	  (McGinnis,	  2011b).	  The	  model	  of	  
the	  actors	   is	   that	  of	  bounded	   rationality	   (Section	  1.3).	  Ostrom	  and	  McGinnis	   (2011b)	   summarise	  
their	  interpretation	  of	  this	  concept	  in	  the	  view	  that	  actors	  intend	  to	  be	  rational	  but	  are	  limited	  in	  
their	  cognitive	  and	  information-­‐processing	  capability.	  Actors	  operate	  with	  incomplete	  information	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and	  are	  subject	  tot	  the	  subtle	  influences	  of	  cultural	  predispositions	  and	  beliefs	  (McGinnis,	  2011b;	  
Ostrom,	  2011).	  
	  
Ostrom	   and	   her	   colleagues	   at	   the	   Workshop	   in	   Political	   Theory	   and	   Policy	   Analysis	   have	  
incorporated	   the	   concept	  of	   SES	   in	  an	  effort	   to	  provide	  a	   common	   language	   for	   interdisciplinary	  
work	  that	  gives	  equal	  emphasis	  to	  biophysical	  and	  ecological	  foundations	  of	   institutional	  systems	  
(McGinnis,	  2011b;	  McGinnis	  and	  Ostrom,	  2011;	  Ostrom,	  2009;	  Ostrom,	  2011).	  It	  is	  this	  form	  of	  the	  
framework,	   sometimes	   called	   the	   Program	   in	   Institutional	   Analysis	   of	   Social-­‐Ecological	   Systems	  
(PIASES)	  framework	  that	   is	  most	  relevant	  to	  the	  study	  (Figure	  4).15	  The	  central	  component	  of	  the	  
IAD	   framework	   is	   the	  action	   situation,16	  which	   is	   the	   “black	  box”	  where	  policy	   choices	  are	  made	  
(McGinnis,	  2011b).	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  4.	  PIASES	  Framework	  –	  Top	  Tier	  Components	  
Source:	  McGinnis	  and	  Ostrom,	  2011,	  p.	  16	  
	  
Action	  situations	  form	  a	  network	  of	  linked	  situations,	  and	  in	  the	  field	  it	  can	  be	  difficult	  to	  tell	  where	  
one	   action	   situation	   stops	   and	   another	   begins	   (Ostrom,	   2011).	   In	   these	   situations,	   patterns	   of	  
interaction	   are	   influenced	   by	   three	   categories	   of	   exogenous	   variables:	   biophysical	   conditions,	  
attributes	  of	  the	  community	  and	  rules-­‐in-­‐use	  (institutions).	  It	  is	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  last	  category	  that	  
is	  the	  central	  focus	  of	  the	  IAD,	  which	  is	  built	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  institutions	  impact	  policy	  by	  
guiding	  and	  constraining	  decision-­‐making	  by	  prescribing	  what	  actions	  are	   required,	  prohibited	  or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Ostrom	  and	  her	  colleagues	  use	  the	  name	  PIASES	  in	  some	  working	  papers,	  but	  more	  frequently	  refer	  to	  this	  form	  of	  the	  
framework	  as	  the	  “SES	  Framework”	  in	  the	  literature.	  PIASES	  is	  used	  here	  to	  avoid	  confusion	  by	  distinguishing	  the	  
analytical	  framework	  from	  the	  SES	  literature	  that	  informs	  the	  study.	  Other	  terms	  have	  also	  been	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  this	  
framework,	  e.g.	  the	  SES	  Sustainability	  Framework.	  
16	  Earlier	  incarnations	  of	  the	  framework	  distinguished	  between	  ‘action	  arenas’	  and	  ‘action	  situations’;	  however,	  the	  most	  
recent	  versions	  discard	  this	  distinction	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  simplify	  the	  framework	  and	  achieve	  integration	  with	  SESs	  (McGinnis	  
2011).	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permitted.	   In	   particular,	   Ostrom	   focuses	   on	   rules-­‐in-­‐use	   as	   the	   defining	   characteristic	   of	  
institutions	  (Ostrom,	  2005).	  	  
	  
Both	  the	  IAD	  and	  PIASES	  frameworks	  are	  nested,	  providing	  multiple	  levels	  of	  analysis.	  For	  example,	  
action	   situations	   are	   networked,	  meaning	   they	   are	   nested	  within	   an	   action	   situation	   at	   a	   higher	  
level.	  This	  is	  most	  easily	  illustrated	  with	  the	  three	  levels	  of	  analysis	  or	  ‘arenas	  of	  choice’	  outlined	  in	  
the	   IAD	  and	  PIASES:	   constitutional,	   collective	   choice,	   and	  operational	   (McGinnis,	  2011b;	  Ostrom,	  
1982).	  Each	  arena	  has	  its	  own	  set	  of	  rules,	  and	  choice	  arenas	  are	  nested	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  changes	  
in	   rules	  at	  a	  one	   level	  affect	   rules	  at	  a	   lower	   level.	  For	   instance,	   in	   the	  operational	  arena,	  actors	  
implement	   practical	   decisions.	   The	   actors	   that	   are	   allowed	   to	   participate	   in	   this	   arena	   is	  
determined	  in	  the	  collective	  choice	  arena,	  where	  institutions	  are	  constructed	  and	  policy	  decisions	  
are	   made.	   Processes	   at	   that	   level	   originate	   in	   the	   constitutional	   choice	   arena,	   where	   collective	  
entities	  are	   legitimised	  and	  the	  authorities	  of	  actors	  at	  the	  collective	  choice	   level	  are	  constituted	  
(McGinnis,	   2011b;	   Ostrom,	   1999;	   Ostrom,	   2011).	   Changes	   at	   deeper	   levels	   are	  more	   difficult	   to	  
accomplish,	  which	  means	   that	   changes	  here	   can	   increase	   the	   stability	  of	  mutual	   expectations	  of	  
actors	  operating	  according	  to	  a	  set	  of	  rules	  (Ostrom,	  1990).	  	  
	  
The	  framework	  is	  also	  nested	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  has	  both	  top-­‐tier	  variables	  (Figure	  4)	  and	  second-­‐
tier	   variables	   (Figure	   5).	   In	   the	   top-­‐tier	   variables,	   actors	   are	   those	   who	   participate	   in	   action	  
situations,	   resource	   units	   are	   viewed	   as	   inputs	   into	   the	   processes	   that	   take	   place	   in	   the	   action	  
situation,	   and	   governance	   systems	   establish	   the	   conditions	   under	   which	   the	   action	   situation	  
operates	  by	  determining	  the	  rules-­‐in-­‐use.	  Resource	  systems	  also	  establish	  important	  conditions	  in	  
the	   action	   situation,	   including	   the	   attributes	   of	   the	   community	   and	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   goods	   in	  
question	   (McGinnis	  and	  Ostrom,	  2011).	  The	   influence	  of	  economic	   theory	   is	  quite	  evident	   in	   this	  
language,	  which	  emphasises	  inputs	  and	  outputs.	  	  
	  
As	  the	  IAD	  and	  PIASES	  frameworks	  are	  based	  on	  a	  collective-­‐choice	  model	  of	  institutions,	  they	  are	  
most	   compatible	   with	   theories	   that	   emphasis	   economic	   rationalism.	   Ostrom	   (2011)	   states	   that	  
economic	   theory,	   game	   theory,	   transaction	   cost	   theory,	   social	   choice	   theory,	   covenantal	   theory,	  
and	  theories	  of	  public	  goods	  and	  common-­‐pool	  resources	  are	  all	  compatible	  with	  the	  frameworks.	  
Both	   forms	   of	   the	   framework	   provide	   excellent	   tools	   for	   designing	   research	   and	   enabling	  
comparisons	   across	   studies	   by	   providing	   a	   common	   research	   language	   (Ostrom	   and	   Cox,	   2010).	  
There	   are	   also	   a	   number	   of	   challenges	   associated	   with	   the	   underlying	   assumptions	   of	   the	   IAD	  
framework	  that	  make	  use	  of	  the	  framework	  “as	  is”	  inappropriate	  for	  my	  PhD.	  
	  
In	   particular,	   the	   IAD	   framework	   suits	   a	   neo-­‐positivist	   paradigm	   and	   a	   rational	   choice	  
institutionalism	   perspective,	   creating	   challenges	   for	   the	   interpretive	   paradigm	   and	   discursive	  
institutionalist	  perspective	  I	  have	  adopted.	  Though	  it	  does	  not	  mandate	  use	  of	  a	  particular	  theory,	  
both	   forms	  of	   the	   framework	  closely	   follow	  the	  collective-­‐choice	  cluster	  of	  models	   that	   focus	  on	  
costs	   and	   benefits.	   Its	   basis	   in	   rational	   choice	   institutionalism	   is	   evident	   in	   its	   language	   and	  
structure,	   with	   a	   focus	   on	   economic	   value,	   expressed	   as	   opportunities	   and	   constraints	   for	   self-­‐
organisation	  by	  resource	  users	  (Poteete	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  These	  frameworks	  also	  have	  their	  origins	  in	  
the	  CPR	  literature,	   just	  as	  the	  design	  principles	  and	  enabling	  conditions	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  
section.	  The	   framework	  therefore	  directs	  attention	  to	  a	  set	  of	  variables	   that	  offer	  an	   incomplete	  
account	   of	   the	   biodiversity	   conservation	   policy	   problem.	   While	   an	   economic	   perspective	   can	  
account	   for	   ordered	   rational	   preferences,	   costs	   and	   benefits,	   and	   incentives	   and	   sanctions;	   it	  
provides	  an	   insufficient	  account	  of	  the	  diverse	  motivations	  for	  conserving	  biodiversity	  (Steinberg,	  
2009).	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Figure	  5.	  PIASES	  Framework	  –	  Second	  Tier	  Variables	  
Source:	  McGinnis	  and	  Ostrom,	  2011,	  p.	  18	  	  
The	   frameworks	   are	   also	   not	   an	   ideal	   fit	   because	   they	   tend	   to	   provide	   static	   descriptions	   of	  
institutions.	   This	   is	   due	   in	   part	   to	   the	   focus	   on	   robustness	   (Section	   5.2)	   and	   sustainability	   of	  
institutional	   arrangements.	   Although	   more	   recently	   there	   have	   been	   attempts	   to	   discuss	   the	  
framework	   in	   light	   of	   the	   SES	   perspective	   (Anderies	   et	   al.,	   2004;	   Cox	   and	   Ross,	   2011;	   Ostrom,	  
2009),	   its	   philosophy	   of	   dynamics	   in	   an	   SES	   is	   quite	   different	   than	   the	   resilience	   thinking	   and	  
institutional	   change	   perspective	   adopted	   here.	   The	   focus	   is	   still	   largely	   on	   the	   stability	   of	  
institutions	  and	  examining	  the	  factors	  that	  generate	  this	  stability.	  Even	  when	  change	   is	  explored,	  
the	   focus	   tends	   to	   be	   on	   incremental	   shifts	   (Dudley	   et	   al.,	   2000)	   and	   neither	   version	   of	   the	  
frameworks	   appear	   to	   provide	   guidance	   on	   how	   such	   change	   may	   occur.	   Even	   the	   PIASES	  
framework	   appears	   to	   take	   the	   position	   that	   that	   transformational	   change	   in	   governance	   is	  
detrimental,	  seeking	  to	  avoid	  disturbance	  to	  maintain	  resilience.	  The	  framework	   is	  perhaps	  more	  
aptly	   called	   the	   ‘SES	   sustainability	   framework’	   (Ferguson	   et	   al.,	   2011)	   to	   distinguish	   it	   from	   the	  
more	  dynamic	  accounts	  of	  complex	  systems	  in	  the	  SES	  literature.	  	  
	  
The	  framework	  is	  also	  so	  complex	  that	  it	  can	  be	  challenging	  to	  implement.	  This	  has	  been	  conceded	  
by	  the	  researchers	  who	  developed	  the	  framework:	  “Readers	  should	  be	  warned	  that	  the	  framework	  
developed	   here	   is	   complicated,	   as	   an	   early	   commenter	   put	   it	   politely”	   (McGinnis	   and	   Ostrom,	  
2011).	  McGinnis	  (2011b)	  notes	  that	  although	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  tool	  was	  to	  simplify	  the	  analytical	  
task	   of	   trying	   to	   understand	   institutions	   in	   their	   full	   complexity,	   efforts	   to	   revise	   the	   framework	  
over	  time	  have	  introduced	  complexity.	  The	  framework	  is	  also	  continuously	  changing	  in	  light	  of	  new	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information	   and	   input	   from	   other	   researchers,	   making	   it	   a	   bit	   of	   a	   moving	   target.	   In	   reviewing	  
studies	  that	  had	  applied	  the	  IAD	  and	  PIASES	  framework,	  it	  was	  apparent	  that	  many	  researchers	  are	  
only	  able	  to	  focus	  on	  a	  small	  sub-­‐set	  of	  variables	  in	  this	  framework,	  and	  many	  do	  not	  actually	  apply	  
the	   framework	  but	   just	  use	  some	  of	   its	   language	  and	  structure.	  A	  similar	  approach	  will	  be	   taken	  
here.	  
	  
These	  challenges	  can	  be	  overcome,	  however,	  by	  using	  the	  IAD	  framework	  only	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  
and	   modifying	   as	   required.	   The	   IAD	   framework	   has	   been	   chosen	   as	   a	   starting	   point	   above	  
principles	   because	   of	   its	   flexibility.	   It	   does	   not	   adopt	   particular	   design	   principles	   or	   treat	   the	  
problem	  as	  a	  generic	  problem	  type,	  and	  it	  explicitly	  calls	  for	  consideration	  of	  the	  specific	  resource	  
characteristics.	  Even	  though	  the	  framework	  is	  most	  compatible	  with	  economic	  theories,	  it	  does	  not	  
explicitly	   preclude	   other	   theories	   (Ostrom,	   2011).	   	   A	   number	   of	   researchers	   have	   significantly	  
modified	  the	  framework	  to	  suit	  their	  research	  questions	  and	  even	  to	  create	  new	  frameworks.	  For	  
example,	   Clement	   (2010)	   developed	   a	   “politicised”	   version	   of	   the	   IAD	   to	   enhance	   its	   power	   in	  
analysing	   policy	   processes	   and	   assessing	   policy	   impacts	   and	   policy	   change	   across	   multiple	  
governance	   levels. Pahl-­‐Wostl	   et	   al.	   (2010)	   developed	   the	   Management	   and	   Transitions	  
Framework,	   a	   useful	   framework	   for	   organising	   transitions	   in	   water	   governance	   systems.	   The	  
framework	  retains	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  the	  IAD	  (i.e.	  the	  action	  situation	  and	  the	  action	  arena),	  but	  
gives	   equal	   emphasis	   to	   actors	   and	   institutions	   (Pahl-­‐Wostl	   et	   al.,	   2010).	   The	   framework	   also	  
emphasises	   the	   necessity	   of	   adaptive	   governance	   and	   learning	   as	   essential	   components	   of	  
governance	   under	   transition	   (Pahl-­‐Wostl	   et	   al.,	   2010).	   The	   IAD	   is	   hardly	   recognisable	   in	   the	  
Management	  and	  Transitions	  Framework,	  but	  it	  still	  served	  as	  a	  useful	  foundation	  for	  researchers	  
to	   develop	   their	   own	   framework	   to	   explain	   transitional	   change	   in	   an	   urban	   water	   governance	  
regimes.	   Here,	   the	   IAD	   will	   only	   provide	   broad	   guidance	   in	   conceptual	   development	   of	   the	  
diagnostic	   framework.	   Even	   though	   the	   framework	   originates	   from	   a	   different	   perspective	   than	  
adopted	  in	  my	  PhD,	  it	  can	  provide	  a	  solid	  foundation	  on	  which	  to	  build	  a	  new	  framework.	  
	  
Institutional	  Grammar	  Tool	  (IGT)	  
One	   particular	   tool	   associated	   with	   the	   IAD	   framework	   is	   the	   Institutional	   Grammar	   Tool	   (IGT),	  
which	  may	  be	  used	  to	  aid	  analysis	  of	  policy	  instruments.	  The	  IGT	  provides	  a	  structured	  method	  to	  
identity	   and	   categorise	   written	   institutional	   statements,	   allowing	   researchers	   to	   aggregate	   the	  
minutia	  of	  policy	  to	  reveal	  practically	  and	  theoretically	  relevant	  relationships	  (Siddiki	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  
As	   discussed,	   the	   IAD	   is	   an	   evolving	   framework	   that	   continues	   to	   be	   refined,	   and	   one	   of	   these	  
refinements	  was	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  IGT	  by	  Crawford	  and	  Ostrom	  (Crawford	  and	  Ostrom,	  1995;	  
Crawford	  and	  Ostrom,	  2005).	  Although	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  tool	  was	  originally	  introduced	  in	  1995,	  it	  
was	  not	  until	  2010	  that	  clearer	  empirical	  guidelines	  were	  developed	  (Basurto	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  Siddiki	  
et	  al.	  (2011)	  have	  since	  further	  refined	  these	  guidelines.	  Although	  the	  IGT	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  both	  
informal	  and	  formal	  institutions,	  it	  would	  only	  be	  applied	  to	  formal	  institutions	  (i.e.	  written	  policy	  
instruments)	  in	  this	  research.	  	  
	  
The	   IGT	   provides	   a	  way	   to	   uncover	   some	  of	   the	   inner	  workings	   in	   the	   “black	   box”	  where	   policy	  
choices	   (i.e.	   action	   situations)	   are	   made.	   It	   consists	   of	   a	   grammatical	   syntax	   for	   understanding	  
three	  types	  of	   institutional	  statements	  (rules,	  norms	  and	  strategies)	   in	   formal	  documents	  to	  help	  
the	   analyst	   understand	   how	   policy	   choices	   are	  made.	   An	   institutional	   statement	   is	   “the	   shared	  
linguistic	   constraint	   or	   opportunity	   that	   prescribes,	   permits,	   or	   advises	   actions	   or	   outcomes	   for	  
actors	   (both	   individual	   and	   corporate).	   Institutional	   statements	   are	   spoken,	   written,	   or	   tacitly	  
understood	  in	  a	  form	  intelligible	  to	  actors	  in	  an	  empirical	  setting”	  (Crawford	  and	  Ostrom,	  1995,	  p.	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583).	  	  
	  
The	  tool	  provides	  a	  systematic	  way	  of	  analysing	  institutions,	  and	  allows	  the	  analyst	  to	  distinguish	  
rules	  as	  distinct	  from	  strategies	  and	  norms,	  which	  are	  attributes	  of	  the	  community	  (Crawford	  and	  
Ostrom,	   2005).	   Application	   of	   the	   IGT	   generates	   a	   detailed	   description	   of	   what	   actions	   are	  
prescribed,	  permitted	  or	  advised,	  who	  can	  participate,	  and	  under	  what	  conditions	  (Crawford	  and	  
Ostrom,	   2005).	   In	   short,	   it	   provides	   a	   structured	   way	   of	   understanding	   the	   intended	   target	   of	  
policies	   and	   how	  policies	   prescribe	   opportunities	   and	   constraints.	   This	   is	   achieved	   by	   organising	  
institutional	  statements	  into	  five	  subcomponents:	  attribute	  (A),	  deontic	  (D),	  aim	  (I),	  condition	  (C),	  
or	  else	  (O)	  (alternatively	  called	  ADICO)	  (Crawford	  and	  Ostrom,	  1995;	  Crawford	  and	  Ostrom,	  2005)	  
(Table	  4).	  Based	  on	  a	  PhD	  thesis	  by	  Siddiki	  (2011),	  a	  sixth	  subcomponent	  has	  been	  proposed,	  the	  
object	   (B).	   This	   code	  was	   introduced	   to	   resolve	  previously	   identified	  ambiguities	   in	   the	  grammar	  
(Basurto	  et	   al.,	   2010),	   and	   allows	   a	   clearer	   distinction	   between	   the	   actor	   and	  what	   the	   actor	   is	  
acting	  upon	  (Siddiki	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  
	  
Table	  4.	  Subcomponents	  if	  the	  IGT	  syntax	  
Subcomponent	   Description	  
Attribute	   individual	  or	  organisation	  to	  which	  it	  applies	  
Deontic	   what	  is	  permitted,	  obliged,	  or	  forbidden	  (e.g.	  will,	  shall,	  shall	  not)	  
aIm	   goal	  or	  action	  to	  which	  D	  refers	  
Condition	   when	  or	  where	  the	  aim	  applies	  
Or	  else	   punitive	  action	  if	  rule	  is	  not	  adhered	  to	  (e.g.	  fine)	  
oBject	   inanimate	  or	  animate	  part	  of	  a	  statement	  that	  receives	  the	  action	  (e.g.	  plan	  or	  policy)	  
Sources:	  Crawford	  and	  Ostrom,	  1995;	  Crawford	  and	  Ostrom,	  2005;	  Basurto	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Siddiki	  et	  al.,	  2011	  
	  
The	   IGT	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   useful	   methodological	   tool,	   although	   it	   has	   only	   been	   used	   in	   a	   few	  
studies.	  To	  determine	  its	  utility	  for	  my	  PhD,	  it	  will	  be	  applied	  to	  a	  selection	  of	  policy	  instrument	  to	  
test	  its	  analytical	  power	  in	  this	  context.	  It	  is	  notable	  that	  although	  the	  IGT	  was	  borne	  out	  of	  the	  IAD	  
framework,	   it	   is	   also	  not	  necessarily	  wedded	   to	   the	   IAD	   framework.	   Siddiki	  et	  al.	   (2011)	   suggest	  
that	   the	   resulting	   data	  may	   be	   analysed	   and	   interpreted	   from	   different	   theoretical	   perspectives	  
and	  frameworks.	  If	  the	  IGT	  proves	  useful	  in	  this	  research,	  the	  data	  will	  be	  used	  both	  to	  describe	  the	  
policy	  instruments	  and	  generate	  questions	  to	  be	  explored	  in	  the	  subsequent	  phases	  of	  research.	  In	  
addition,	   no	   studies	   were	   found	   that	   used	   the	   IGT	   where	   the	   research	   operated	   from	   an	  
interpretivist	  paradigm,	  so	  testing	  the	  tool	  in	  this	  study	  may	  provide	  useful	  insight	  into	  its	  utility	  for	  
interpretive	  researchers.	  
	  
8.2.5	   Incorporating	  Discourse	  
One	   of	   the	   challenges	   of	   institutional	   analysis	   is	   that	   the	   rules,	   norms	   and	   strategies	   (i.e.	  
institutions)	   are	   not	   objects	   that	   can	   be	  measured.	   The	  meaning	   of	   a	   statement	   or	   concept	   can	  
vary	   considerably	  between	  actors,	  even	  as	   they	  are	  parties	   to	   the	   same	  conversation	   (McKeown	  
and	  Thomas,	  1988).	  This	  has	  significant	  implications	  for	  the	  way	  institutions	  shape	  behaviour,	  and	  
understanding	  this	  discourse	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  an	  interpretive	  approach.	  For	  example,	  researchers	  
studying	   environmental	   discourse	  have	   found	   that	   language	  use	  may	   shift	   to	   reflect	   a	   particular	  
paradigm	  (e.g.	  climate	  change	  or	  sustainability),	  even	  though	  the	  substance	  of	  actual	  practices	  may	  
not	   change	   (Fischer,	   2007;	   Frantzeskaki	   et	   al.,	   2010;	   Hajer	   and	  Wagenaar,	   2003;	   Winkel	   et	   al.,	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2011).	   In	   my	   PhD,	   it	   will	   be	   important	   to	   understand	   not	   only	   whether	   or	   not	   terms	   such	   as	  
landscape	   scale	   and	   climate	   change	   are	   part	   of	   institutional	   statements,	   but	   also	   how	   actors	  
interpret	  these	  challenges	  and	  their	  implications	  for	  biodiversity	  conservation.	  
	  
My	  PhD	  adopts	  the	  perspective	  that	  rational	  choice	  institutionalism	  not	  only	  neglects	  these	  sorts	  of	  
discourses,	   but	   it	   also	   provides	   an	   inadequate	   account	   of	   change.	   It	   turns	   to	   discursive	  
institutionalism	  to	  fill	  that	  gap	  (Section	  1.3).	  Schmidt	  (2011)	  contends	  that	  discourse	  is	  the	  key	  to	  
understanding	   the	   dynamics	   of	   institutional	   change.	   Discursive	   institutionalism	   focuses	   on	   the	  
substance	   of	   ideas	   and	   how	   they	   are	   developed	   and	   conveyed	   by	   actors	   through	   discursive	  
interactions	   that	   inform	   policy-­‐oriented	   actions.	   This	   discursive	   process	   can	   alter	   (or	   maintain)	  
institutions:	  “Speaking	  of	  change,	   in	  other	  words,	  rather	  than	   just	  thinking	   it,	   is	  key	  to	  explaining	  
the	   actions	   that	   lead	   to	   major	   policy	   transformations”	   (Schmidt,	   2011;	   p.	   107).	   A	   discursive	  
framework	   directs	   attention	   to	   narratives,	   frames	   and	   frames	   of	   reference,	   discursive	   fields	   of	  
ideas,	   argumentative	   practices,	   story-­‐telling,	   and	   collective	   memories,	   among	   other	   ideas.	   The	  
agents	  involved	  in	  discourse	  are	  important,	  but	  so	  is	  the	  institutional	  context,	  which	  is	  where	  the	  
discourse	   takes	  place	  and	  also	  a	  point	  of	  origin	   for	   ideas	  and	   the	  content	  of	  discourse	   (Schmidt,	  
2011).	  	  
	  
My	  PhD	  will	   incorporate	  elements	  of	  this	  perspective	  into	  the	  diagnostic	  framework	  by	  reviewing	  
the	  discursive	   institutionalist	   literature	  to	   identify	   factors	  that	  can	  be	  explored	   in	   interviews	  with	  
actors.	   In	  addition,	  the	  focus	  on	  the	  strategies	  of	  change	  agents	  (e.g.	   institutional	  entrepreneurs)	  
will	   also	   require	   examination	   of	   discourse	   and	   ideas	   held	   by	   these	   agents	   (Section	   4).	   Finally,	  
interview	  data	  will	  be	  analysed	  using	  Q	  methodology	  to	  identify	  discourse	  coalitions.	  The	  concept	  
of	  discourse	  coalitions	  and	  the	  basic	  principles	  of	  Q	  methodology	  are	  described	  below.	  
	  
Discourse	  Coalitions	  
The	  ACF	   (Sabatier,	   1988;	   Sabatier	   and	   Jenkins-­‐Smith,	   1993)	   is	   a	   theoretical	   framework	   that,	   to	  a	  
certain	   extent,	   spans	   the	  divide	  between	  RC	   institutionalism	  and	  discursive	   institutionalism.	   Like	  
the	   IAD,	   it	   adopts	   a	   bounded	   rationality	   view	   of	   the	   actor	   and	   is	   neo-­‐positivist	   in	   origin.	   At	   the	  
same	   time,	   it	   incorporates	   discursive	   elements	   and	   in	   recent	   years	   it	   has	   even	   spurred	  
development	  of	  a	  related	  framework	  known	  as	  the	  Narrative	  Policy	  Framework,	  which	  is	  unique	  in	  
offering	  a	  neo-­‐positivist,	  quantitative	  approach	  to	  studying	  how	  narrative	  intersects	  with	  the	  ACF	  
(Jones	  and	  McBeth,	  2010;	   Shanahan	  et	  al.,	   2011).	  A	   central	   feature	  of	   the	  ACF	   is	   the	   concept	  of	  
advocacy	   coalitions,	   a	   concept	   that	   was	   discussed	   in	   Section	   4.1.	   Although	   Sabatier	   and	   other	  
researchers	  who	  use	  the	  ACF	  may	  not	  count	  themselves	  among	  discursive	  institutionalists,	  Schmidt	  
(2010)	   contends	   that	   the	   framework	   spans	   the	   divide	   between	   older	   institutionalisms	   and	  
discursive	   institutionalism	  because	   it	   focuses	  on	  the	  role	  of	  these	  coalitions	   in	  the	  formation	  and	  
spread	  of	  policy	  ideas.	  	  
	  
Advocacy	  coalitions	  are	  the	  way	  actors	  are	  aggregated	   in	  the	  primary	  unit	  of	  analysis	   in	  the	  ACF,	  
i.e.	   the	   policy	   subsystem.	   These	   coalitions	   are	   held	   together	   by	   beliefs,	   and	   policy	   designs	   are	  
viewed	  as	  translations	  of	  those	  beliefs	  (Sabatier	  and	  Jenkins-­‐Smith,	  1999;	  Weible	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  The	  
policy	  process	  in	  the	  ACF	  has	  no	  clear	  beginning	  or	  end,	  and	  the	  dynamics	  of	  policy	  are	  a	  results	  of	  
interactions	   between	   advocacy	   coalitions	   (Fischer,	   2003a;	   Sabatier	   and	   Jenkins-­‐Smith,	   1999).	  
Actors	   in	   these	   coalitions	   are	   instrumentally	   rational,	   employing	   strategies	   and	   competing	   with	  
other	  coalitions	  to	  ensure	  their	  coalition	  beliefs	  are	  integrated	  into	  political	  institutions	  (Winkel	  et	  
al.,	   2011).	   Three	   lines	   of	   inquiry	   stem	   from	   the	   ACF:	   formation	   and	   maintenance	   of	   coalitions,	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learning,	  and	  policy	  change	  (Weible	  et	  al.	  2011).	  The	  framework	  offers	  a	  set	  of	  hypothesis	  for	  each	  
of	   these	   categories.	   The	   ACF	   is	   used	   widely	   in	   policy	   studies,	   which	   is	   likely	   due	   to	   its	   strong	  
theoretical	   integration.	   It	   brings	   together	   policy	   network	   theory,	   policy	   learning	   theory,	   ideas-­‐
based	  empirical	  research,	  and	  institutional	  rational	  choice	  theory	  alongside	  concepts	  such	  as	  policy	  
communities	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  correlates	  of	  policy	  outcomes	  (Fischer,	  2003a).	  	  
	  
There	  are	  several	  barriers	  to	  using	  the	  ACF	   in	  my	  PhD.	  Although	  the	  framework	  provides	  a	  much	  
more	  dynamic	  account	  of	  change	  than	  the	  IAD	  and	  PIASES	  frameworks,	  but	  it	  does	  so	  over	  a	  long	  
time	   scale.	   The	   ACF	   will	   not	   be	   used	   in	   this	   research,	   primarily	   because	   the	   study	   of	   advocacy	  
coalitions	  should	  be	  done	  over	  fairly	   long	  periods	  and	  would	  require	  a	  retrospective	  focus	  rather	  
than	  a	  contemporary	  one.	  The	  framework	  is	  predicated	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  advocacy	  coalitions	  are	  
stable	   over	   time,	   and	   it	   directs	   researchers	   to	   take	   a	   time	   perspective	   of	   at	   least	   a	   decade	   to	  
understand	  policy	  change	   (Weible	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  Although	  some	  researchers	  adopt	  a	  shorter	   time	  
perspective,	  in	  order	  for	  the	  ACF	  hypotheses,	  the	  vintage	  test	  of	  ten	  years	  is	  required	  to	  ensure	  the	  
subsystem	  is	  mature	  (Weible	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  Another	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  applicability	  and	  limitations	  
of	   the	   frameworks	   in	   other	   political	   systems	   has	   been	   questioned.	   Although	   it	   has	   been	   used	  
successfully	  in	  some	  studies	  outside	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  it	  is	  most	  robust	  in	  the	  American	  political	  
system	  (Dudley	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  Weible	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  If	  the	  ACF	  is	  used	  at	  all	  in	  my	  PhD,	  it	  will	  likely	  only	  
be	  to	  aid	  in	  understanding	  policy	  learning	  across	  discourse	  coalitions.	  	  
	  
The	  concept	  of	  discourse	  coalitions	  is	  attributed	  to	  Hajer	  (1993),	  who	  contends	  the	  ACF	  is	  too	  thin	  
analytically	  to	  account	  for	  the	  dynamics	  of	  change.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  ACF,	  Hajer	  (2003)	  describes	  
his	   discourse	   coalitions	   as	   “communities	   of	   interpretation”	   organised	   around	   shared	   “identity	  
stories”	  rather	  than	  shared	  beliefs.	  These	  narrative	  storylines	  not	  only	  hold	  coalitions	  together,	  but	  
they	   are	   the	   lens	   through	   which	   events	   and	   courses	   of	   action	   are	   interpreted.	   This	   does	   not	  
exclude	  beliefs,	  rather	  the	  idea	  is	  that	  storylines	  essentially	  condense	  the	  facts	  and	  values	  basic	  to	  
the	   coalition’s	   belief	   system	   (Fischer,	   2003a).	   This	   is	   not	   unlike	   the	   cultural	   cognition	   processes	  
discussed	   earlier	   (Section	   4.1),	   in	   which	   people	   filter	   new	   information	   through	   their	   existing	  
attitudes	   and	   cultural	   identities.	   Discourse	   coalitions	   form	   part	   of	   his	   Argumentative	   Discourse	  
Analysis	  (ADA)	  framework,	  in	  which	  argumentative	  disputes	  between	  discourse	  coalitions	  drive	  the	  
policy	   process,	   with	   coalitions	   competing	   to	   have	   their	   rival	   discursive	   concepts	   integrated	   into	  
public	  policy	  (Winkel	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	  
	  
The	  concept	  of	  discourse	  coalitions	   is	  not	  entirely	  different	   than	   the	  advocacy	  coalition	  concept,	  
and	   both	   concepts	   have	   been	   used	   frequently	   to	   understand	   discourse	   in	   the	   realm	   of	  
environmental	   policy	   disputes.17	   There	   are,	   however,	   several	   key	   differences	   between	   advocacy	  
coalitions	   and	   discourse	   coalitions.	   The	   glue	   holding	   the	   coalitions	   together	   (beliefs	   versus	  
storylines)	  is	  chief	  among	  these	  differences.	  Many	  of	  the	  other	  differences	  are	  related	  to	  the	  neo-­‐
positivist	   approach	   adopted	   in	   the	  ACF	   and	   the	   interpretive	   approach	   of	   the	  ADA.	   For	   example,	  
their	   account	   of	   change	   is	   different.	   In	   the	   ACF,	   policy	   change	   occurs	   if	   a	   coalition	   succeeds	   in	  
integrating	   its	   belief	   into	   institutions	   that	   previously	   represented	  opposite	  belief	   systems.	   In	   the	  
ADA,	   change	   occurs	   through	   interactive	   discourse.	   A	   new	   discourse	   becomes	   dominant	  when	   it	  
becomes	  a	  part	  of	  many	  actors’	  view	  of	  the	  world	  and	  if	  it	  becomes	  integrated	  into	  institutions	  and	  
organisational	  practices	  (Winkel	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Wikel	  et	  al.	  (2011),	  for	  example,	  combined	  the	  two	  concepts	  to	  explain	  discourses	  in	  the	  area	  of	  forest	  management	  
and	  climate	  change.	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The	  neo-­‐positivist	  approach	  adopted	  in	  the	  ACF	  also	  requires	  a	  number	  of	  simplifications,	  such	  as	  
removing	  statements	  from	  their	  context	  for	  analysis	  and	  treating	  coalitions	  as	  stable,	  unitary	  actors	  
and	  neglecting	  disputes	  within	  coalitions.	  As	  a	   result,	   the	   framework	  performs	  well	   in	  describing	  
aspects	  of	  policy	  change,	  but	  not	   the	  how	  or	  why.	  The	  material	   that	   is	   removed	   from	  the	  ACF	   is	  
explored	  in	  the	  ADA	  because	  it	  is	  viewed	  as	  the	  key	  to	  understanding	  how	  and	  why	  policy	  change	  
occurs	  (Fischer,	  2003a).	  Although	  the	  approach	  outlined	  in	  the	  ADA	  acknowledges	  that	  statements	  
can	  be	  analysed	  empirically,	  it	  focuses	  on	  the	  use	  of	  the	  qualitative	  method	  of	  discourse	  analysis.	  
My	   PhD	   adopts	   a	   slightly	   different	   approach,	   using	  Q	  methodology	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   bridge	   the	  
qualitative-­‐quantitative	  divide.	  	  
Q	  Methodology	  
As	  part	  of	  my	  PhD,	   several	   dozen	  actors	  will	   be	   interviewed	   to	  understand	  how	   institutions	   and	  
actors	   constrain	   or	   enable	   biodiversity	   conservation.	   In	   addition	   to	   analysing	   these	   interviews	  
qualitatively,	  Q	  methodology	  will	  be	  used	  to	  study	  these	  policy-­‐relevant	  discourses	  and	  to	  identify	  
discourse	  coalitions.	  Q-­‐technique	  and	  its	  methodology	  has	  its	  origins	  in	  psychology	  and	  is	  generally	  
attributed	   to	   a	   paper	   by	   Stephenson	   in	   the	   1930s,	   followed	   by	   a	   book	   (Stephenson,	   1953).	   Q	  
methodology	   provides	   an	   inductive	   yet	   systematic	  way	   to	   study	   individual	   subjectivity	   by	   asking	  
participants	  to	  rank	  a	  series	  of	  statements	   from	  their	  own	  point	  of	  view	  (McKeown	  and	  Thomas,	  
1988).	  The	  technique	  is	  useful	  for	  those	  seeking	  to	  combine	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  methods	  
(Brown,	   1993).	   The	   method	   is	   most	   useful	   when	   respondents	   fully	   understand	   the	   research	  
methodology	   and	   questions	   (Dryzek	   and	   Berejikian,	   1993).	   It	   is	   suitable	   in	   this	   research,	   as	  
participants	   will	   be	   actors	   who	   are	   involved	   in	   biodiversity	   conservation.	   An	   overview	   of	   the	  
methodology	  and	  research	  questions	  will	  be	  provided	  to	  all	  participants.	  	  
	  
The	   method	   involves	   the	   following	   steps	   (Barry	   and	   Proops,	   1999;	   Clark,	   2002;	   Dryzek	   and	  
Berejikian,	  1993;	  Frantzi	  et	  al.,	  2009):	  
• Identify	   a	   theme	   and	   the	   target	   population	   (i.e.	   biodiversity	   governance	   and	   interview	  
participants).	  
• Generate	  a	  series	  of	  opinion	  statements	  from	  those	  made	  by	  the	  stakeholders.	  Statements	  
can	  be	  drawn	  from	  conversations,	  commentary,	  and	  discourse.	  In	  this	  case,	  statements	  will	  
be	  drawn	  from	  interviews.	  
• These	  statements	  are	  then	  reduced	  to	  a	  manageable	  number	  of	  themes	  using	  a	  ‘concourse	  
matrix’	  (36	  statements	  are	  thought	  to	  be	  ideal).	  
• Participants	  score	  these	  statements	  by	  how	  strongly	  they	  agree	  or	  disagree	  with	  them.	  The	  
technique	  assumes	  that	  context	  is	  important,	  thus	  participants	  are	  asked	  to	  consider	  how	  
their	  preferences	  relate	  to	  each	  other.	  
• Statistical	  analysis	  (correlations	  and	  factor	  analysis)	  to	  identify	  factors.	  
• Interpret	  the	  factors	  to	  examine	  the	  discourses	  revealed	  in	  the	  data.	  
	  
The	  benefit	  of	   this	  method	   is	   that	   it	  does	  not	  require	  a	   large	  sample	  size	  to	  get	  statistically	  valid	  
results,	  thus	   it	   is	  useful	  for	  small-­‐n	  datasets	  (Dryzek	  and	  Berejikian,	  1993).	   It	   is	  also	  cost	  effective	  
and	   does	   not	   require	   specialist	   computer	   programs	   for	   analysing	   large	   data	   sets	   (Brown,	   1993;	  
Frantzi	   et	   al.,	   2009;	  McKeown	  and	  Thomas,	  1988).	   Perhaps	   its	  most	  unique	   characteristic	   is	   that	  
statements	   are	   drawn	   directly	   from	   participants,	   yet	   it	   still	   allows	   statistical	   analysis	   (Barry	   and	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Proops,	  1999).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Q	  methodology	  is	  limited	  in	  several	  
respects.	   It	  measures	  subjectivity,	  thus	   it	   is	  not	  a	  technique	  to	  find	  the	  ‘right’	  or	   ‘wrong’	  answers	  
(or	   factors)	   (Brown,	   1993).	   This	   also	  means	   it	   is	   not	   a	   statistically	   representative	   sample	   of	   the	  
entire	  population,	  thus	  it	  does	  not	  indicate	  what	  proportion	  of	  the	  larger	  population	  subscribes	  to	  
each	  discourse	  (Dryzek	  and	  Berejikian,	  1993).	  It	  is	  also	  time	  intensive	  for	  the	  researcher	  (Barry	  and	  
Proops,	  1999).	  Open	  source	  software	  (PQMethod)	  is	  now	  available	  to	  assist	  in	  this	  regard	  and	  will	  
be	  employed	  in	  this	  study.	  	  
Governmentality	  
The	  concept	  of	  governmentality	  will	  also	  be	  considered	  as	  means	  to	  incorporate	  political	  discourse	  
into	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  study.	  In	  its	  most	  general	  conception,	  governmentality	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  
the	  mentality	  of	  government,	   i.e.	  how	  we	  think	  about	  government	   (Dean,	  1999).	  The	  concept	  of	  
governmentality	  forms	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  useful	   framework	  for	  researchers	   interested	   in	  the	   ‘how’	  of	  
governing.	  This	  framework	  offers	  a	  means	  of	  “investigating	  the	  surfaces	  of	  emergence	  of	  political	  
discourse	  and	  action”	  (Dean,	  1999,	  p.	  198).	  The	  foundations	  of	  governmentality	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  a	  
lecture	  by	  Michel	  Foucault	   in	  the	  late	  1970s,	  but	   it	   is	  a	  concept	  that	  has	  had	  significant	   influence	  
even	   outside	   of	   Foucauldian	   schools	   of	   thought.	   It	   is	   in	   line	   with	   the	   contemporary	   focus	   on	  
governance,	   as	   it	   emphasises	   that	   the	   job	   of	   “government”	   is	   carried	   out	   at	  many	   levels	   and	   at	  
many	  sites.	  The	   framework	   is	  a	   response	   to	  neo-­‐liberalism,	  which	  Foucault	  argued	  had	  obscured	  
the	  fact	  that	  governance	  is	  conducted	  in	  the	  plural,	  not	  just	  by	  the	  state	  (Dean,	  1999).	  Like	  the	  new	  
governance	   literature,	   governmentality	  adopts	  a	  broader	  meaning	  of	   government,	   to	  one	   that	   is	  
beyond	   the	   state	   and	   includes	   a	   plurality	   of	   agencies,	   authorities,	   aspects	   of	   behaviour,	   norms,	  
purposes,	  effects,	  and	  outcomes	   (Dean,	  1999).	  This	  broad	  view	  of	   the	  notion	  of	  government	  has	  
important	  implications	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  governance.	  	  
	  
Analyses	   based	   on	   the	   governmentality	   framework	   are	   thus	   concerned	   with	   “the	   means	   of	  
calculation,	  both	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative,	  the	  type	  of	  governing	  authority	  or	  agency,	  the	  forms	  
of	   knowledge,	   techniques	   and	   other	  means	   employed,	   the	   entity	   to	   be	   governed	   and	   how	   it	   is	  
conceived,	  the	  ends	  sought	  and	  the	  outcomes	  and	  consequences”	  (Dean,	  1999,	  p.	  11).	  Governance	  
is	   seen	   as	   a	   rational	   activity,	   but	   the	   meaning	   of	   rational	   here	   is	   different	   than	   that	   used	   by	  
economists.	   Rather,	   rational	   here	   simply	   means	   that	   the	   thinking	   employed	   involves	   making	  
calculations,	   is	   relatively	   clear	   and	   systematic,	   employs	   knowledge,	   and	   purposeful	   (i.e.	   defines	  
how	  things	  are	  or	  how	  they	  ought	  to	  be)	   (Dean,	  1999).	  Rationality	   is	  described	   in	  many	  different	  
ways	   in	   the	   literature,	   and	   this	   type	   of	   rationality	   is	   more	   consistent	   with	   an	   interpretivist	  
perspective	  than	  the	  model	  of	  bounded	  rationality	  discussed	  earlier.	  	  
	  
As	   a	   framework	   governmentality	   is	  most	   useful	   for	   answering	   “how”	   questions.	   The	   framework	  
draws	   attention	   to	   the	   conditions	   under	   which	   governance	   regimes	   emerge,	   operate,	   and	  
transform,	   focusing	   on	   how	   we	   govern	   and	   how	   we	   are	   governed.	   Dean	   (1999)	   identifies	   four	  
interrelated	   dimensions	   of	   a	   governmentality	   analysis,	   visibilities,	   knowledge,	   techniques	   and	  
practices,	  and	  identities,	  which	  he	  describes	  as	  follows	  (Dean,	  1999,	  p.	  23):	  
1. Characteristic	  forms	  of	  visibility,	  ways	  of	  seeing	  and	  perceiving.	  	  
2. Distinctive	   ways	   of	   thinking	   and	   questioning,	   relying	   on	   definite	   vocabularies	   and	  
procedures	  for	  the	  production	  of	  truth	  (e.g.	  those	  derived	  from	  the	  social,	  human	  and	  
behavioural	  sciences)	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3. Specific	   ways	   of	   acting,	   intervening	   and	   directing,	   made	   up	   of	   particular	   types	   of	  
practical	   rationality	   (‘expertise’	   and	   ‘know-­‐how’),	   and	   relying	   upon	   definite	  
mechanisms,	  techniques	  and	  technologies.	  
4. Characteristic	  ways	  of	  forming	  subjects,	  selves,	  persons,	  actors	  or	  agents.	  	  	  
The	  governmentality	   framework	  emphasises	  power	  and	  ethics,	  distinguishing	   it	   from	  the	  rational	  
choice	  approaches	  discussed	  earlier,	  which	  emphasised	  well-­‐ordered	  preferences	  and	  cost	  versus	  
benefit	   calculations.	   However,	   governmentality	   has	   faced	   similar	   challenges	   to	   the	   frameworks	  
discussed	  previously,	  as	  the	  development	  of	  a	  generalised	  theory	  has	  been	  challenging.	  Although	  a	  
large	   body	   of	   case	   studies	   exist,	   attempts	   to	   synthesis	   the	   framework	   into	   a	   generalised	   theory	  
have	  been	  unsuccessful	   (Dean,	  1999).	  Some	  have	  also	  criticised	  the	   framework	  as	  an	  attempt	  by	  
Foucault	   to	   employ	   his	   theory	   of	   government	   processes	   at	   the	   micro	   scale	   to	   a	   macro	   scale	  
(Kendall	   and	  Wickham,	   2004).	   Kendall	   and	  Wickham	   (2004)	   contend	   that	   this	   approach	   can	   be	  
applied	   at	   any	   scale	   of	   government,	   from	   the	   individual	   level	   (governance	   of	   the	   self)	   to	   the	  
national	  state.	  They	  therefore	  refer	  to	  the	  approach	  as	  “…a	  kind	  of	  meta-­‐analysis.	  It	  is	  not	  so	  much	  
a	  way	  of	  doing	  political	  science,	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  philosophical	  intervention	  into	  the	  objects	  of	  political	  
science”	   (p.	   130).	  Viewed	   this	   way,	   governmentality	   does	   not	   fit	   the	   strict	   definition	   of	   meta-­‐
theoretical	  framework	  (Section	  8.2.1).	  
	  
The	  concept,	  then,	  is	  perhaps	  better	  viewed	  not	  as	  a	  tool,	  but	  an	  attitude	  that	  can	  be	  adopted	  to	  
understanding	   the	   mentalities	   and	   rationalities	   of	   governance.	   The	   approach	   can	   be	   used	   in	  
combination	  with	  traditional	  methodologies,	  and	  offers	  the	  researchers	  a	  series	  of	  questions	  to	  be	  
explored	   (Kendall	   and	   Wickham,	   2004).	   The	   governmentality	   framework	   is	   flexible	   and	   open	  
enough	  to	  be	  used	   in	  combination	  with	  the	  other	  tools	   in	  an	   institutional	  analysis.	   It	  provides	  an	  
approach	   to	   understanding	   the	  more	  philosophical	   and	   abstract	   components	   of	   governance	   and	  
could	   lead	   to	   novel	   discoveries	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   governance.	   The	   potential	   utility	   of	   this	  
approach	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  developing	  the	  framework	  for	  my	  PhD.	  
	  
8.3	   Conclusion	  and	  Next	  Steps	  
The	  next	  step	  in	  my	  PhD	  will	  be	  to	  develop	  the	  diagnostic	  framework	  that	  will	  guide	  the	  analysis.	  
Specifically,	   the	   research	   falls	   under	   the	   analytical	   themes	   of	   fit	   and	   design,	   examining	   how	   the	  
current	   institutional	   framework	   fits	   the	   problem	   of	   conserving	   biodiversity	   in	   the	   face	   of	   key	  
drivers	   and	   disturbances	   (e.g.	   climate	   change).	   Along	  with	   the	   literature	   on	   institutional	  misfits,	  
this	   will	   require	   further	   research	   into	   the	   attributes	   of	   the	   problem.	   The	   framework	   will	  
incorporate	   these	  attributes	   along	  with	  elements	  of	   resilience	   thinking,	   the	   IAD	  Framework,	   and	  
discursive	   institutionalism.	  To	  understand	  how	  formal	   institutions	  currently	  describe	  the	  problem	  
of	  biodiversity	  conservation	  and	  prescribe	  solutions,	  the	  relevant	  formal	  laws,	  policies,	  plans,	  and	  
strategies	  will	   be	   reviewed.	  My	  PhD	   seeks	   a	   deeper	   understanding	  of	   how	   institutions	   on	  paper	  
affect	   institutions	   in	   practice.	   This	   will	   require	   examination	   of	   the	   subtler	   characteristics	   of	  
institutional	  arrangements	  through	  interviews	  with	  actors	  involved	  in	  biodiversity	  governance.	  The	  
study	  will	  be	  aided	  by	  the	  literature	  discussed	  throughout	  this	  review,	  with	  further	  review	  focused	  
on	   literature	   in	   the	   areas	   of	   institutional	   change,	   policy	   learning,	   network	   governance,	   and	  
institutional	  entrepreneurship.	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